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Abstract
Scholars of Islamic law point to the absence of any extant work of legal theory between the Risāla of alShāfiʿī and the Fuṣūl of al-Jaṣṣāṣ as a major barrier to reconstructing the history of Islamic legal thought.
However, careful analysis of three major works of the Ḥanafī jurist al-Ṭaḥāwī, Aḥkām al-Qurʾān, Sharḥ
maʿānī al-āthār and Sharḥ mushkil al-āthār, reveals the existence of myriad brief passages elaborating
questions of legal theory scattered throughout their many volumes. This study reconstructs the legal
thought of al-Ṭaḥāwī as a window onto legal theory in the late 3rd/9th and early 4th/10th centuries, a
crucial period of transformation between late formative and post-formative Islamic law. It argues that alṬaḥāwī’s works are not direct precursors to the genre of uṣūl al-fiqh, but instead represent a different,
previously unrecognized, type of intellectual and literary activity. This activity, here termed practical
hermeneutics, is concerned with demonstrating in detail how individually coherent rules of law may be
derived from the often messy texts of revelation. The integrated reading of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s entire
hermeneutical corpus uncovers several areas in which his legal thought departs quite notably from that of
other jurists, suggesting that al-Ṭaḥāwī was neither as dependent on al-Shāfiʿī nor as closely related to
mature uṣūl al-fiqh as has been suggested in previous studies. Most crucially, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works unsettle
accepted accounts of Islamic legal theory which assign varying levels of authority to a series of clearly
distinguished legal sources—Qurʾān, Sunna, consensus, etc. This study demonstrates that, in contrast to
both al-Shāfiʿī and later uṣūlīs, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought blurs boundaries between these categories and
instead rests upon an underlying binary concept of legal authority which draws a crucial distinction
between knowledge that might permissibly be reached by inference, and knowledge that can only have
come from revelation. The authority that al-Ṭaḥāwī grants any given source is therefore not a function of
its formal characteristics, but rather the result of his own judgment about content and origins.
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ABSTRACT

FROM TEXT TO LAW: ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORY AND THE PRACTICAL
HERMENEUTICS OF ABŪ JAʿFAR AḤMAD AL-ṬAḤĀWĪ (D. 321/933)
Carolyn Anne Brunelle
Joseph E. Lowry

Scholars of Islamic law point to the absence of any extant work of legal theory between
the Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī and the Fuṣūl of al-Jaṣṣāṣ as a major barrier to reconstructing the
history of Islamic legal thought. However, careful analysis of three major works of the
Ḥanafī jurist al-Ṭaḥāwī,

ā al-Qurʾān, Shar

aʿānī al-āthār and Shar mushkil al-

āthār, reveals the existence of myriad brief passages elaborating questions of legal theory
scattered throughout their many volumes. This study reconstructs the legal thought of alṬaḥāwī as a window onto legal theory in the late 3rd/9th and early 4th/10th centuries, a
crucial period of transformation between late formative and post-formative Islamic law. It
argues that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works are not direct precursors to the genre of uṣūl al-fiqh, but
instead represent a different, previously unrecognized, type of intellectual and literary
activity. This activity, here termed practical hermeneutics, is concerned with
demonstrating in detail how individually coherent rules of law may be derived from the
often messy texts of revelation. The integrated reading of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s entire
hermeneutical corpus uncovers several areas in which his legal thought departs quite
notably from that of other jurists, suggesting that al-Ṭaḥāwī was neither as dependent on
al-Shāfiʿī nor as closely related to mature uṣūl al-fiqh as has been suggested in previous
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studies. Most crucially, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works unsettle accepted accounts of Islamic legal
theory which assign varying levels of authority to a series of clearly distinguished legal
sources—Qurʾān, Sunna, consensus, etc. This study demonstrates that, in contrast to both
al-Shāfiʿī and later uṣūlīs, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought blurs boundaries between these
categories and instead rests upon an underlying binary concept of legal authority which
draws a crucial distinction between knowledge that might permissibly be reached by
inference, and knowledge that can only have come from revelation. The authority that alṬaḥāwī grants any given source is therefore not a function of its formal characteristics,
but rather the result of his own judgment about content and origins.
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1
Introduction

Background and Objectives
By the middle of the 4th/10th century, Muslim jurists who engaged in theorizing
about the divine law were composing systematic texts of legal theory in the genre of uṣūl
al-fiqh (lit., “the bases of law”). Works of the uṣūl al-fiqh genre identify the sources of
the law, argue for a theory of textual interpretation permitting the law to be derived from
its sources, and establish the theological, epistemological, linguistic and, at a later period,
logical presuppositions on which those theories of interpretation and derivation rest.1 The
earliest extant uṣūl work, al-Fuṣūl fī al-uṣūl by the Ḥanafī al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980-981),
already displays the characteristic literary form and array of topics of the mature genre.2
The maturity of al-Fuṣūl suggests that it represents the culmination of a process of
development whose earlier stages are largely unknown, although some evidence for this
development is available in the form of passages from early theory works preserved in
later uṣūl texts. One possible approach to studying Islamic legal theory in the period

1

Discussions of formal Aristotelian logic do not begin to appear in works of uṣūl until the Mustaṣfā of alGhazālī (d. 505/1111). See Wael Hallaq, “Logic, Formal Arguments and the Formalization of Arguments
in Sunnī Jurisprudence,” Arabica 37, no. 3 (1990): 1-5.
2
Earlier works entitled “Uṣūl” are either unrelated to legal theory or are interested in questions of theory
without yet belonging to the genre of uṣūl al-fiqh. Although Norman Calder and Wael Hallaq have cited
Uṣūl al-Shāshī as a work in the genre of uṣūl al-fiqh predating the Fuṣūl of al-Jaṣṣāṣ..Murteza Bedir has
shown that it has been incorrectly attributed to two different 4 th/10th-century jurists named al-Shāshī, and is
in fact the work of the 7th/13th-century Niẓām al-Dīn al-Shāshī (Murteza Bedir, “The Problem of Uṣūl alShāshī,” Islamic Studies 42, no. 3 (2003): 417; Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An
Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl al-fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 33; The Encyclopaedia
of Islam, New Edition, s.v. “Fiḳh,” by Norman Calder).
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before al-Jaṣṣāṣ is thus to attempt to reconstruct the earliest works of the uṣūl genre by
identifying these surviving passages.3
Other studies of early Islamic legal theory focus instead on the activity of
theorizing about the law, in whatever form that theorizing might take. Only a single work
explicitly devoted to legal theory has been preserved from the formative period. That
work, the well-studied Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820), shares with the mature uṣūl
tradition the goal of giving a complete account of the structure and derivation of the
divine law, although its literary form and theological concerns are otherwise quite
different from those of the uṣūl genre.4 Other extant texts before al-Jaṣṣāṣ are not
primarily motivated by or structured around questions of legal theory.5 Nonetheless,
many non-theory oriented works are important sources for the study of early Islamic legal
theory, either because they employ hermeneutical techniques in ways that allow
researchers to reconstruct the theory behind them, or because they contain occasional

3

Devin Stewart is a major advocate of this approach. To date, he has worked to reconstruct the Wuṣūl ilā
aʿrifat al-uṣūl of Muḥammad ibn Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī (d. 294/909) and the Bayān ʿan uṣūl al-a ā of
Muḥammad ibn Jarīr al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) (“Muḥammad b. Dāʾūd al-Ẓāhirī’s Manual of Jurisprudence,
al-Wuṣūl ilā aʿrifat al-uṣūl,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002),
100-101; Stewart, “Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s al-Bayān ʿan uṣūl al-a ā and the Genre of Uṣūl alfiqh in Ninth-Century Baghdad,” in ʿ bbāsid Studies, ed. James Montgomery (Leeuven: Peeters, 2004),
321-349.
4
Joseph Lowry has argued that al-Shāfiʿī cannot, in fact, be considered the founder of the uṣūl al-fiqh
tradition as earlier scholars such as Joseph Schacht and John Burton have assumed. See Joseph Lowry,
Early Islamic Legal Theory: The Risāla of Mu ammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 1, 360361; Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 1;
John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 12-15.
5
By ‘legal theory,’ I intend to signal all questions regarding the origins, justification for and force of a
body of laws as well as the institutions and interrelationships between the laws that make up a particular
legal system.
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explicit discussions of legal theory.6 To date, a number of articles have analyzed aspects
of the legal theory of early jurists based on their non-theory oriented writings.7
This study similarly employs the explicitly theoretical passages contained in nontheory oriented texts to shed light on legal theory during the late 3rd/9th and early 4th/10th
centuries, a critical transitional period in the history of Islamic law during which uṣūl alfiqh and the madhhabs (schools of legal thought) were both maturing. Specifically, I
examine the legal thought of Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 321/933), a major
Egyptian Ḥanafī jurist, traditionist and theologian, many of whose works have been
preserved and edited. Where this study departs from earlier studies of the type referred to
above is in its depth and comprehensiveness. While most studies seeking to reconstruct

6

I employ the term ‘non-theory oriented works’ to point to texts whose literary form is not primarily
structured around questions of legal theory, even though some (like the works of al-Ṭaḥāwī analyzed in this
study) can be considered works of theory in the sense that they treat questions of legal sources or textual
hermeneutics in the course of their arguments. I make the distinction between theory-oriented and nontheory oriented works in order to highlight the way in which historians of Islamic law have generally
privileged theory-oriented works in their narratives of Islamic legal theory.
7
Studies taking this approach to studying early Islamic legal theory include Zafar Ishaq Ansari, “Islamic
Juristic Terminology before Šāfi‘ī: A Semantic Analysis with Special Reference to Kūfa,” Arabica 19, no.
3 (1972): 255-300; Murteza Bedir, “An Early Response to Shāfiʿī: ʿĪsā b. Abān on the Prophetic Report
(Khabar),” Islamic Law and Society 9, no. 3 (2002): 285-311; Jonathan Brockopp, “Competing Theories of
Authority in Early Mālikī Texts,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill,
2002), 3-22; Joseph Lowry, “Ibn Qutayba: The Earliest Witness to al-Shāfiʿī and His Legal Doctrines,” in
ʿ bbāsid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of ʿ bbāsid Studies, ed. James Montgomery (Leeuven:
Peeters, 2004), 303-319; Lowry, “The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba: A
Reconsideration,” Islamic Law and Society 11, no. 1 (2004): 1-41; Lowry, “The Reception of al-Shāfiʿī’s
Concept of Amr and Nahy in the Thought of His Student al-Muzanī,” in Law and Education in Medieval
Islam: Studies in Memory of George Makdisi, ed. Joseph Lowry, Devin Stewart and Shawkat Toorawa
(Cambridge: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 2004), 128-149; Lowry, “The First Islamic Legal Theory: Ibn
al-Muqaffaʿ on Interpretation, Authority, and the Structure of the Law,” Journal of the American Oriental
Society 128, no. 1 (2008): 25-40; Scott Lucas, “The Legal Principles of Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī
and Their Relationship to Classical Salafī Islam,” Islamic Law and Society 13, no. 3 (2006): 289-324;
Christopher Melchert, “Qurʾānic Abrogation across the Ninth Century: Shāfiʿī, Abū ʿUbayd, Muḥāsibī, and
Ibn Qutaybah,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 75-98;
Melchert, “Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law,” Islamic Law and Society 8, no. 3
(2001): 383-406; Ya’akov Meron, “The Development of Legal Thought in Ḥanafī Texts,” Studia Islamica
30 (1969): 73-118; Sahiron Syamsuddin, “Abū Ḥanīfah’s Use of the Solitary Ḥadīth as a Source of Islamic
Law,” Islamic Studies 40, no. 2 (2001): 257-272.
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early legal theory from non-theoretical texts inquire only into specific topics,8 this study
surveys and analyzes al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory as a whole as expressed across three major
extant works,9

ā al-Qurʾān (Legal Rulings of the Qurʾān), Shar

aʿānī al-āthār

(An Elucidation of the Meaning of Reports) and Shar mushkil al-āthār (An Elucidation
of Problematic Reports), each of which contains numerous, if brief, discussions of
theoretical topics.10
The conclusions that this approach produces differ substantially from those
reached by earlier, preliminary analyses of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought. Previous studies
have generally relied on the very brief theoretical introductions to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works or
on a necessarily limited selection of chapters within his many extant texts. While no
independent article or book has yet been published on al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory, the most
frequent arguments concerning him are that he brought a ‘Shāfiʿī’ attitude toward adīth
and legal hermeneutics to the Ḥanafī school, and that he was the jurist most responsible
for the initial effort to justify Ḥanafī law through Prophetic adīths.11 While strongly
8

Several of the articles cited above very usefully survey the entire known legal theory of particular jurists
of the formative period; however, none are in-depth studies.
9
I am mindful of the dangers of reconstructing a general theory from context-specific texts, and in
consequence I have not attempted to impose any structure or draw any connections between different
aspects of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought except where he himself suggests such a structure or connection.
Nonetheless, the great majority of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s statements on questions of theory appear repeatedly across
his works, suggesting that they constitute a separable body of thought, even if not a highly organized theory
such as that described by al-Shāfiʿī in the Risāla.
10
Al-Ṭaḥāwī,
ā al-Qurʾān al- arī , ed. Saʿd al-Dīn Ūnāl (Istanbul: T rkiye Diyanet akf , sl m
Ara t rmalar Merkezi, 1995-1998); al-Ṭaḥāwī, Shar aʿānī al-āthār, ed. Muḥammad Sayyid Jād alḤaqq, Muḥammad Zuhrī al-Najjār and Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub,
1994); al-Ṭaḥāwī, Shar mushkil al-āthār, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1994).
While al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other legal works, including Mukhtaṣar I htilāf al-ʿula āʾ (Disagreements of the
Jurists), al-Shurūṭ al- abīr (Comprehensive Contract Formulary), al-Shurūṭ al-ṣaghīr (Concise Contract
Formulary), and al-Mukhtaṣar fī al-fiqh (Concise Manual of Positive Law), sometimes mention legal
sources or hermeneutical techniques in the course of justifying a rule of positive law, no attempt is made to
explain or elaborate upon them.
11
Specific arguments made in earlier studies regarding al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory will be treated in the
relevant chapters of this study. Studies making one or both of the arguments above include Norman Calder,
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affirming al-Ṭaḥāwī’s importance in fitting out Ḥanafī law with a basis in adīth,12 this
study transforms our understanding of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory—and, by extension, the
legal field of the late 3rd/9th and early 4th/10th centuries—by moving beyond labeling the
‘Shāfiʿī’ and ‘Ḥanafī’ elements of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought to argue that his theory of the
structure of the law was distinct from those of both al-Shāfiʿī and the later Ḥanafī legal
theorists, although it had important ties to both. That this work has not been done until
now is doubtless due at least in part to the difficulty of locating isolated theoretical
discussions scattered across many volumes. Nonetheless, a number of the most important
features of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought become visible only when far-flung passages of
multiple works are put into dialogue with each other.
In particular, my analysis challenges a narrative of Islamic legal history which
holds that the exclusive identification of Prophetic authority with Prophetic adīth—one
of the most important arguments in the Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī—was settled by the late 3rd/9th
century. Instead, I argue, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s continued appeal to a wide spectrum of legal
sources that he understands to represent Prophetic authority suggests that we need a more
complex model for thinking about the intricate relationship between Prophetic authority,
Prophetic practice and Prophetic text. Further, while the mature uṣūl tradition would posit
Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 66; Melchert, “TraditionistJurisprudents,” 397-398; Aisha Musa, Ḥadīth as Scripture: Discussions on the Authority of Prophetic
Traditions in Islam (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 70; David Vishanoff, The Formation of
Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law (Ann Arbor: American
Oriental Society, 2010), 214; Ahmed El Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law: A Social and
Intellectual History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 205; Behnam Sadeghi, The Logic of
Law Making in Islam: Women and Prayer in the Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013), 131n12. The primary exception to this trend is found in ʿAbd Allāh Nadhīr Aḥmad’s bū Jaʿfar alṬa āwī, which seeks to portray al-Ṭaḥāwī as closely aligned with the Ḥanafī school by describing him as
following Ḥanafī principles of legal theory almost exclusively ( bū Jaʿfar al-Ṭa āwī: al-i ā almu addith al-faqīh (239 H-321 H) (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 1991), 179.
12
In this study, I employ ‘ adīth’ to signify both individual prophetic reports and the wider genre.

6
a hierarchy of legal authority based upon the literary form of legal sources—Qurʾānic
verses, Prophetic adīths, juristic consensus and analogical reasoning as well as other,
more minor sources—al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of legal authority rests instead upon an
underlying binary division of all Prophetic and post-Prophetic statements of the law into
those which individuals might permissibly have arrived at by employing legal reasoning,
and those which can only have been the result of revelatory instruction. Where al-Ṭaḥāwī
understands a certain post-Prophetic adīth or instance of consensus to represent
revelatory instruction, he holds its authority sufficient to challenge and often override that
of established Prophetic adīths. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s vision of the structure of the law, then,
transcends traditional hierarchies and categories of legal sources in order to assert a
system of legal authority based not on form, but instead on judgments about content and
origins.
What emerges from this study’s work of reconstruction, then, is a portrait of a
jurist whose legal thought differs in important ways from the uṣūl al-fiqh tradition that
would mature perhaps within half a century of his death. That some of the more
surprising features of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought have been overlooked or smoothed away in
studies seeking to place him within a historical trajectory of the development of legal
thought is testament to the urgent and ongoing need for in-depth studies of the legal
thought of individual jurists, a type of work that has become too rare in our field. Where
monographs do exist, they investigate jurists of the post-formative period, with the
exception of several studies on al-Shāfiʿī. 13 Existing studies also often draw primarily on

13

G rard Lecomte’s study of Ibn Qutayba presents a comprehensive sketch of an ʿAbbāsid intellectual,
including Ibn Qutayba’s activities as a jurist, but does not go into great detail concerning his legal thought
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a single major work rather than a jurist’s larger output. While the overall goals of the
study of Islamic legal theory are rightly to discern ideas and types of development that
transcend any one jurist, we risk glossing over crucial debates and anomalies when we
relegate the investigation of individual jurists to article-length studies. Where the sources
permit them, in-depth studies are particularly needed for jurists of the formative period
like al-Ṭaḥāwī, whose works contain a rich trove of statements on a wide variety of
theoretical topics without yet being organized to allow researchers easy access to specific
topics of interest. One outcome of this study, therefore, is to provide future researchers
with a firmer foundation on which to build arguments about the development of Islamic
legal thought from the late formative into the post-formative periods.

Practical Hermeneutics
This study does not seek to portray al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works as precursors to the
emerging genre of uṣūl al-fiqh or to suggest that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought directly
influenced later debates in uṣūl al-fiqh works. Although al-Ṭaḥāwī considered himself

(Ibn Qutayba (mort en 276/889): l'ho e, son œuvre, ses id es (Damascus: Institut Fran ais de Damas,
1965), 215-273). Joseph Lowry’s Early Islamic Legal Theory analyzes the legal thought of al-Shāfiʿī as
expressed in his Risāla; Ahmed El Shamsy also incorporates other texts by al-Shāfiʿī in his Canonization of
Islamic Law. For post-formative jurists, George Makdisi uses Ibn ʿAqīl (d. 513/1119) as a window onto
5th/11th-century Baghdad in Ibn ʿ qīl et la r surgence de l’islam traditionaliste au XIe siècle, Ve siècle de
l’H gire (Damascus: Institut Fran ais de Damas, 1963). In his magisterial Search for God’s Law, Bernard
Weiss has given a detailed, synchronic exposition of the legal thought of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (d.
631/1233), based primarily upon al-Āmidī’s uṣūl work, al-I ā fī uṣūl al-a ā (Salt Lake City:
University of Utah Press, 2010). Sherman Jackson analyzes certain aspects of the legal thought of al-Qarāfī
(d. 684/1285) in his Islamic Law and the State, although he is primarily interested in the power relationship
between jurists and the state as discussed in al-Qarāfī’s al-I ā fī ta yī al-fatāwā ʿan al-a ā (Leiden:
Brill, 1996). Muhammad Khalid Masud analyzes the Muwāfaqāt of al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388) with a
particular focus on maṣla a in Shāṭibī’s Philosophy of Islamic Law (Islamabad: The Islamic Research
Institute, 1995). For a much later period, Bernard Haykel has analyzed the legal thought of al-Shawkānī (d.
1250/1834) in the context of reform in 18 th-century Yemen in his Revival and Reform in Islam (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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and was considered by his biographers to be a mujtahid, or jurist capable of
independently deriving the law from its sources, he is not said to have written a work of
uṣūl al-fiqh, nor is he reported to have been an uṣūlī (legal theorist).14 The earliest Ḥanafī
uṣūl works do not cite his positions on questions of theory, and later uṣūl works note him
only as a rare Ḥanafī who rejected isti sān (juristic preference).15
Instead, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of legal theory emerge as part of a very different
kind of intellectual activity. Where the uṣūlīs probe complex and even hypothetical
questions of theology, epistemology and linguistics in their quest to elaborate a
comprehensive system of textual interpretation, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s statements on legal theory
appear only when required to support his interpretations of specific revealed texts, with
the exception of the theory-driven introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān. Rather than being

organized by topics of legal theory, his works are structured with the objective of
demonstrating concretely how scholars may interpret revealed texts, individually and in
combination with other legal sources, in order to discover a single, coherent Divine
Message and to produce individually coherent rules. I label this work of demonstration
‘practical hermeneutics.’

14

Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Lisān al-mī ān, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ
al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1995-1996), 1:420; ʿAlī ibn Amr Allāh Qinālīzādah, Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafīya, ed. Muḥyi
Hilāl al-Sarḥān (Baghdad: Dīwān al-Waqf al-Sunnī, 2005), 2.25.
15
In al-Fuṣūl, al-Jaṣṣāṣ mentions his own commentary on al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Mukhtaṣar, but does not otherwise
cite al-Ṭaḥāwī (Uṣūl al-Jaṣṣāṣ al- usa ā al-Fuṣūl fī al-uṣūl, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Tāmir (Beirut:
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 2000), 1.23, 2.40). Ibn Ḥazm names al-Ṭaḥāwī as a Ḥanafī who rejected isti sān
(juristic preference) in al-I ā fī uṣūl al-a ā (ed. Muḥammad Aḥmad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (Cairo: Maktabat
ʿĀṭif, 1978), 2.992), and al-Zarkashī transmits the same claim from Ibn Ḥazm (al-Ba r al-mu īṭ fī uṣūl alfiqh, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAbd Allāh al-ʿĀnī and ʿUmar Sulaymān al-Ashqar (Kuwait: Wizārat al-Awqāf wal-Shuʾūn al-Islāmīya, 1992), 6.88). On al-Ṭaḥāwī’s attitude toward isti sān, see Chapter Four,
“Hermeneutics,” pp. 273-276.
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After a brief introduction ranging from a single paragraph in Shar
āthār to seven pages in

aʿānī al-

ā al-Qurʾān, each chapter in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical

hermeneutics takes the same basic literary form: al-Ṭaḥāwī first adduces one or more
revealed texts in apparent conflict or whose import is unclear, and then shows in detail
how the uncertainty can be removed or the apparent contradiction resolved in order to
arrive at God’s intent, usually in the form of a rule of positive law. While the specific
methods al-Ṭaḥāwī uses to reach his conclusions vary in frequency between different
works, his overall catalog of techniques is notably stable. These include isnād and matn
criticism; invoking consensus or the authority of the Companions and Successors;
abrogation; hermeneutical principles such as the primacy of the unrestricted (ʿāmm) and
apparent (ẓāhir) meanings; ijtihād; descriptions of the range of existing opinions and the
subsequent discrediting of all but one; and limited appeals to communal practice (ʿamal).
Occasionally, al-Ṭaḥāwī pauses to justify or explain his use of these or other techniques
and principles; these explicit discussions of theory constitute the major material for this
study. While each chapter generally employs only a small selection of these techniques,
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments consistently move from text to meaning. The literary form of alṬaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works thus stands in clear contrast to both the theory-driven
discussions of the uṣūl al-fiqh genre and to the earlier Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī, in which
practical examples illustrate al-Shāfiʿī’s theoretical claims, rather than the other way
around.
In the legal sphere, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical writing functions to affirm the
relationship between texts of revelation and the rules of positive law by showing in detail
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how specific rules may be derived from revealed texts. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutics-driven
approach is not limited to the field of law, however. While

ā al-Qurʾān and Shar

aʿānī al-āthār are exclusively concerned with demonstrating the relationship between
revelation and positive law, his third major hermeneutical text, Shar mushkil al-āthār,
demonstrates the interpretation and harmonization of both legal and non-legal adīths.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī applies many of the same hermeneutical techniques to non-legal adīths that
he uses in legal derivation. However, because this study is concerned with the legal
theory underlying al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments, I will from this point on be focusing on
practical hermeneutics as a form of legal writing.
Although ‘practical hermeneutics’ is not a term in general use in the field of
Islamic intellectual history, a small number of scholars in other fields have invoked this
term in their descriptions of modern Christian interpretive practices. In “Practical
Hermeneutics: Noticing in Bible Study Interaction,” Esa Lehtinen frames practical
hermeneutics as the way in which the interpretation of sacred texts is shaped by the daily,
local context of the interpreters, such that they produce a “reading that is morally relevant
to the participants.”16 In contrast, in Practical Hermeneutics: A Revised Agenda for
Ministry, Charles Winquist is concerned with the interpretation of revelation as wordevent rather than as text, but similarly emphasizes how interpretation is bound to the
“situational presence of a new consciousness in the world of historical experience.”17
Both Lehtinen and Winquist, then, appeal to the phrase ‘practical hermeneutics’ to evoke

16

Esa Lehtinen, “Practical Hermeneutics: Noticing in Bible Study Interaction,” Human Studies 32, no. 4
(2009): 280-281.
17
Charles Winquist, Practical Hermeneutics: A Revised Agenda for Ministry (Ann Arbor: McNaughton &
Gunn, 1980), 17.
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the way in which interpretation is inevitably (and, for them, usefully) responsive to the
needs and contexts of interpreters. Further, they employ the term ‘practical’ in order to
highlight a perceived divide between the theoretical discussions of hermeneutics among
academics and the applied interpretive practices of believers and clergy in a pastoral
context.
In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of hermeneutics is firmly intentionalist— like the
legal theorists of the mature uṣūl tradition, he holds that the goal of scriptural
interpretation is to discover God’s intent as encoded in revealed texts. Although alṬaḥāwī and other Muslim jurists recognize that the interpretive process may be impeded
by questions surrounding source preservation and interaction or the sheer complexity of
human language, they nonetheless view the meaning of revelation as unchanging and
independent of the perspective of the interpreter.18 The questions concerning the role of
the interpreter in creating meaning that arose in discussions of hermeneutics among
European philosophers and theologians beginning in the 18th century (and which shape
the thought of Lehtinen and Winquist above) are thus entirely absent from medieval
Muslim jurists’ approach to textual interpretation.19 Nor, when I term al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
hermeneutical writings ‘practical,’ do I mean to suggest an activity of laypeople as
opposed to that of scholars. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics were composed

18

On the intentionalism of the classical uṣūl tradition, see Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law
(Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 52-65. In the modern period, some Muslim
intellectuals have sought to develop a hermeneutic that is responsive to what they identify as the changing
needs of interpreters in the modern world, drawing in particular on an expanded role for the legal theory
concept of maṣla a (public interest). For an overview of these efforts, see Wael Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory,
Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 500-550.
19
On the development of the field of hermeneutics in the 18 th century and later, see The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Hermeneutics” by Bjørn Ramberg and Kristin Gjesdal,
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/hermeneutics/>.
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by a scholar for a scholarly audience, and he, like other Muslim jurists, would deny that
non-experts have any role in deriving the law from revelation.
Instead, by the phrase ‘practical hermeneutics,’ I propose to signal, first, alṬaḥāwī’s practical aim of producing individual rules of positive law from the canon of
revealed sources and, second, the way in which al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works serve as extended
illustrations of his fundamental claim that a single, coherent Divine Message underlies
the sometimes conflicting texts of revelation. Although al-Ṭaḥāwī never states this
second claim directly, his project is implicit in the anxieties he expresses in the
introductions to Shar

aʿānī al-āthār and Shar mushkil al-āthār concerning those who

see contradictions or absurdities in the corpus of Prophetic adīths.20 Each chapter of his
hermeneutical works then shows in detail how God’s intent may be derived from one or
more revealed texts by means of a correct application of hermeneutical procedures. AlṬaḥāwī does not portray the interpretive process as simple or mechanical; nonetheless,
across many hundreds of chapters, al-Ṭaḥāwī concretely demonstrates the derivation of
meaning from text according to hermeneutical principles both implicit and explicit.
In one sense, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics can be understood as a
response to a specifically Ḥanafī crisis: as the authority of Prophetic adīth grew over the
3rd/9th century, the Ḥanafīs came to be widely criticized as ahl al-raʾy (the partisans of
mere opinion), with the implication that Ḥanafī positive law was insufficiently tethered to
revelation.21 In the late 3rd/9th century, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Ḥanafī predecessor, Muḥammad ibn
Shujāʿ al-Thaljī (d. 266/880), is reported to have responded to these criticisms by

20
21

Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 1.11; Mushkil, 1.6.
On the ahl al-raʾy and ahl al- adīth, see Chapter One, “Qurʾān and Sunna,” pp. 56-60.
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providing Abū Ḥanīfa’s legal doctrine with a basis in adīth, and to have composed a
work entitled Taṣ ī al-āthār.22 However, with only the title of Ibn Shujāʿ’s work
surviving, the literary form of his arguments remains unknown. Later, when al-Ṭaḥāwī
took up the task of tethering Ḥanafī fiqh to revelation, we know that he chose to do so by
painstakingly demonstrating chapter by chapter how the correct interpretation of revealed
texts produces established rules of Ḥanafī positive law.23
In a larger sense, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics should be
understood not only as a Ḥanafī phenomenon, but also as part of the broader evolution of
Islamic law and Islamic legal writing from the formative into the post-formative periods.
The earliest decades of the formative period of Islamic law, through most of the 2nd/8th
century, were characterized by great diversity of doctrine, but have left little literary
trace. The end of the 2nd/8th century and first half of the 3rd/9th century then witness a
flowering of authoritative fiqh literature, including the appearance of major compendia
associated with the jurists who would later come to be considered the eponymous
founders of the mature madhhabs. Al-Ṭaḥāwī represents the late formative period of
Islamic law, a period stretching from the establishment of fiqh handbooks until the
maturation of the madhhabs and of uṣūl al-fiqh in the mid-4th/10th century. With the rules
of positive law already set down, the jurists of the late formative period grappled with

22

Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-fihrist, ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (London: Muʾassasat al-Furqān lil-Turāth alIslāmī, 2009), vol. 2, pt. 1.29; Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9 th-10th
Centuries C.E. (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 48-53.
23
While the overall function of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics may be to provide Ḥanafī fiqh
with a basis in revelation, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal reasoning is not exclusively instrumental. In the course of this
study, we will see that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s fidelity to a set of hermeneutical principles sometimes leads him to
depart from established Ḥanafī legal positions, suggesting that legal theory plays both justificatory and
productive roles in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought. On instrumental and philosophical reasoning in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
works, see Chapter Two, “Companion and Successor Ḥadīths,” pp. 125-129.
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two major, closely-related challenges: 1) to explain the relationship of established laws to
revelation, including the increasingly-revered corpus of Prophetic adīth; and 2) to
explain the great diversity of legal doctrine. The second challenge is reflected in the
growth of i htilāf al-fuqahāʾ literature, a genre in which al-Ṭaḥāwī composed one of the
earliest substantial works.
Practical hermeneutics, in contrast, can be understood as the response to the
challenge of articulating the relationship of the doctrine found in the major compendia to
the corpus of revealed texts. It is possible to identify a number of texts structured
similarly to the hermeneutical works of al-Ṭaḥāwī, and I suggest that these may usefully
be considered together under the umbrella of practical hermeneutics. For example, alṬaḥāwī’s

ā al-Qurʾān forms part of a minor genre of a ā al-Qurʾān works

expounding the rules of positive law that may be derived from Qurʾānic verses. In Kashf
al-ẓunūn, K tip elebi (d. 1068/1657) states that al-Shāfiʿī was the first to compose a
work of a ā al-Qurʾān.24 Although al-Shāfiʿī’s text is no longer extant, it is
unsurprising that a figure so strongly associated with the effort to insist that all law be
grounded in revelation should also be the first author in the a ā al-Qurʾān genre.
K tip elebi lists a total of four a ā al-Qurʾān works preceding that of alṬaḥāwī: those of al-Shāfiʿī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Ḥajar al-Saʿdī (d. 244/ 858-859), the
Qāḍī Abū Isḥāq Ismāʿīl ibn Isḥāq al-Azdī al-Baṣrī (d. 282/895-896) and Abū al-Ḥasan
ʿAlī ibn Mūsā ibn Yazdād al-Qummī al-Ḥanafī (d. 305/917-918).25 None of the four is
extant. Ibn al-Nadīm also attributes an a ā al-Qurʾān work to the Baṣran traditionist24

K tip elebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn ʿan asā ī al-kutub wa-l-funūn, ed. Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn Yāltkāyā
(Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, [1858]), 1.20.
25
K tip elebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1.20.
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jurist Ḥafṣ al-Ḍarīr (d. 246/861).26 The author of one a ā work, the Ḥanafī Abū alḤasan ʿAlī ibn Mūsā al-Qummī, is reported by Ibn al-Nadīm to have composed both a
work of a ā al-Qurʾān and a refutation of the aspects of al-Shāfiʿī’s

ā al-Qurʾān

which contradicted the Iraqi jurists (Kitāb naqḍ ā hālafa fīhi al-Shāfiʿī al-ʿIrāqiyīn fī
ā al-Qurʾān).27 It therefore appears that al-Qummī, like al-Ṭaḥāwī, employed the
a ā al-Qurʾān genre to defend Ḥanafī positive law and assert its origins in revelation.
Although a ā al-Qurʾān works are ostensibly concerned only with Qurʾānic
law, the complex interaction of legal sources within Islamic hermeneutics means that
these works must inevitably address other legal sources, especially Prophetic adīths.
Indeed, very few chapters in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s

ā al-Qurʾān treat the Qurʾān only.28

Rather, Qurʾānic verses serve as the starting point for hermeneutical discussions that
often devote more space to addressing issues related to adīth and other sources than to
the Qurʾān itself. Although we cannot know the literary form of works in the a ā
genre before al-Ṭaḥāwī, it is notable that the chapters of later surviving works are
structured similarly to the chapters of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s

ā al-Qurʾān.29 For example, the

Ḥanafī al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980-981) and the Shāfiʿī al-Kiyā al-Harāsī (d. 504/1110-1111)
begin each chapter or subsection of a chapter of their extant

ā al-Qurʾān works by

citing a Qurʾānic verse and then describing the hermeneutical issues involved in deriving
26

Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 1.108.
Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 2.32. Although Ibn al-Nadīm clearly lists these as two separate works, it
seems possible that they represent a single text.
28
To give an approximation of the prevalence of adīths in
ā al-Qurʾān, within the 21 chapters that
comprise Kitāb al-Ṣalāt, only 3 chapters do not contain Prophetic adīths. Of those 3 chapters, 2 contain
Companion adīths. Only 1 chapter contains no adīths at all.
29
It appears, however, that al-Ṭaḥāwī was unusual in the overall structure of his
ā al-Qurʾān; where
he organizes the book according to the normal chapters of a work of fiqh and then addresses the Qurʾānic
verses relevant to each topic, later authors of
ā al-Qurʾān texts generally follow the tafsīr genre by
organizing their works according to the chapter of the Qurʾān.
27
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the associated rules of positive law.30 Like al-Ṭaḥāwī, they acknowledge the conflicting
interpretations of other jurists while still asserting the positive law of their own madhhab.
The attention devoted in these works to hermeneutical issues that transcend the Qurʾān
itself suggests that the common classification of a ā al-Qurʾān works as a subgenre of
tafsīr (Qurʾānic exegesis) fails to capture the scope and purpose of a ā al-Qurʾān as
an intellectual project.31 By labeling the a ā al-Qurʾān genre as part of a broader
category of practical hermeneutical writing, I hope to draw attention to the way in which
these works may share more in common with works of adīth hermeneutics than they do
with most tafsīr.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other two works of practical hermeneutics, Shar mushkil al-āthār
and Shar

aʿānī al-āthār, belong to a second genre closely associated with the late

formative period: mukhtalif al- adīth (the harmonization of Prophetic reports). Once
again, K tip elebi attributes the first work of this genre to al-Shāfiʿī.32 In the
introduction to his I htilāf al- adīth, al-Shāfiʿī emphasizes that the Qurʾān and Sunna
function together to express the law.33 Each chapter of al-Shāfiʿī’s work then adduces one

30

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ,
ā al-Qurʾān, ed. Muḥammad al-Ṣādiq Qamḥāwī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī,
1985); al-Kiyā al-Harāsī,
ā al-Qurʾān, ed. Muḥammad Mūsā and ʿAzza ʿAbd ʿAṭīya (Beirut: Dār alKutub al-ʿIlmīya, 1985).
31
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
ā al-Qurʾān is categorized as a work of tafsīr in Miṣbāḥ Allāh ʿAbd al-Bāqī, al-I ā
bū Jaʿfar al-Ṭa āwī wa-atharuhu fī naqd al- adīth (Cairo: Dār al-Salām, 2010), 64 and ʿAbd al-Majīd
Maḥmūd ʿAbd al-Majīd, al-I ā al-Ṭa āwī mu addithan (Cairo: Dār al-Muḥaddithīn, 2008), 139.
Hussein Abdul-Raof describes a ā al-Qurʾān works in general as a variety of tafsīr in Schools of
Qurʾānic Exegesis: Genesis and Develop ent (New York: Routledge, 2010), 140. The tafsīr of al-Qurṭubī
(d. 671/1273), entitled al-Jā iʿ li-a ā al-Qurʾān, appears to be an intermediate case (ed. Aḥmad alBurdūnī and Ibrāhīm Aṭfīsh (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣrīya, 1964)). Although it gives special attention to
the rules of fiqh contained in the Qurʾān and draws upon other legal sources in doing so, it does not contain
the complex hermeneutical arguments found in the works of al-Ṭaḥāwī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ, for example.
32
K tip elebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1.32.
33
Al-Shāfiʿī, I htilāf al- adīth, vol. 10 of Kitāb al-Umm, ed. Rifʿat Fawzī ʿAbd al-Muṭṭalib (al-Manṣūra,
Egypt: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 2005), 5-6. For a discussion of and translated excepts from al-Shāfiʿī’s I htilāf al-
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or more adīths and resolves the attendant hermeneutical issues in order to derive a
related law; the organization of the work seems to be influenced loosely by the chapter
organization of fiqh works. In contrast, while the next known work in the genre, the
Taʾwīl u htalif al- adīth of Ibn Qutayba (d. 276/889), likewise begins each chapter by
adducing one or more problematic adīths and then resolving the apparent difficulties,
Ibn Qutayba devotes most of his chapters to theological, rather than legal, topics.34 K tip
elebi lists a third work of this title by the Shāfiʿī Zakarīya ibn Yaḥyā al-Sājī (d.
307/919-920), now lost.35
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Shar mushkil al-āthār and Shar

aʿānī al-āthār do not

employ a term linguistically related to ‘i htilāf’ in their titles, they share the literary form
and objectives of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba’s earlier mukhtalif al- adīth works. Like alShāfiʿī’s I htilāf al- adīth, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Shar

aʿānī al-āthār is exclusively concerned

with the derivation of law from revealed sources. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s work represents an
advance over al-Shāfiʿī’s earlier work in several respects, however; it is both a much
more substantial work—four volumes compared to the hundred or so pages of al-Shāfiʿī’s
I htilāf—and also more rigorously organized according to the topics of fiqh. In contrast,
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Shar mushkil al-āthār more closely resembles Ibn Qutayba’s Taʾwīl
mukhtalif al- adīth in its apparent lack of an overall organizing principle and its attention

adīth, see Joseph Lowry, “al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820),” in Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim
Jurists, ed. Oussama Arabi, David Powers and Susan Spectorsky (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 51-64.
34
Lecomte analyzes the relationship between al-Shāfiʿī’s I htilāf al- adīth and Ibn Qutayba’s Taʾwīl
mukhtalif al- adīth in “Un exemple d'évolution de la controverse en Islam: de l'Iḫtilāf al-Ḥadīṯ d'al-Šāfiʿī
au Muḫtalif al-Ḥadīṯ d'Ibn Qutayba,” Studia Islamica 27 (1967): 5-40.
35
K tip elebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 1.32.
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to both legal and non-legal topics. Once again, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s 15-volume work is
considerably more substantial than Ibn Qutayba’s single volume.
Traditionally, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s

ā al-Qurʾān, Shar mushkil al-āthār and Shar

aʿānī al-āthār have been analyzed separately as belonging to either the a ā alQurʾān or the mukhtalif al- adīth genres.36 By applying the label of ‘practical
hermeneutics’ to all three of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, I hope to draw attention to the way in
which, despite their surface differences, they all share a literary form that moves from
revealed text to law (or, sometimes in Shar mushkil al-āthār, to non-legal meanings
derived from revelation). This shared literary form points to a common project
underlying all three of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, and indeed all the works of practical
hermeneutics that I have described above: the assertion that the revealed texts of Qurʾān
and Sunna form a single, coherent Divine Message from which a coherent Divine Law
may be derived. Nor is the concept of practical hermeneutics limited to works
traditionally ascribed to the genres of a ā al-Qurʾān or mukhtalif al- adīth; the
Tahdhīb al-āthār and Tafsīr of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s contemporary al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) both
devote considerable attention to determining the legal implications of the revealed texts
he adduces, even though they are not exclusively works of practical hermeneutics as
described above.
‘Practical hermeneutics,’ then, is a label that transcends traditional notions of
generic boundaries by pointing to a larger intellectual project among jurists of the late

36

E.g., Saʿd al-Dīn Ūnāl, “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq,” Introduction to
ā al-Qurʾān, by Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad
al-Ṭaḥāwī (Istanbul: T rkiye Diyanet akf , sl m Ara t rmalar Merkezi, 1995-1998), 5-7; ʿAbd al-Majīd,
al-I ā al-Ṭa āwī u addithan, 297-321; ʿAbd al-Bāqī, al-I ā
bū Jaʿfar al-Ṭa āwī wa-atharuhu fī
naqd al- adīth, 333-334.
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formative period of Islamic law. It cannot be coincidental that al-Shāfiʿī, who strongly
argued for the basis of law in revelation, is identified as the author of the earliest works in
both the mukhtalif al- adīth and the a ā al-Qurʾān genres. His project was, in a sense,
completed by al-Ṭaḥāwī, who made the same argument on behalf of the Ḥanafīs, who had
until then been criticized as ahl al-raʾy, implying that their fiqh was not based in
revelation. That is not to say that jurists after al-Ṭaḥāwī ceased to compose works of
mukhtalif al- adīth or a ā al-Qurʾān; genres, once established, often develop in ways
that are not determined by the needs that originally inspired them. However, while a few
Ḥanafīs before al-Ṭaḥāwī may have begun the project of grounding Ḥanafī fiqh in
revelation as noted above, it is al-Ṭaḥāwī whose works were preserved and extensively
commented upon by Ḥanafīs and others.37 His lifetime therefore seems to represent a
crucial moment in the process by which the basis of law in revelation—at least in theory,
if not as an obvious characteristic of specific rules of positive law—ceased to be an issue
dividing jurists of the emerging madhhabs, and became unquestioned doctrine.38
In fact, it seems likely that the more pressing task for jurists of the post-formative
period would be to tether the principles of uṣūl al-fiqh, rather than the texts of revelation,
to established rules of positive law. In his Structural Interrelations of Theory and
Practice in Islamic Law, Ahmad Atif Ahmad identifies a genre of legal writing which he
labels ta hrīj al-furūʿ ʿalā al-uṣūl, or ‘deriving the rules of positive law from the bases of
the law.’ Works of this genre, which appear first at the turn of the 5th/11th century but
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become more common in the 6th/12th century, demonstrate how legal rules can be
established on the basis of known principles of uṣūl in much the same way that works of
practical hermeneutics demonstrate the derivation of law from text.39 Both genres
respond to the anxieties of their own periods by asserting a connection between bodies of
texts and ideas that had come to be perceived as insufficiently connected.
The close analysis of the legal theory contained in the works of practical
hermeneutics listed above and other, yet-to-be-identified works is beyond the scope of
this study. However, it is reasonable to assume that, like al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, other
surviving early texts that we may label ‘practical hermeneutics’ may also prove to be
particularly rich sources for reconstructing legal theory in the late formative period.
Where early fiqh or hilāf (juristic disagreement) works, for example, often provide no
justification at all for the rules they expound or only a kind of shorthand explanation, the
nature of practical hermeneutics is to demonstrate the relationship between text and rule.
Within al-Ṭaḥāwī’s own corpus, for example, one could learn from the Mukhtaṣar or
I htilāf al-ʿula āʾ that he was familiar with concepts such as ij āʿ, qiyās, ʿā

: hāṣṣ

and isti sān, but only the detailed legal derivations of his works of practical hermeneutics
reveal the nuances of how he understood these concepts, and the ways in which his
understandings differ sometimes quite dramatically from how they were understood by
most theorists of the mature uṣūl tradition.
To some degree, the differences between the legal theories of al-Ṭaḥāwī and later
jurists are attributable to the different periods in which they lived; al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
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Ahmad Atif Ahmad, Structural Interrelations of Theory and Practice in Islamic Law: A Study of Six
Works of Medieval Islamic Jurisprudence (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 16.
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hermeneutical works are particularly valuable to researchers because they represent rare
survivals from the transitional period between late formative and post-formative Islamic
law. However, in the course of this study, I will indicate a number of places where the
differences between al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theories and those of the uṣūlīs seem to be due not to the
passage of time, but rather to the different imperatives of the genres of practical
hermeneutics and uṣūl al-fiqh. While uṣūlīs sought elegance and consistency in their
descriptions of the workings of the law, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theories require great
flexibility in order to be useful tools for the practical business of interpreting revealed
texts.
It is possible, therefore, that our current narrative of the history of Islamic legal
theory is in need of revision. Instead of a single trajectory of development from the first
theoretical statements of the early jurists to the canonization of uṣūl al-fiqh as a genre, we
might instead trace two literary forms addressing questions of legal theory: one in close
contact with the practical interpretation of texts, and another in which the elaboration of
theory became an end in itself.40 Much work remains to be done on the legal theory
contained in works of practical hermeneutics before this possibility can be confirmed or
refuted.41 This study contributes to that work by offering the first full-length analysis of
one jurist’s legal theory as reflected in his practical works of legal interpretation.
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Norman Calder terms this function of uṣūl al-fiqh “virtuoso patterning” (Calder, Studies in Early Muslim
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labeled practical hermeneutics might be particularly instructive.

22
Approach and Structure
This study reconstructs al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory from the many scattered
discussions of theoretical topics found in his works of practical hermeneutics, with
occasional reference to his other extant legal texts. Wherever possible, I place alṬaḥāwī’s ideas in the context of other jurists of the formative and early classical periods.
In particular, I compare al-Ṭaḥāwī’s positions to those of al-Shāfiʿī as well as earlier and
later Ḥanafīs in order to evaluate claims regarding his intellectual debt to jurists of those
schools. Because of the difficulty of locating theoretical passages in works of practical
hermeneutics and of understanding the relationship of those passages to a jurist’s overall
legal theory, my comparisons between al-Ṭaḥāwī and other jurists are of necessity
primarily drawn from works of uṣūl al-fiqh rather than works that might be labeled
practical hermeneutics. It is the difficulty of determining the details of a jurist’s legal
theory from the brief, isolated passages in works of practical hermeneutics that makes the
present study vital. As mentioned above, much important work remains to be done
identifying and analyzing hermeneutical texts before we will be in a position to
characterize the relationship among texts of practical hermeneutics or that between
practical hermeneutics and uṣūl al-fiqh. As a result, my suggestions regarding alṬaḥāwī’s place in a narrative of the development of Islamic legal thought of the late
3rd/9th and early 4th/10th centuries are necessarily tentative.
In my selection of topics I have been guided by the frequency and urgency with
which al-Ṭaḥāwī returns to each issue of legal theory in the course of his works. Passages
on legal theory in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works can be divided into two categories: discussions of

23
the authority and relative status of legal sources, and discussions of interpretive
paradigms for understanding revealed texts. Because al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of legal
sources are more complex and detailed than his discussions of hermeneutical techniques,
I devote individual chapters to Qurʾān and Sunna (Chapter One), Companion and
Successor Ḥadīths (Chapter Two), and Consensus and the Practice of the Community
(Chapter Three).
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not set out an overarching theory of legal sources, I base
my chapter order loosely on a list that appears repeatedly across his hermeneutical works:
Qurʾān, Sunna and Consensus.42 Al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces this list, always in the same order,
whenever he wishes to assert that an interpretive move requires evidence to support it.43
For instance, in Shar mushkil al-āthār he refutes an interlocutor’s argument on the
grounds that no one may depart from a certain established opinion supported by most of
the Companions without evidence from Qurʾān, Sunna or Consensus, while in Shar
aʿānī al-āthār he asserts that it is impermissible to choose between two possible
interpretations of a certain adīth without evidence from the Qurʾān, Sunna or
Consensus.44 This list thus in some sense stands in for the idea of authoritative legal
sources.
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Occasionally, other elements appear in these lists. Although Companion opinions
appear only twice in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s list of authoritative sources,45 they play a far larger role
in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical arguments in practice than these lists would seem to
suggest. I therefore devote a chapter to exploring the role of the Companions and
Successors in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought. Communal practice (ʿamal) does not appear at
all in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s lists of sources and plays only a small role in his works; nonetheless, I
include a discussion of it in my chapter on Consensus because of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s unusual
statements concerning it and its complicated relationship with his concept of Consensus.
Finally, al-Ṭaḥāwī sometimes mentions qiyās, naẓar or raʾy along with other sources of
legal authority;46 however, several passages clarify that al-Ṭaḥāwī does not consider these
to be legal sources in themselves, but rather a hermeneutical method to resort to in the
absence of evidence from the authoritative sources of Qurʾān, Sunna and Consensus.47 I
therefore discuss rational methods of legal derivation in Chapter Four, “Hermeneutics.”
The remainder of that chapter takes its structure from the only extended theorydriven discussion in all of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works, the introduction to

ā al-

Qurʾān. Within the seven pages of the introduction, al-Ṭaḥāwī establishes a hierarchical
relationship between three sets of hermeneutical terms: mu a : utashābih
(unequivocal:equivocal), ẓāhir:bāṭin (apparent:non-apparent) and ʿā

: hāṣṣ

(unrestricted:restricted), and I have made an exploration of the relationship among these
45
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the subject of the first half of that chapter.48 In the remainder of this introductory chapter,
I provide an overview of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s life and works before addressing questions related
to the authorship and composition of the three works used as the major sources of this
study.

Life
Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Salāma al-Ṭaḥāwī was born in Ṭaḥā or the
nearby village of Ṭaḥṭūṭ in Upper Egypt,49 most probably in 239/853,50 although some
biographers give birth dates as early as 229/843.51 His ancestors, members of the Ḥajr
branch of the Azd tribe, were likely among the earliest Arab settlers in Egypt, almost all
of whom came from South Arabian or Yemeni tribes, including Azd.52 His grandfather
Salāma was one of the army notables (wujūh al-jund) who responded to a missive from
the anti-caliph Ibrāhīm ibn al-Mahdī calling the Egyptian jund to renounce the ʿAbbāsid
caliph al-Maʾmūn (r. 198-218/813-833) and the Egyptian governor al-Sarī ibn al-Ḥakam
(r. 200-201/816, 201-205/817-820) upon al-Maʾmūn’s controversial naming of ʿAlī alRiḍā (d. 203/818) as his heir in 202/817. After leading his troops in support of al-Sarī’s
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rival in the complicated internal power struggles in Egypt at that time, Salāma and his son
Ibrāhīm were eventually captured, brought to Fusṭāṭ and executed on al-Sarī’s command
in 204/819.53
Considerably less is known about al-Ṭaḥāwī’s parents. In his entry for al-Ṭaḥāwī,
Ibn Khallikān reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s father died in 264/877-8.54 Al-Ṭaḥāwī also
transmitted adīth from his father,55 although the absence of any ṭabaqāt entries on
Muḥammad suggests that he was not an important traditionist. A few passages of alṬaḥāwī’s own works indicate that his father was an expert on poetry. In Shar mushkil
al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces a variant of a poem on his father’s authority, and in his
transmission of al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Sunan, he gives his father as the source for two additional
lines of a poem transmitted by al-Shāfiʿī to al-Muzanī.56 Modern studies of al-Ṭaḥāwī
generally identify his mother as a sister of al-Muzanī, who was one of the most important
students of al-Shāfiʿī.57 However, the earliest biographies indicate only that al-Ṭaḥāwī
was a student of al-Muzanī.58 The first mention of a familial relationship between the two
53
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jurists appears in the entry on al-Muzanī in al-Khalīlī’s (d. 446/1054) al-Irshād fī aʿrifat
ʿula āʾ al- adīth.59 Two centuries later, Ibn Khallikān (d. 681/1282) again describes alṬaḥāwī as the nephew of al-Muzanī, citing al-Khalīlī as his source.60 From that time,
their familial relationship becomes an important part of the biographical tradition.61
It is certainly possible that al-Ṭaḥāwī was the nephew of al-Muzanī and earlier
biographers simply omitted to mention their relationship. However, it is perhaps more
probable that the familial relationship between the two jurists was a detail added later to
heighten the narrative drama of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s decision to affiliate with the Ḥanafīs after his
early study of Shāfiʿī doctrine under al-Muzanī. Biographers give various accounts of alṬaḥāwī’s transfer to Ḥanafism. Ibn Yūnus (d. 347/958) states only that al-Ṭaḥāwī began
to study Ḥanafī doctrine when the Ḥanafī Aḥmad ibn Abī ʿImrān came to Egypt, and that
al-Muzanī reproached al-Ṭaḥāwī in a dream for his abandonment of him.62 Al-Ṣaymarī
(d. 436/1044) reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī joined the Ḥanafīs in anger at an insult from alMuzanī.63 Al-Khalīlī, however, portrays al-Ṭaḥāwī’s decision as an oblique act of
deference to al-Muzanī, writing that al-Ṭaḥāwī frequently observed his uncle studying the
books of Abū Ḥanīfa and was inspired to study them himself.64 Later biographers would
adduce and reframe these three basic narratives in various combinations in their attempts
59
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to explain a shift in madhhab affiliation that was, from the viewpoint of the mature legal
tradition, very much in need of explanation.65
It is less clear that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s shift in affiliation was a noteworthy event by the
standards of his own time. Although Monique Bernards and John Nawas have found that
only about 5% of jurists who died before the year 250/864 are recorded by the
biographical literature as having changed madhhabs, they also found that 54% of jurists
of the same period are not reported to have belonged to any established Sunni madhhab.66
Further, Nurit Tsafrir has demonstrated that later biographers sometimes claimed as
members of their own madhhab jurists and traditionists who may have had only weak ties
to the school.67 The biographical literature suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s change of madhhab
occurred less than a decade after the end of the period under consideration by Nawas and
Bernards.68 Given the wide variation in what it meant for an individual to be claimed as a
member of a madhhab in the biographical tradition, Bernards and Nawas may be too
quick in their conclusion that changing madhhabs has always been a “marginal and
unique” practice.69
Al-Ṭaḥāwī lived during an important transitional period during which the
madhhabs were developing into their mature form. Eyyup Said Kaya points to the
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appearance of legal handbooks (mukhtaṣars) and commentaries, the compilation of
Prophetic traditions, the first works of legal theory, and the labeling of some jurists as
heads of the Ḥanafī school, as evidence for the maturation of the Ḥanafī madhhab in the
4th/10th century.70 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s career exemplifies many of these developments: he
composed a Mukhtaṣar as well as commentaries on the works of his Ḥanafī predecessor
al-Shaybānī;71 gathered Prophetic adīths in his works of practical hermeneutics and
perhaps in a adīth compilation;72 and was considered by later biographers to have been
the head of the Ḥanafīs in Egypt for his time.73 He is also reported to have written a work
on the virtues of Abū Ḥanīfa,74 another indication of the development of madhhab
identity.
However, the Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī madhhabs of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s time in Egypt had not
yet developed what Melchert terms their “guild” nature; that is, they did not yet constitute
“a body of jurisprudents with a regular method of reproducing itself” and
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“distinguish[ing] those qualified from those not qualified.“75 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s study under alMuzanī and later under Ḥanafīs including Ibn Abī ʿImrān, Bakkār ibn Qutayba and
others, was not undertaken as part of the transmission of a set canon, and his relationships
with his Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī teachers seem to have been personal rather than institutional.
In this context, a student’s decision to change madhhab affiliation is unlikely to have had
the meaning that it would within the mature guild system. For al-Ṭaḥāwī, affiliation with
a madhhab appears to have signified a personal loyalty to the doctrine of Abū Ḥanīfa,
Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī, albeit one that did not constrain him from expressing his
opposition to their opinions in cases where his own legal reasoning led him to a different
result.
Nor was al-Ṭaḥāwī, at the time of his affiliation with the Ḥanafīs, a major jurist
whose change in loyalties would have represented a recanting of an established career
and body of work. None of his own works are said to date from his time as a Shāfiʿī,
although he did transmit al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Sunan al- aʾthūra from al-Muzanī. If we accept
accounts that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s affiliation followed swiftly upon the arrival of Aḥmad ibn Abī
ʿImrān in Egypt in 258/871-2, then al-Ṭaḥāwī was probably not yet twenty years old
when he began to study with the Ḥanafīs.76 At the very latest, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s study with Ibn
Abī ʿImrān predates his journey to Syria in 268-9/881-2, where he studied with the
Ḥanafī judge Abū Khāzim (d. 292/904).77 It is therefore difficult to agree with Tsafrir that
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“al-Ṭaḥāwī’s transfer to the Ḥanafī school must have shocked his contemporaries,
particularly his family,” 78 although it certainly was shocking to later biographers.
It is probably only in hindsight, from the perspective of a mature madhhab
tradition which viewed al-Ṭaḥāwī as having been the head of the Ḥanafīs in Egypt, that
one young man’s decision to study with the Ḥanafīs after having studied with the Shāfiʿīs
appears particularly noteworthy. It may also be that the biographical tradition’s enduring
interest in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s change of madhhab is due to the way in which these ‘conversion’
narratives dramatize al-Ṭaḥāwī’s complex relationship with both madhhabs. Far from
completely abandoning Shāfiʿī thought upon his move to Ḥanafism, al-Ṭaḥāwī justified
Ḥanafī law using many of the elements of al-Shāfiʿī’s traditionalism. An evaluation of alṬaḥāwī’s relationship with both Shāfiʿī and Ḥanafī thought is one of the major tasks of
this study.
Although it is not possible to reconstruct al-Ṭaḥāwī’s motivation in affiliating
with the Ḥanafīs with any certainty from the biographical literature, we can draw some
conclusions about the probable effects of his decision. While the majority of Egyptian
Muslims of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s time were Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs, the qāḍīs appointed by the
ʿAbbāsids were usually Ḥanafīs, and Egyptian Ḥanafism in general was closely
associated with the central ʿAbbāsid government in Iraq.79 When Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn (r.
254-70/868-84) established autonomous Ṭūlūnid rule in Egypt, he allowed the ʿAbbāsid-
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appointed Ḥanafī judge Bakkār ibn Qutayba (d. 270/884) to remain in his post.80 The next
Ṭūlūnid qāḍī was likewise an Iraqi Ḥanafī, and the first Shāfiʿī qāḍī of Egypt, Abū Zurʿa,
was not appointed until 284/897.81
In becoming a Ḥanafī, al-Ṭaḥāwī therefore aligned himself with the Egyptian
judiciary, which was in turn closely aligned with the ʿAbbāsid governors of Egypt and,
later, the Ṭūlūnids. His change in madhhab thus may have restored some of the access to
power that his family had lost after his grandfather’s execution and the caliph alMuʿtaṣim’s (r. 218-227/833-842) later abolishment of the ʿaṭāʾ (military salary) of the
Egyptian jund, a move that put a final end to the already declining power of the jund
families.82 That al-Ṭaḥāwī may have had a political motive in becoming a Ḥanafī is
suggested by his earliest biographer, Ibn Yūnus, who quotes al-Ṭaḥāwī as saying that,
“when Aḥmad ibn Abī ʿImrān came to us as a qāḍī over Egypt, I became his disciple and
adopted his doctrine.”83 In fact, Ibn Abī ʿImrān appears to have served briefly as a judge
in Egypt only after the death of Bakkār ibn Qutayba in 270/884, more than a decade after
Ibn Abī ʿImrān’s probable arrival in Egypt, if he ever was in fact a judge at all.84 By
noting Ibn Abī ʿImrān’s role as qāḍī, Ibn Yūnus draws a connection between the
judiciary and al-Ṭaḥāwī’s affiliation with the Ḥanafīs.
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The little we know of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s subsequent career suggests that he succeeded in
forging close ties with the Ḥanafī qāḍīs of Egypt and, through them, the Egyptian court.
We have already observed that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s first Ḥanafī teacher was Aḥmad ibn Abī
ʿImrān, a Baghdādī Ḥanafī who came to Egypt in the company of a tax collector for the
ʿAbbāsids and later may have served briefly as qāḍī.85 In 268-9/881-2, al-Ṭaḥāwī traveled
to Syria, where he studied with the Baghdādī Ḥanafī Abū Khāzim ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd ibn
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (d. 292/904), who was then qāḍī of Damascus.86 Another Ḥanafī qāḍī of
Egypt, the Baṣran Bakkār ibn Qutayba (d. 270/883), also served as al-Ṭaḥāwī’s teacher in
adīth and perhaps in fiqh.87 In his professional life, al-Ṭaḥāwī served as ātib (secretary)
for both Bakkār ibn Qutayba and for his successor, the Ḥanafī qāḍī Muḥammad ibn
ʿAbda ibn Ḥarb (277 or 278/890 or 891-283/896). He was also the latter’s deputy
(nāʾib).88
In addition, various literary sources portray al-Ṭaḥāwī as closely connected with
Aḥmad ibn Ṭūlūn: one anecdote shows al-Ṭaḥāwī convincing Ibn Ṭūlūn to restore to him
the title on one of his grandfather’s seized estates in Upper Egypt,89 while another
suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s journey to Damascus was undertaken at Ibn Ṭūlūn’s behest in
order to confirm a technical detail of a charitable trust (waqf) for a hospital.90 Elsewhere,
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al-Ṭaḥāwī is described as part of Ibn Ṭūlūn’s retinue ( in hāṣṣatihi).91 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
close ties to the Ṭūlūnids also caused him to be suspected of corruption: in the Fihrist,
Ibn al-Nadīm reports al-Ṭaḥāwī composed a work at Ibn Ṭūlūn’s behest justifying the
latter’s improper marriage to a slave girl.92 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s ties to the judiciary also made
him vulnerable to court politics. Ibn Zūlāq reports that when the qāḍī Muḥammad ibn
ʿAbda hid in his home for ten years in order to avoid persecution from the new Ṭūlūnid
ruler, Hārūn (r. 283/896-292/904), the governor instead pursued Ibn ʿAbda’s associates,
imprisoning al-Ṭaḥāwī for a time.93
After the restoration of ʿAbbāsid rule in Egypt in 292/905, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to
have retained his close ties to the judiciary, even as the qāḍīs sent from Baghdad began to
represent a wider range of madhhabs. The Shāfiʿī qāḍī Abū ʿUbayd ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥusayn
ibn Ḥarb (293/906-311/24) was so eager to appoint al-Ṭaḥāwī as a court witness (shāhid)
that he took advantage of the absence of other court witnesses on the Hajj in 306/919 to
make the appointment over their objections.94 When the ʿAbbāsid ruler replaced Abū
ʿUbayd as qāḍī with the Baghdādī ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Mukram, the latter wrote
to al-Ṭaḥāwī and three other important Egyptians, asking them to select a deputy so that
he would not need to come to Egypt himself.95 Ibn Zūlāq reports anecdotes about the
deference shown to al-Ṭaḥāwī by a number of qāḍīs including the Ḥanafī ʿAbd al91
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Raḥmān ibn Isḥāq al-Jawharī (313/925-314/926), the Shāfiʿī ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn
Zabr (317/929), and the Mālikī Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Ḥammād (321/933-322/934).96
In addition to his activities as a jurist, al-Ṭaḥāwī was also an active traditionist
who both collected adīths and practiced isnād criticism.97 As the Ṭūlūnid court became
a major cultural center in the second half of the 3rd/9th century, Egypt drew traditionists
from across the Islamic world. As a result, al-Ṭaḥāwī was able to collect adīths from
important traditionists without making the multiple study journeys typical of many of the
ahl al- adīth.98 Al-Ṭaḥāwī was also unusual for a Ḥanafī of his time in that he
consistently adduced the adīths he collected in support of his legal positions in works
including
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al-Ṭaḥāwī’s most significant and lasting contribution to Ḥanafism was to provide
established Ḥanafī fiqh with a foundation in Prophetic adīth.100 The biographical
tradition dramatizes al-Ṭaḥāwī’s unusual joining of Ḥanafī fiqh and adīth study in the
form of an anecdote that Ibn Ḥajar transmits from Ibn Zūlāq (d. 387/997). After attending
the study circle of the qāḍī Muḥammad ibn ʿAbda, a mysterious but important stranger
asks al-Ṭaḥāwī and a Shāfiʿī jurist, Abū Saʿīd al-Fāryābī, to remain behind. When the
stranger tests the two jurists by asking about an obscure isnād, al-Fāryābī is reduced to
silence, while al-Ṭaḥāwī recites the isnād and accompanying adīth flawlessly. In
response, the mysterious stranger exclaims, “Don’t you know what you have just said?
…This evening I have seen you among the jurists (fuqahāʾ) acting in their sphere, and
now I see you acting in the sphere of the traditionists (ahl al- adīth). How few are those
who combine the two!”101
Although later biographers would consider al-Ṭaḥāwī the head of the Egyptian
Ḥanafīs of his day,102 he had no important students in law, perhaps reflecting the weak
roots of Ḥanafism in Egypt at the time. Very few jurists are reported to have studied
under him, although biographers record a number of those who transmitted adīth from
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him.103 His few students in law include his own son, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad alṬaḥāwī (fl. 350/961-2).104 The only other jurists reported to be al-Ṭaḥāwī’s students in
law in Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ’s al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya are the qāḍī Muḥammad ibn Badr ibn
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Ṣayrafī (d. 330/941), Abū Bakr Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Damaghānī
(n.d.) and Saʿīd ibn Muḥammad al-Bardaʿī (n.d.).105 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s importance within the
Ḥanafī madhhab instead derives from his works, a number of which attracted
commentary traditions, discussed below. Al-Ṭaḥāwī died in Egypt in Dhū al-Qaʿda
321/933, most likely in his early eighties.106 He is buried in a mausoleum in the Qarāfa
cemetery of present-day Cairo.107

An Overview of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Works
The substantial body of extant works available to scholars studying al-Ṭaḥāwī
distinguishes him from other late 3rd/9th and early 4th/10th-century jurists, as the briefest
perusal of Sezgin’s Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums will confirm.108 The most
complete catalog of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works in the biographical tradition is found in alJawāhir al-muḍīya of Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ (d. 775/1373), which is the source for titles listed
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Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 2005),
11.187; al-Dhahabī, Tadhkirat al- uffāẓ, 3.22. Ibn al-Nadīm disagrees, stating that al-Ṭaḥāwī died in
322/934 (Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 1.31).
107
Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-aʿyān, 1.71. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī provides a description of and
directions to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s mausoleum according to modern geography (al-Ḥāwī fī sīrat al-I ā al-Ṭa āwī
(Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Azharīya lil-Turāth, 1995), 42).
108
Sezgin’s entry on al-Ṭaḥāwī can be found in Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums (Leiden: Brill,
1967-1994), 1.439-442; for other jurists of the late 3rd/9th and early 4th/10th centuries, see 1.433ff.
104
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below except where otherwise indicated.109 In the following pages I give a brief overview
of all of the works attributed to al-Ṭaḥāwī, both lost and extant, in order to suggest the
wide scope of his intellectual activity in the fields of theology, exegesis,
history/biography, adīth and law. The three works that are the subject of this study,
however, transcend individual categories such as law, adīth or exegesis. Shar

aʿānī

al-āthār and Shar mushkil al-āthār can be considered works on both law and adīth,
ā al-Qurʾān has been described as a specialized form of exegesis. What

while

unites all three works and distinguishes them from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other extant compositions
is the kind of intellectual activity they represent—an activity that I have termed practical
hermeneutics.

Theology
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s well-known ʿ qīda (Creed), along with that of his contemporary alAshʿarī (d. 324/935-6), represents one of the earliest statements of Sunni belief of
undoubted authenticity.110 The ʿ qīda remains the focus of an active commentary
tradition today.111 Two short theological treatises (or perhaps two versions of the same

109

Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ, al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya, 1.165-7. The earliest substantial list of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works is
found in Ibn al-Nadīm’s Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 1.31-2; it contains all of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s authenticated works that
are extant today, as well as some lost works. Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ’s list contains almost all of the works found
in Ibn al-Nadīm and includes approximately ten additional titles. These appear to be minor works, except
for al-Tārī h al- abīr and al-Tafsīr, both of which the biographical tradition suggests were major
compendiums. I have not identified Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ’s source for these additional titles. Other extensive
lists of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works can be found in al-Laknawī, al-Fawāʾid al-bahīya, 60 and Qinālīzādah, Ṭabaqāt
al-Ḥanafīya, 2.26, but these appear to be derivative of Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ.
110
On both, see W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Creeds: A Selection (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1994), 41-56. Curiously, Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ does not include the ʿ qīda in his list of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
works; however, it is mentioned by Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 1.32.
111
The commentaries on the ʿ qīda are too numerous to list here; the most important of them is that of Ibn
Abī al-ʿIzz al-Ḥanafī (d. 792/1390), Shar al-ʿ qīda al-Ṭa āwīya, ed. ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Muḥsin alTurkī and Shuʿayb al-Arnāʾūṭ (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1987). A number of medieval and modern
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treatise) bound together and attributed to al-Ṭaḥāwī are held by the Princeton University
Libraries, although they remain unauthenticated and are not reported in the biographical
tradition.112 Al-Ṭaḥāwī may also have written a heresiography entitled Kitāb al-ni al waa ā ihā wa-ṣifātihā wa-ajnāsihā (Religious Sects: Their Laws, Characteristics and
Types).113

Biography/History
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s major historical and biographical work, al-Tārī h al- abīr (The
Comprehensive Chronicle), is no longer extant, but was a source (perhaps indirectly) for
Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ’s al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya.114 Also lost are al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Manāqib bī
Ḥanīfa ( irtues of Abū Ḥanīfa) and his Radd ʿalā bī ʿUbayd fī ā a hṭaʾa fīhā (A
Refutation of Abū ʿUbayd’s Errors), which is about the Kitāb al-nasab (Genealogy) of
Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. ca. 224/838).115

Exegesis
Al-Ṭaḥāwī is reported to have written one thousand pages on the Qurʾān. That
work may be identical to the unauthenticated manuscript entitled Tafsīr al-Qurʾān

commentaries have been gathered in the three-volume Jā iʿ al-shurū wa-l-taʿlīqāt al-ʿil īya ʿalā alʿ qīda al-Ṭa āwīya (Cairo: Dār Bidāya lil-Iʿlām wa-l-Nashr, 2010).
112
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, “Hādhā kitāb al-Ṭaḥāwī fī uṣūl al-dīn,” ms., Princeton, Arabic, Third Series, no. 288. Fol.
1a-6b., 1714; al-Ṭaḥāwī, “Kitāb al-Ṭaḥāwī li-uṣūl al-dīn,” ms., Princeton, Arabic, Third Series, no. 288.
Fol. 108a-125b., 1714.
113
Al-Kawtharī mentions the work in al-Ḥāwī fī sīrat al-I ā al-Ṭa āwī, 38, without citing his source; I
have not located any mention of it in the earlier biographical tradition.
114
On borrowings from al-Tārī h al- abīr in Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ, see Tsafrir, “Semi-Ḥanafīs and Ḥanafī
Biographical Sources,” 74.
115
Al-Ṭaḥāwī nonetheless cites Abū ʿUbayd’s Kitāb al-nasab in Shar mushkil al-āthār; see below, p.
49n161.

40
(Exegesis of the Qurʾān) discovered at the Jā iʿ al-Shaykh in Alexandria bearing alṬaḥāwī’s name and beginning with Q 8/al- nfāl.116 The partially extant

ā al-

Qurʾān (The Legal Rulings of the Qurʾān) has been described in other studies as a
specialized form of Qurʾānic exegesis, because it systematically expounds the legal
rulings that can be derived from each legal verse in conjunction with other sources of the
law.117 As I have argued above,118 however, labeling al-Ṭaḥāwī’s

ā al-Qurʾān a

work of tafsīr does not do justice to its hermeneutical ambitions, and I treat it in this
study as a work of practical hermeneutics.

Ḥadīth
Three of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s major works, Shar

aʿānī al-āthār (An Elucidation of the

Meaning of Reports), Shar mushkil al-āthār (An Elucidation of Problematic Reports)
and

ā al-Qurʾān (The Legal Rulings of the Qurʾān), all contain substantial

discussion of the authority of Prophetic adīth and varying degrees of discussion of the
reliability of particular adīths and transmitters. The first two are fully extant and have
been published in multiple editions;119 the latter has been described above under

116

Institute of Arabic Manuscripts, Fihris al-makhṭūṭāt al-muṣawwara, ed. Fuʾād Sayyid (Cairo: Dār alRiyāḍ, 1954-1963), 1.29-30.
117
The first two of the original four volumes of this work are extant in unicum. Saʿd al-Dīn Ūnāl, the text’s
modern editor, notes that the final two volumes appear to have been lost or stolen from the library in the
Amasya province of northeastern Turkey where the manuscript was found, based on the fact that the
catalog numbers indicate four volumes (Ūnāl, “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq,” 11). Unlike a traditional exegesis,
however, it is organized according to the chapters of a fiqh work, not the chapters of the Qurʾān. The first
volume contains chapters on ṣalāt (prayer) to iʿti āf (seclusion in a mosque), while the second volume
begins with the Ḥajj (pilgrimage) and ends with u ātaba (contract of manumission). I have not found
mention of a commentary tradition for
ā al-Qurʾān, although the work is widely reported in the
biographical tradition.
118
See above, p. 16.
119
Shar aʿānī al-āthār was first published in two volumes in India in the late 19 th century (Lucknow: AlMaṭbaʿa al-Muṣtafāʾī, 1882-1883). This study uses the indexed edition, al-Ṭaḥāwī, Shar aʿānī al-āthār,
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“Exegesis.” Shar

aʿānī al-āthār and Shar mushkil al-āthār were influential within the

Ḥanafī tradition for their justification of Ḥanafī law on the basis of Prophetic adīth.
Shar

aʿānī al-āthār in particular attracted a number of commentaries and

abridgements. The Mamluk Sulṭān al-Muʾayyad (r. 815/1412-824/1421) created a chair
dedicated to teaching Shar

aʿānī al-āthār upon building the Muʿayyadīya Mosque in

Cairo.120 The chair was given to the Ḥanafī Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī (d. 855/1451), who
composed two commentaries on the book.121 Other scholars who wrote commentaries on
or abridgements of Shar

aʿānī al-āthār include Ibn Rushd al-Jadd (d. 520/1126) and

al-Ṭaḥāwī’s biographer, the Ḥanafī Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ.122 While Shar mushkil al-āthār
did not attract a similar commentary tradition, it was abridged by the Andalusian Mālikī
jurist Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 474/1081) and then further abridged by Yūsuf ibn Mūsā
ibn Muḥammad al-Malaṭī (d. 803/1400),123 a Ḥanafī judge active in Cairo and one of the
teachers of Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī. Another abridgement is attributed to Ibn Rushd alJadd.124
A very short treatise on adīth terminology by al-Ṭaḥāwī, al-Taswiya bayn
addathanā wa a hbaranā (The Equivalence of “He Transmitted [Directly] to Us” and
ed. Muḥammad Sayyid Jad al-Ḥaqq, Muḥammad Zuhrī al-Najjār, and Yūsuf ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Marʿashlī,
5 vols. in 4 (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1994). The earliest printed edition of Shar mushkil al-āthār
(Hyderabad: Maṭbaʿa Majlis Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif al-Niẓāmīya al-Kāʾina fī al-Hind, 1914-1915) contains
about half of the work. The full text can be found in al-Ṭaḥāwī, Shar mushkil al-āthār, ed. Shuʿayb alArnāʾūṭ, 16 vols. (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 1994), which is the edition used in this study..
120
Al-Kawtharī, al-Ḥāwī, 33-34.
121
Badr al-Dīn al-ʿAynī, Maghānī al-a hyār fī shar asā ī rijāl Ma ānī al-āthār, ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan
Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 2006); al-ʿAynī, Nukhab al-af ār fī tanqīh
abānī al-a hbār fī Shar aʿānī al-āthār, ed. Abū Tamīm Yāsir b. Ibrāhīm (Beirut: Dār al-Nawādir,
2008).
122
For a list of commentaries and abridgements of Shar aʿānī al-āthār, see Ūnāl, “Muqaddimat altaḥqīq,” 43-44.
123
Sezgin, Geschichte, 1.440. Yūsuf ibn Mūsā al-Ḥanafī’s abridgement has been published as al-Muʿtaṣar
min al-Mukhtaṣar min Shar mushkil al-āthār (Beirut: ʿĀlam al-Kutub, 1976).
124
Ūnāl, “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq,” 43.
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“He Informed Us”), is also extant.125 In it, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues against traditionists who
hold that ‘ addathanā’ exclusively indicates a adīth recited by the transmitter, while
‘a hbaranā’ should be used for cases in which the recipient of a adīth recites it to its
original transmitter, who then confirms that the recitation was correct. Instead, he argues,
the Qurʾān and Sunna use the verbs akhbara and addatha interchangeably, and so too
may adīth transmitters.
In Shar mushkil al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī also references another work on adīth
criticism, now lost, entitled Naqḍ al-Mudallisīn lil-Karabīsī (Refutation of the Book
Entitled Those Who Conceal Defects in the Transmission of Prophetic Reports by alKarabīsī).126 We have also already had occasion above to note that al-Ṭaḥāwī is the
transmitter of al-Shāfiʿī’s al-Sunan through al-Muzanī. Finally, the Khuda Baksh Library
in Patna, India holds a manuscript attributed to al-Ṭaḥāwī entitled Ṣa ī al-āthār;127
however, no biographer attributes such a work to al-Ṭaḥāwī. To the best of my
knowledge, no one has yet authenticated the manuscript or described its contents.

Law
A number of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s major legal works are both extant and published. The
three works that form the subject of this study, Shar
125

aʿānī al-āthār, Shar mushkil al-

Al-Ṭaḥāwī, al-Taswiya bayn addathanā wa a hbaranā, in Kha s rasāʾil fī ʿulū al- adīth, ed. ʿAbd
al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islamīya, 2002). This treatise does not appear in Ibn Abī
al-Wafāʾ’s catalog, but is mentioned by Ibn al-Nadīm (Fihrist, vol. 2, pt. 1.32).
126
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 6.382. In Shar mushkil al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī merely indicates that he wrote a book
on al-Karabīsī; the longer title given above is taken from the biographical tradition. Al-Karabīsī (d. 245/859
or 248/862) was a traditionist and jurist initially associated with the Ḥanafīs who later became associated
with the Shāfiʿīs. His book al-Mudallisūn is reported to criticize the traditionist and Qur’an reader alAʿmash (d. 148/765).
127
Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur (Leiden: Brill, 1943), G I, 173; Khuda Bakhsh
H.L. No. 548, Catalog No. 308. Law.
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āthār and

ā al-Qurʾān, treat law as well as adīth. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s al-Mukhtaṣar fī-l-

fiqh (Concise Manual of Legal Doctrine) represents the first Ḥanafī mukhtaṣar, and it
attracted numerous commentaries from later Ḥanafīs including al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980-981)
and al-Sarakhsī (d. ca. 483/1090).128 In al-Mukhtaṣar, al-Ṭaḥāwī sets out the rules of
Ḥanafī positive law almost entirely without justification or explanation, although he does
state his own opinion on many of the legal questions disagreed upon by earlier
Ḥanafīs.129 His lengthy I htilāf al-ʿula āʾ (Disagreements of the Jurists), extant only in
an abridgement by al-Jaṣṣāṣ, records controversies among Sunni jurists of all schools and
preserves important opinions of early jurists.130 Although al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s abridgement
contains occasional justifications of legal positions by al-Ṭaḥāwī, it, too, primarily
catalogs rules of positive law propounded by different jurists and schools. Because alMukhtaṣar and I htilāf al-ʿula āʾ are concerned with legal rules rather than how those
rules were reached, they feature only rarely in this study.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī is also important as the author of an early Ḥanafī Shurūṭ (Contract
Formulary) work. Jeanette Wakin has edited, analyzed and translated the chapters on
sales of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s partially extant al-Shurūṭ al- abīr (Comprehensive Contract

128

A list of commentaries is found in K tip elebi, Kashf al-ẓunūn, 2.1627. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s commentary has
been published as Shar Mukhtaṣar al-Ṭa āwī fī al-fiqh al-Ḥanafī, ed. ʿIṣmat Allāh ʿInāyat Allāh
Muḥammad et al. (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir al-Islāmīya, 2010). K tip elebi reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī
composed both extended and concise versions of this work (Kashf al-ẓunūn, 2.1627); the one-volume
extant work is the concise Mukhtaṣar.
129
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s disinterest in resolving differences of opinion or establishing a hierarchy of authority
among early Ḥanafī figures may be contrasted with the later Mukhtaṣar genre of the 7th/13th century, which
Mohammad Fadel describes as working to classify systematically the authoritative opinions of the school
(“The Social Logic of Taqlīd and the Rise of the Mukhtaṣar,” Islamic Law and Society 3, no. 2 (1996):
215-219).
130
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, Mukhtaṣar I htilāf al-ʿula āʾ, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Nadhīr Aḥmad (Beirut: Dār al-Bashāʾir alIslāmīya, 1995).
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Formulary) in her Function of Documents in Islamic Law;131 two additional fragments of
the work have been edited by Schacht.132 In contrast, al-Shurūṭ al-ṣaghīr (Concise
Contract Formulary) is fully extant and has been published with footnotes incorporating
the existing fragments of al-Shurūṭ al- abīr.133 The Shurūṭ al-awsaṭ (Medium Contract
Formulary) mentioned by Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ and others is now lost.
The biographical tradition also attributes many other legal works to al-Ṭaḥāwī
that are no longer extant. His Shar al-Jā iʿ al- abīr (Commentary on the Major
Compendium) and Shar al-Jā iʿ al-ṣaghīr (Commentary on the Minor Compendium)
refer to two of the major works of Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805).
Ibn al-Nadīm lists works entitled al-Ma ādīr wa-l-sijjilāt (Minutes of the Court and
Records of the Qāḍī’s Judgments), al-Waṣāya (Bequests) and al-Farāʾiḍ (Inheritance
Shares) in his entry on al-Ṭaḥāwī. However, these are most likely identical to chapters
with those titles found within al-Ṭaḥāwī’s larger compendiums.134 Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ also
reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī wrote “a book based upon the “Chapter on Coitus Interruptus as a
Technique of Birth Control” ( itāb aṣluhu itāb al-ʿazl). Other lost legal works include
al-Nawādir al-fiqhīya (Legal Rarities), Ḥu

arāḍī Ma a (The Legal Status of the

Lands Surrounding Mecca), Qasm al-fayʾ wa-l-ghanāʾi (The Division of Spoils and
Booty), I htilāf al-riwāyāt ʿalā adhhab al-Kufīyīn (Divergent Legal Opinions of Kūfan

131

The Function of Documents in Islamic Law, ed. Jeanette Wakin (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1972).
132
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Das Kitāb ad ār al- uqūq war-ruhūn aus de al- ā iʿ al- abīr fi - urūṭ des bū aʿfar
ad ibn Mu a ad aṭ-Ṭa āwī, ed. Joseph Schacht (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1927) and al-Ṭaḥāwī, Das
Kitāb a - uf a aus de al-Gā i al- abīr fi - urut des bū aʿfar
ad ibn Mu a ad at-Ṭa āwī, ed.
Joseph Schacht (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1930).
133
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, al-Shurūṭ al-ṣaghīr, udhayyalan bi- ā ʿuthira ʿalayhā in al-Shurūṭ al- abīr, ed. Rawḥī
Awzān (Baghdad: Dīwān al-Awqāf, 1974).
134
The first three are chapters in al-Shurūṭ al-ṣaghīr; the latter two are found in al-Mukhtaṣar.
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School), al-Ashriba ((Alcoholic) Beverages)135 and al-Radd ʿalā ʿĪsā ibn bān
(Refutation of ʿĪsā ibn Abān).136

Lost Works of Undetermined Subject
Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ reports that al-Ṭaḥāwī wrote a work called al-Nawādir wa-li āyāt (Rarities and Recountings). In al-Ḥāwī fī sīrat al-I ā al-Ṭa āwī, al-Kawtharī
mentions a work by al-Ṭaḥāwī on ri īya (calamities) for which he gives no source.137
Ismāʿīl Pāshā also attributes works entitled al-Khiṭābāt (Discourses) and al-Mish āt (The
Lamp) to al-Ṭaḥāwī, likewise giving no indication of the source for his citations.138

Authorship and Composition
In the course of this study I reconstruct al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought by bringing
together passages from his three hermeneutical works. My approach rests upon the
assumption that all of these texts can meaningfully be said to be the work of a single
jurist, an assumption that Norman Calder has questioned by labeling Shar

aʿānī al-

āthār and Shar mushkil al-āthār as “school texts, accumulating over time, and subject
135

Al-Kawtharī mentions Kitāb al-ashriba in al-Ḥāwī, 38, saying that it was one of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s books
brought to the Maghrib by Abū al-Qāsim Hishām al-Ruʿaynī. Al-Kawtharī appears to have concluded that
al-Ruʿaynī brought al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works to North Africa based on al-Ruʿaynī’s status as transmitter of all
three of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works listed in Ibn Khayr al-Ishbīlī’s (d. 575/1179 or 80) Fihrisa, an important catalog
of texts written in or transmitted to al-Andalus by the late 6th/12th century (Fihrisat Ibn Khayr al-Ishbīlī, ed.
Muḥammad Fuʾād Manṣūr (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya, 1998), 168, 229). However, Arnāʾūṭ notes that
the next transmitter in the isnād of Shar mushkil al-āthār, Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Aḥmad al-Tamīmī
al-Qurṭubī (d. 416/1025), traveled to Egypt, where he met al-Ruʿaynī, so it may be the al-Ruʿaynī did not
personally transmit these works to North Africa (Shuʿayb Arnāʿūṭ, “Muqaddimat al-taḥqīq,” Introduction to
Shar mushkil al-āthār (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 2010), 18).
136
ʿĪsā b. Abān (d. 189/804) was a proto-Ḥanafī. Apart from Kitāb al-ashriba, the works mentioned in this
paragraph are all found in Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ.
137
Al-Kawtharī, al-Ḥāwī, 38.
138
Ismāʿīl Pasha, Hadīyat al-ʿārifīn as āʾ al- uʾallifīn wa-āthār al-muṣannifīn (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ alTurāth al-ʿArabī, 1951), 1.58.
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perhaps to redactional supervision by Ṭaḥāwī.”139 That is, although Calder accepts that
the works attributed to al-Ṭaḥāwī likely date from his lifetime, he does not view them as
reflecting a single, unified authorial voice. My own more extensive analysis of alṬaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works does not support this conclusion. When Calder composed
his Studies in Islamic Jurisprudence, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s

ā al-Qurʾān had yet to be

discovered, and the only printed edition of Shar mushkil al-āthār contained about half of
the full text. My analysis of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical writing is therefore based on a
larger body of textual evidence than was available to Calder as well as a closer study of
that material.
By tracing several important markers across the twenty-one total volumes of alṬaḥāwī’s extant hermeneutical works, I have found strong evidence that they represent a
single authorial voice. The three works employ a consistent range of hermeneutical
techniques and a stable technical vocabulary. The same phrases and sentences often
reappear across works in association with particular theoretical topics. They also appeal
to a consistent set of legal authorities: if a jurist is of sufficient importance to al-Ṭaḥāwī
that he cites his legal opinions at least five times in the course of his works, then that
jurist will almost certainly be mentioned in all three texts.140 In addition, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
positions on questions of legal theory are consistent across works with only one
exception: Shar

139

aʿānī al-āthār appears in several places to permit the abrogation of

Calder, Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence, 229.
The major apparent exception to this rule is the absence from Shar aʿānī al-āthār of any explicit
mention of al-Shāfiʿī, who appears regularly in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other works. This absence is stylistic rather
than substantive, however; although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not refer to al-Shāfiʿī by name, he cites al-Shāfiʿī’s
ideas anonymously. In general, Shar aʿānī al-āthār contains fewer named references to jurists than alṬaḥāwī’s other hermeneutical works.
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Prophetic adīth by Companion consensus, while Shar mushkil al-āthār vehemently
denies the possibility.141
The observations above suggest that it is justifiable to reconstruct al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
legal theory by combining statements from these three works. Questions remain,
however, concerning how these texts were composed and consumed. Many of the
muṣannafāt (textual compilations) of 3rd/9th-century scholars cannot be considered true
books; that is, they are not systematic works composed in writing and intended for
written publication.142 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works bear many of the features
associated with true books, however. They begin with introductions, however brief,
describing the author’s goals and approach. Although the introductions do not contain a
list of each book’s contents, al-Ṭaḥāwī often signals the transition between chapters in
ā al-Qurʾān by announcing that a certain chapter has concluded.143 In the
introduction to each work, al-Ṭaḥāwī also refers to himself as composing a book ( itāb);
the introduction to Shar

aʿānī al-āthār contains the conventional claim that he is

writing at the request of an unnamed colleague.144
Each of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works also contains internal cross-references
to discussions that have appeared in earlier chapters or will appear in later chapters. Such
references are strongly associated with books and written composition, because they
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reveal that the author has a mental conception of his work as a sequential whole.145
Examining a selection of internal references within

ā al-Qurʾān, I had no difficulty

in locating the passages referred to for extant parts of the work.146 Perhaps more telling
are the internal references within Shar mushkil al-āthār, a text with no apparent overall
structure, although chapters in close proximity with each other often treat similar
issues.147 To test the accuracy of these references, I examined Volume 7, in which I
identified 11 mentions of earlier passages and 8 mentions of upcoming passages, for a
total of 19 internal references.148 Of these, I was able to identify 14 of the passages
referred to, although one passage stated that a certain topic would be discussed in a future
chapter, when in fact I located the discussion in an earlier chapter. 149 Although most
references were to passages that were no more than 20 pages away, 4 references
concerned passages in other volumes.150 I was unable to identify the passages referred to
in 5 references;151 however, it is possible that the adīths mentioned appear as support for
an argument without being clearly connected to the subject of the chapter, which would
make them nearly impossible to locate in the absence of a word-searchable text. The
frequency and overall accuracy of the internal references with Shar mushkil al-āthār
145
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suggests that, despite the apparent disorganization of the text, it was composed as a book,
perhaps intended to be edited later.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works also show evidence of belonging to a fledging
world of books making intertextual reference to each other. Although his works do not
quote or reference other books on the same scale that would become common in later
centuries, he refers to a number of works by title. In law, he cites titles from each of the
three major madhhabs of his day as well as the Kitāb al-a wāl of the early jurist Abū
ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām (d. 224/838).152 The Ḥanafī works quoted are Abū Yūsuf’s
(d. 182/798) Kitāb al-i lāʾ153 and al-Shaybānī’s (d. 189/805) al-Siyar al- abīr, alZiyādāt and al-Nawādir;154 he also draws upon Mālik’s (d. 179/795) al-Muwaṭṭaʾ,155 the
Mālikī Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam’s (d. 214/829) al-Mukhtaṣar al-ṣaghīr,156 al-Shāfiʿī’s alWaṣāyā,157 and al-Muzanī’s (d. 264/868) al-Mukhtaṣar.158 In the fields of biography and
history, he cites al-Maghā ī by Ibn Isḥāq (d. 150/767),159 al-Siyar by al-Wāqidī (d.
207/822),160 al-Nasab by Abū ʿUbayd,161 al-Ṭabaqāt by Ibn Saʿd (d. 230/845)162 and alTārī h al- abīr by al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870).163 In adīth, linguistics, and Qurʾān, he refers
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to Gharīb al- adīth and al-Qirāʾāt by Abū ʿUbayd,164 an unnamed Kitāb on adīth by
Yaḥyā ibn Maʿīn (d. 233/847),165 Maʿānī al-Qurʾān by al-Farrāʾ (d. 207/833),166 and the
Iṣlā al-manṭiq by Ibn al-Sikkīt (d. 244/858).167
Most importantly, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works accurately crossreference each other, confirming that that they should be considered books representing
the corpus of a single jurist. In Shar mushkil al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī accurately refers the
reader to discussions in his earlier works of
āthār.168

ā al-Qurʾān and Shar

ā al-Qurʾān in turn makes reference to Shar

aʿānī al-

aʿānī al-āthār.169 The

latter contains no references to earlier or later works. These internal references suggest a
composition order of (1) Shar

aʿānī al-āthār, (2)

ā al-Qurʾān and, finally, (3)

Shar mushkil al-āthār. The biographical tradition likewise identifies Shar

aʿānī al-

āthār as al-Ṭaḥāwī’s first work and Shar mushkil al-āthār as his last work;170 however,
this information may well have been extracted from these same internal references and so
cannot necessarily be taken as independent confirmation.
While there is strong evidence for considering

ā al-Qurʾān, Shar

aʿānī

al-āthār and Shar mushkil al-āthār to be the written compositions of al-Ṭaḥāwī, Shar

references within al-Tārī h al- abīr: Mushkil, 3.8, 4.390, 5.288, 6.156, 7.123, 8.37, 10.436, 10.437, 12.26,
15.342. Finally, al-Ṭaḥāwī quotes an unnamed work of al-Bukhārī in the following passages, but they
cannot be clearly identified as part of al-Tārī h al- abīr: 4.390, 6.81, 9.70, 9.237, 12.328, 14.488.
164
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mushkil al-āthār contains some evidence of subsequent oral transmission in the form of
statements at the beginning of a number of chapters indicating that Abū al-Qāsim Hishām
al-Ruʿaynī (d. 376/986) transmitted the ensuing material from al-Ṭaḥāwī.171 Given the
independence of individual chapters within these works, they also lend themselves to
being taught orally. While the length and complexity of some individual chapters would
seem to require written consumption, many other chapters are brief and suitable for oral
publication. Further, it is possible that Calder is correct that some of the material for alṬaḥāwī’s works came from earlier texts, oral or written. However, any such earlier
material has been brought so thoroughly under the control of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s distinctive
authorial voice that it is reasonable to consider all material in these works to be his.172 In
consequence, I treat al-Ṭaḥāwī’s authorship of Shar

aʿānī al-āthār,

ā al-Qurʾān

and Shar mushkil al-āthār as unproblematic in the chapters that follow.
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Chapter One: Qurʾān and Sunna

The mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition understood Islamic law to be grounded in two
textual sources, the Qurʾān and Sunna, both of which were revealed through the Prophet
Muḥammad gradually over the course of about twenty years, from 610 CE until his death
in 632 CE. While Muḥammad served as God’s conduit for both kinds of revelation, legal
theorists carefully distinguished between them. The Qurʾān was wa y atlū (recited
revelation), a miraculous text recording God’s direct speech. The Sunna, in contrast, was
wa y ghayr atlū (non-recited revelation), a collection of reports about the statements
and actions of Muḥammad that only over time came to be viewed as revelation.
173

Jurists distinguished between the Qurʾān and Sunna in other ways as well. While the

Qurʾān was a single, well-defined text whose authenticity and accuracy were held to be
epistemologically certain, the Sunna was an amorphous body of reports whose
epistemological status individually and collectively was subject to debate.174 In order to
assure the status of the Sunna as revelation, jurists developed theories of the immunity of
Muḥammad to disobedience against God and to many kinds of error.175
This chapter examines the Qurʾān and Sunna in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought as expressed
across his hermeneutical works of

ā al-Qurʾān, Shar

aʿānī al-āthār and Shar

mushkil al-āthār. In addition to comparing his theories to those of the mature uṣūl al-fiqh
tradition, I will consider his ideas against those of other early jurists, with special
173
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emphasis on al-Shāfiʿī, whom one recent study has portrayed as the major source for alṬaḥāwī’s discussion of the Sunna.176 After examining al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments for the
revelatory status of Qurʾān and Sunna, I will argue that, in contrast to both al-Shāfiʿī and
the mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition, al-Ṭaḥāwī did not draw an absolute ontological
distinction between Qurʾān and Sunna.
I will then turn to issues affecting only the Sunna, including adīth epistemology
and terminology, to argue that al-Ṭaḥāwī also does not draw a strong distinction between
Prophetic and post-Prophetic adīth, a theme which will be further explored in the next
chapter. Finally, I will look at al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of Muḥammad’s ijtihād (legal
reasoning) to show that, while al-Ṭaḥāwī and later jurists both use discussions of
Muḥammad’s infallibility to support the status of the Sunna as revelation, they do so in
very different ways. While many later jurists would claim that Muḥammad is infallible
even in his ijtihād, since God would not permit him to continue in an error, al-Ṭaḥāwī
uses Muḥammad’s ijtihād as a kind of safety valve to explain potentially embarrassing
adīths which might cast doubt on the status of Muḥammad’s words as revelation.

Qurʾān
Unsurprisingly, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant legal works largely take for granted the
Qurʾān as a source of law. Like the authors of later uṣūl al-fiqh texts, al-Ṭaḥāwī feels it
unnecessary to argue in his legal works for the Qurʾān’s status as revelation.177 The only
question related to the legal standing of the Qurʾān that al-Ṭaḥāwī addresses concerns the
176
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persistence of the Qurʾān’s legal provisions after Muḥammad’s death. In response to Abū
Yūsuf’s (d. 182/798) claim that certain legal verses (here, the command in Q 4/alNisāʾ:102 to undertake the prayer of fear) are addressed specifically to Muḥammad and
therefore cease to apply after his death, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that the verse in question is an
example of a text that has a specific ( hāṣṣ) addressee without intending to exclude other
addressees. 178 While there are indeed some (unspecified) legal verses which require
Muḥammad’s physical presence for their application, this verse is not one of them. Here,
the caliphs may fill Muḥammad’s role. There are also other verses in the Qurʾān which
address some or all of Muḥammad’s contemporaries which nonetheless extend to all
legally competent Muslims in perpetuity. For example, Q 2/al-Baqara:185 states that “all
of you” who witness the new month of Ramadan should fast, yet does not intend only
those who were legally competent Muslims at the time of revelation.179 The legal
obligations (farāʾiḍ) in these verses are not abolished with the death of the Qurʾān’s
original audience; rather, all those acquiring the legal status of the original addressees
become addressees as well.
It is important to note that al-Ṭaḥāwī is not arguing here for the general
persistence of Qurʾānic obligations after the death of Muḥammad, a principle he takes for
granted. Instead, he is considering a more limited subset of legal verses—those addressed
specifically to Muḥammad or to a restricted set of his contemporaries—in order to
178
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determine which verses are temporally bound to his lifetime and which have more
general application. The unusual length of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s response, at six paragraphs,
suggests that he found Abū Yūsuf’s claim particularly threatening to his understanding of
the Qurʾān as a stable and persistent source of law—in fact, the source that guarantees the
authority of all other legal sources. In addition, the atypically large number of Qurʾānic
examples adduced serves to preemptively protect other Qurʾānic verses from this kind of
restrictive reading, which, if taken seriously, could disrupt such foundational legal
matters as the Ramadan fast and the permission to shorten prayer while traveling. Despite
the anxieties in this passage, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī generally considers the status of the
Qurʾān as a source of law unproblematic, and I have located no other similar discussions
in his extant works.

Sunna
Historical Development
The same cannot be said for the status of the Sunna as a source of law. While
classical and modern Islamic legal theorists overwhelmingly recognize the Sunna as a
second form of revelation on par with the Qurʾān, early Islamic legal thought was much
more diverse in its understanding of the status accorded to Muḥammad’s words and
actions. This diversity reflects the fact that Islamic law emerged only gradually in the
first two centuries of Islamic history as a result of the efforts of private individuals
seeking to understand how God wished them to act in different situations. Over time,
recognizable trends emerged in how these pious individuals approached legal problems,
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and jurists collectively achieved a religious authority within Muslim societies—an
authority that both guaranteed and stood apart from the authority of the state.
Nonetheless, the legal field as a whole remained quite diverse until the maturation of the
madhhabs (schools of legal thought) in the second half of the 4th/10th century.
One thing that appears to be true of all these proto-jurists is that they considered
the Qurʾān, which had been canonized during the 1st/7th century, to be legally
authoritative in a general sense, even if a small number of rules of positive law seem to
have developed independently of the relevant Qurʾānic material.180 However, the Qurʾān
is not primarily a legal document, and it contains no guidance for many situations in
which one might wish to know the law. To compensate for this paucity of legal guidance,
pious individuals sought legal rulings for the young Muslim community through a variety
of methods, including looking to raʾy (discretionary reasoning) and sunna (a pre-Islamic
concept indicating the practice of the community or of important individuals within it).181
Throughout most of the 1st/7th century, the term sunna did not refer primarily to the
Prophet’s example, as it would later come to do.182 Instead, the term embraced both the
exemplary actions of individuals and the customary behavior of the community as a
whole.183
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It is at the end of the 1st/7th century and the beginning of the 2nd/8th century that
Muḥammad’s Sunna (sunnat rasūl llāh) appears alongside and then eventually
overtakes the more general concept of sunna. The interest in Muḥammad’s Sunna
indicates the growing importance attached to basing the law on specifically Islamic
sources.184 Concurrent with the rise of interest in Muḥammad’s Sunna among legal
specialists, another, partially overlapping group of pious individuals became particularly
interested in the transmission and, eventually, the recording of adīths, which concretize
Muḥammad’s Sunna in the form of reports in the voices of those who witnessed his
words and actions. The traditionists, or scholars interested in the collection and recording
of adīths, produced several important early adīth collections in the 2nd/8th century,
including the Muṣannaf of Ibn Jurayj (d. 150/767), the Jā iʿ al- abīr and al-Jā iʿ alṣaghīr of Sufyān al-Thawrī (d. 161/778) and, slightly later, the Musnad of al-Ṭayālisī (d.
204/819).185 Although these collections do not exclusively contain Prophetic adīths,
they indicate a growing interest in preserving the Sunna of Muḥammad as text.186
In the second half of the 2nd/8th century, jurists began to justify their legal
doctrines with reference to Prophetic adīth.187 As this practice took hold, some jurists
started to perceive the legal field as divided into two camps: the ahl al- adīth, or those
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who relied on traditions to support their legal opinions, and the ahl al-raʾy, or those who
held that they could use their considered opinion to answer legal questions. As the 2nd/8th
and 3rd/9th centuries progressed, the term ahl al-raʾy, most associated with the protoḤanafīs, acquired an increasingly negative connotation. The polemical language of ahl
al- adīth/ahl al-raʾy, however, obscures considerable diversity and complexity in how
early jurists engaged with Prophetic reports. For example, the proto-Ḥanafī jurists,
accused of being ahl al-raʾy, acknowledged the legal force of the Sunna just as the
traditionists did. Where they differed from the traditionists was in their method of legal
writing, which did not frequently cite adīth, even while acknowledging their authority.
The proto-Ḥanafīs also demanded a higher standard of evidence than the traditionalists
for recognizing the authenticity of individual adīths, a requirement which radically
reduced the number of adīths available to support a given legal argument.188
Neither were the ahl al- adīth a monolithic group. Some scholars were motivated
by their pious desire for closeness with the Prophet to devote their energies to preserving
and transmitting adīth, while others, whom Christopher Melchert has labeled
“traditionist-jurisprudents” and who were often associated with the proto-Ḥanafī school,
wrote about legal questions by adducing large numbers of adīth, usually without
offering further argument.189 Instead, the form of argumentation relied upon by both
traditionists and traditionist-jurisprudents concerned the authentification of adīth by
means of rijāl (transmitter) criticism, which inquired into the moral probity of each link
188
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in the chain of authorities who transmitted a adīth from generation to generation. Even
among traditionists, Prophetic adīth was far from established as the exclusive extraQurʾānic source of the law; through much of the 3rd/9th century, traditionists cited mostly
Companion and Successor adīths in their collections except when engaging polemically
with the ahl al-raʾy.190
Other jurists combined elements of the two approaches, contributing to a process
that over time would lead to the disappearance of the ahl al- adīth and ahl al-raʾy as
opposing groups in favor of a shared understanding of the role of Prophetic Sunna among
jurists. The best known of these “compromisers” is, of course, al-Shāfiʿī (d. 204/820),
who reasoned about the law and its structure, but who understood legal reasoning
primarily as textual hermeneutics and thus, like traditionalists, accorded great importance
to adīth.191 Unlike the traditionists, however, he does not engage in significant isnād
criticism.192 Among the proto-Ḥanafīs, ʿĪsā b. Abān (d. 221/836) exemplifies a growing
interest in adīth; he is the first proto-Ḥanafī to write systematically about adīth
epistemology, although he does not consistently incorporate adīths into his legal
arguments.193 Likewise, the Iraqi Ḥanafī Ibn Shujāʿ al-Thaljī (d. 266/880) is reported to
have strengthened Abū Ḥanīfa’s jurisprudence by means of adīth, although he is also
said to have had a higher allegiance to the doctrine of Abū Ḥanīfa than to Prophetic
adīth.194
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The growth of a shared understanding of the role of Sunna is strongly evident in
the works of al-Ṭaḥāwī. Although he still deems it necessary to argue explicitly for the
authority of Prophetic adīth, I have identified only one direct reference in his works to
the divide between ahl al- adīth and ahl al-raʾy. In the Mukhtaṣar, al-Ṭaḥāwī declares
that a judgeship may be given “neither to a proponent of raʾy (ṣā ib al-raʾy), who has no
knowledge of Sunna and adīth, nor to a proponent of adīth (ṣā ib al- adīth), who has
no knowledge of jurisprudence (fiqh).”195 Further, it was al-Ṭaḥāwī who would engage
systematically in the work of supporting Ḥanafī fiqh with reference to the Sunna. Unlike
earlier Ḥanafīs, he provides full isnāds for the adīths he adduces and sometimes
practices isnād criticism. Both are characteristics of traditionist jurisprudence.196
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s central role in the systematic justification of Ḥanafī positive law
through Prophetic adīth is widely acknowledged by those who have written on alṬaḥāwī’s legal thought, including Joseph Schacht, Norman Calder, Behnam Sadeghi and
Ahmed El Shamsy.197 What has received less attention is al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought regarding
the Sunna and its relationship to the Qurʾān. A careful study of his statements on this
topic reveals that al-Ṭaḥāwī was not, as is often stated or implied by those writing about
his role justifying Ḥanafī law through adīth, merely continuing a project begun by alShāfiʿī after his change of allegiance from Shāfiʿism to Ḥanafism. Instead, al-Ṭaḥāwī has
a theory of the relationship between Qurʾān and Sunna that is distinct from both that of
al-Shāfiʿī and later jurists.
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The Authority of the Sunna
Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues for the authority of Prophetic Sunna in the introductions to two
of his works,

ā al-Qurʾān and Shar mushkil al-āthār. The relevant passage in

ā al-Qurʾān follows a discussion of the equivocal ( utashābih) verses of the
Qurʾān.198 Mutashābih verses, he tells us, are clarified either in another, unequivocal
(mu kam) Qurʾānic verse or by a rule expressed in the Prophet’s Sunna. Having
established that the Sunna can explain the Qurʾān, al-Ṭaḥāwī pauses to state his argument
for the authority of the Prophetic word in general. He writes that “God has commanded
us to accept what comes from His Messenger orally (qawlan), just as He has commanded
us to accept from him His Book as a recitation (qabūl itābihi inhu qurʾānan).”199
Al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces three kinds of evidence in support of this claim. First, he cites
three Qurʾānic proof texts: (1) Q 59/al-Ḥashr:7 (“Whatever the messenger gives you, take
it. Whatever he forbids you to have, leave it alone”); (2) Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:64 (“We did not
send any messenger except that he might be obeyed by God’s permission”); and (3) Q
14/Ibrāhīm:4 (“We never sent any messenger except using the language of his people, for
him to make [the message] clear to them”). The only comment he offers on these verses
is that they affirm our obligation to accept what God sends us through the Prophet [i.e.,
the Sunna], which is like our obligation to accept his recitation of the Qurʾān.200 Beyond
this commentary, we may note that the first two verses concern the command to obey
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Muḥammad, while the third defines Muḥammad’s role as clarifying God’s message. AlṬaḥāwī next supports the authority of adīth with adīth by citing several versions of a
report in which the Prophet condemns those who, after receiving an order from him,
continue to laze about, saying that they only follow the Qurʾān.201 Finally, he argues that
the confirmed historical occurrence of abrogation between the Qurʾān and Sunna
demonstrates that the Sunna must be from God, because otherwise it could not have
abrogated the Qurʾān.202
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument for the authority of the Sunna in the introduction to Shar
mushkil al-āthār is considerably less detailed. After stating that God sent Muḥammad as
the seal of the prophets and the Qurʾān as the seal of the scriptures, al-Ṭaḥāwī observes
that Muḥammad is different from other Muslims. They owe him special deference
because he speaks revelation:
God commanded the Believers not to raise their voices above that of the Prophet
or to place themselves ahead of him. In Q 53/al-Najm:3-4 (“Nor does he speak
out of caprice. This is simply a revelation that is being revealed”), He informed
them that He had entrusted [Muḥammad with authority] in his speech.203
His next statement, again supported by a Qurʾānic proof text, concerns the obligation to
obey Muḥammad:
In Q 59/al-Ḥashr:7 (“Whatever the messenger gives you, take it. Whatever he
forbids you to have, leave it alone”), He commanded them to accept what He sent
them through the Prophet, and to refrain from what He prohibited through him.204
The last two proof texts contain warnings for those who fail to heed this obligation:
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In Q 49/al-Ḥujurāt:2 (“Do not raise your voices above that of the prophet, and do
not speak loudly to him, as you do to one another”) He prohibited them from
acting toward him as they act toward each other. He warned them “lest their
works fail while they were unaware.”205
In Q 24/al-Nūr:63 (“Let those who dissent from His command beware lest a trial
or a painful punishment befall them”), He likewise warned those who disobey the
Prophet’s command.206
These verses conclude al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument for the authority of the Sunna in
Shar mushkil al-āthār. We may note that all of his evidence comes from Qurʾānic proof
texts, and that only one of those proof texts (Q 59/al-Ḥashr:7) also appears in the
introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān. His argument in Shar mushkil al-āthār is immediately

followed by a description of the difficulty some jurists have in understanding adīth
correctly, which leads them to the dangerous delusion that adīths contradict one another.
His purpose in writing this book is to clarify the meanings of difficult adīths for such
people.207 The authority of the Sunna and jurists’ misapprehensions concerning the
coherence of adīth thus appear to be related issues for al-Ṭaḥāwī.208
On the basis of these outlines of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments for the authority of the
Sunna, we may evaluate a comment by Ahmed El Shamsy that al-Ṭaḥāwī “adopted alShāfiʿī’s justification for the systematic incorporation of Hadith into jurisprudence.”209
Three successive chapters of al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla argue for the authority of Prophetic
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adīth.210 Lowry usefully summarizes their argument as follows: “Shāfiʿī first shows that
the Qurʾān has required faith in God and faith in Muḥammad. He next argues that the
Qurʾān refers to itself and the Sunna whenever it uses the pair itāb and ikma,
respectively. Finally, God, in the Qurʾān, has specifically required obedience to
Muḥammad.”211
Al-Shāfiʿī’s first point concerns faith: Muslims are required to believe in God’s
Messenger as well as God Himself.212 This argument does not appear in either of the
passages from al-Ṭaḥāwī discussed above, although he does cite belief in Muḥammad as
an obligation in his ʿ qīda (Creed).213 It appears that, for al-Ṭaḥāwī, faith in Muḥammad
is a theological principle, but not an argument for the authority of Prophetic adīth. AlShāfiʿī’s second argument equates the ikma (wisdom) mentioned in the Qurʾān with the
Sunna,214 a claim not found in any of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works. Al-Shāfiʿī’s final point, that
God commanded us to obey Muḥammad, is the only argument that the two jurists share
in common. Even here, however, only one of the proof texts adduced by al-Shāfiʿī (Q
24/al-Nūr:63, “Let those who dissent from His command beware lest a trial or a painful
punishment befall them”), is also adduced by al-Ṭaḥāwī.215 Further, al-Ṭaḥāwī makes
arguments not found in the Risāla: that the authority of the Sunna is supported by adīth
and that it is supported by the confirmed occurrence of abrogation between the Qurʾān
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and Sunna. In light of these substantial differences, it is difficult to accept the claim that
al-Ṭaḥāwī was employing al-Shāfiʿī’s justifications.
A second claim concerning the relationship between the two jurists’ arguments
appears in Aisha Musa’s Ḥadīth as Scripture, where she argues that “unlike the works of
al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s work is not a direct response to any outright
denial or criticism of the Ḥadīth that he has encountered; rather it addresses what he sees
in the Ḥadīth that others may perceive as problematic because of their lack of knowledge
or understanding.”216 Later she writes that “his change from the defensive, adversarial
tone that characterizes the works of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba is an indication of the
relative success of the concept of the duality of revelation and the increasing confidence
of its adherents.”217
Musa is correct in observing that al-Ṭaḥāwī never accuses any individual or group
of denying the legal force of the Sunna. She is surely also correct in noting the more
widespread acceptance of the authority of the Sunna by the time of al-Ṭaḥāwī, which
must be a factor contributing to his less adversarial language. However, Musa’s analysis
overstates al-Ṭaḥāwī’s confidence in the general acceptance of the Sunna, because it fails
to take into account his intended audience. While Ibn Qutayba might write a long diatribe
against those who deny the Sunna,218 al-Ṭaḥāwī could not, because he identified himself
with the very proto-Ḥanafīs who were accused of not relying sufficiently on adīth in
their legal arguments. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works are not polemical condemnations of a
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villainized Other, but are rather intended to convince the jurists of his own proto-Ḥanafī
school that all of their laws are justifiable by adīth and that they should engage in the
work of that justification.
That al-Ṭaḥāwī still perceived the Sunna to require justification is demonstrated
by the introductions to

ā al-Qurʾān and Shar mushkil al-āthār. Very little of al-

Ṭaḥāwī’s writing consists of extended arguments; the fact that he dedicates much of two
of the only overtly theoretical passages in his works to this argument suggests that he was
not confident that the authority of the Sunna was self-evident. Further, in a number of
passages within the body of his works, al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts that Prophetic adīth may not
be ignored in favor of naẓar (juristic speculation) or any other non-revelatory source of
the law.219 These assertions appear in response to discrete legal opinions of other jurists
that are in conflict with adīth. That al-Ṭaḥāwī does not label as adīth deniers these
jurists whose opinions conflict with adīth must be a function of their mutual
identification with the proto-Ḥanafī school.
Likewise, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s sustained attention to “what he sees in the adīth that
others may perceive as problematic” is not separate from his need to justify the authority
of the Sunna.220 Rather, his underlying argument appears to be that some jurists have not
been properly relying on adīth because they do not fully understand them.221 In both
ā al-Qurʾān and Shar mushkil al-āthār, after arguing for the authority of the
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Sunna, al-Ṭaḥāwī devotes the remainder of the text to demonstrating that adīths do not
conflict with each other and that they underlie the rules of Ḥanafī fiqh. In this sense, these
works are extended arguments for the authority of the Sunna, and they betray an
underlying anxiety that this authority is not universally acknowledged. Were it so, then
al-Ṭaḥāwī would no more have needed to write three lengthy works demonstrating the
coherence of the Sunna than he needed to demonstrate the authority and coherence of the
Qurʾān. While Musa is doubtless correct about the overall movement toward universal
acceptance of the Sunna as a source of law, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concerns about the authority of
the Sunna are still surprisingly close to those of al-Shāfiʿī. Although al-Shāfiʿī and alṬaḥāwī employ quite different sets of arguments to justify the authority of the Sunna and
to deny that the appearance of contradiction among adīths casts that authority into
doubt, notably little change has occurred in the central questions about the authority of
the Sunna during the intervening two generations.

The Relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunna
Bayān
Al-Ṭaḥāwī thus takes the authority of the Qurʾān for granted while devoting two
of the very rare theory-driven discussions within his surviving works of practical
hermeneutics to the authority of Prophetic adīth. To understand al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of
revelation, however, we must also consider how he perceives the Qurʾān and Sunna in
relation to each other. Here, again, El Shamsy sees al-Ṭaḥāwī’s “indebtedness” to alShāfiʿī, writing that the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān “mirrors closely al-Shāfiʿī’s
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discussion of the issue of bayān in the Risāla.”222 To evaluate this claim, we must first
briefly discuss the concept of bayān (clearness; legislative statement) in the Risāla.
Immediately following his introductory chapter, al-Shāfiʿī sets out four modes of bayān:
(1) rules which appear in an explicit text (naṣṣ) of the Qurʾān; (2) rules which appear in
the Qurʾān and are explained in the Sunna; (3) rules which appear only in the Sunna; and
(4) rules which must be derived by ijtihād, because they do not appear in the Qurʾān or
Sunna.223 Lowry observes that al-Shāfiʿī employs the term bayān to “denote a mechanical
or architectural feature of the divine law, specifically the finite number of ways that God
uses the two revealed legal source texts—the Qurʾān and the Sunna—to express rules of
law.”224 The key points here are that bayān refers to a “catalog” 225 of ways in which the
law is expressed, and that this catalog is both finite and comprehensive. Elsewhere,
Lowry has demonstrated that al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of bayān is driven by his overriding
concern with establishing that the Qurʾān and Sunna do not contradict one another, but
rather function together to form a single, coherent expression of the law.226
Returning to the introduction of

ā al-Qurʾān, we may summarize the

relevant points of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument as follows: God informed us in His Book (Q
3/Āl ʿImrān:7) that the Qurʾān contains both mu kam (unequivocal) and utashābih
(equivocal) verses. The ruling contained in the equivocal verses should be sought first in
222
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the unequivocal verses, then in the rulings that God promulgated through the Prophet in
order to illustrate what was ambiguous in the Book.227 El Shamsy identifies the mu kam
verses as those in which the Qurʾān is sufficient to state a rule, while the utashābih
verses require the Qurʾān to be supplemented by the Sunna; both situations are
encompassed by al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of bayān.228 El Shamsy’s summary overlooks an
important aspect of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument, however, which is that the meaning of the
equivocal verses must first be sought in the unequivocal verses of the Qurʾān, before it is
then (thumma) sought in the Sunna. That is, al-Ṭaḥāwī is describing a methodology for
determining the meaning of equivocal verses rather than setting out a catalog of the ways
in which God expresses the law.
That al-Ṭaḥāwī’s purpose in the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān is different than

al-Shāfiʿī’s purpose in the Risāla is confirmed by the fact that al-Ṭaḥāwī mentions no
further modes for expressing legal rules in this passage. Indeed, nowhere in any of his
extant works does al-Ṭaḥāwī set out a catalog of the ways in which Qurʾān and Sunna
may combine to express the law. In this he resembles later legal theorists, who were not
concerned with presenting a unified theory of the “law’s architecture” as was alShāfiʿī.229 All this is not to say that al-Ṭaḥāwī would not have recognized and approved
of al-Shāfiʿī’s modes of bayān; in the course of his works he discusses rules promulgated
through Qurʾān alone, Qurʾān explained by Sunna, Sunna alone, and ijtihād. If he were to
create a catalog of these modes, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī would need to add a possibility not
discussed by al-Shāfiʿī: a rule which appears in the Sunna and is explained by the Qurʾān.
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In a variety of situations al-Ṭaḥāwī observes that a certain adīth cannot be interpreted or
is otherwise not adequate to establish the law. In such cases, an indication must be sought
from the Qurʾān, Sunna, or Consensus.230 It is important to note that al-Ṭaḥāwī does not
use terms from the root b-y-n while discussing the elucidation of the Sunna by the Qurʾān
as he often does when referring to the clarification of the Qurʾān by the Sunna;
nonetheless, his understanding of the relationship between Qurʾān and Sunna displays a
symmetry missing from al-Shāfiʿī, who does not envision the Qurʾān supplementing the
Sunna.231
While al-Ṭaḥāwī frequently uses words from the root b-y-n to discuss rules in the
Qurʾān or rules expressed by the Qurʾān and supplemented by the Sunna, his
understanding of bayān is distinct from that of al-Shāfiʿī. Al-Shāfiʿī employs bayān as a
technical term referring to a ‘“statement’ of the law.”232 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, uses
words from this root to signify a communicative process in which something is made
clear, such as God making a ruling clear in the Qurʾān, or clarifying the Qurʾān by means
of the Sunna. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s association of bayān with a language-based process of
clarification is in accord with the later uṣūl tradition.233 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, for instance, describes
several types of bayān, including the restriction of an unrestricted expression (takhṣīṣ alʿu ū ), the transfer of meaning from the literal to the figurative (ṣarf al- alā ʿan alaqīqa ilā al- ajā ), the explanation of the intent of a statement that cannot provide a
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ruling on its own, or abrogation.234 All of these are processes in which one text bears on
another in order to bring out or clarify a meaning that was not available from the original
text. Likewise, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s most frequent use of a term from the root b-y-n is the
statement that the Sunna clarifies the Qurʾān on a certain question.235 In other cases, a
Qurʾānic verse is clarified (yubayyan) by another Qurʾānic verse.236
Al-Ṭaḥāwī almost never uses the noun bayān, preferring instead the verb bayyana
to refer to clarification as an action or process, in contrast to al-Shāfiʿī’s more static
characterization of bayān as the architecture of the law. Perhaps what is most notable
about al-Ṭaḥāwī’s departure from al-Shāfiʿī’s conception of bayān is that al-Ṭaḥāwī, too,
is overwhelmingly concerned in his works with demonstrating the consistency of Qurʾān
and Sunna. We therefore might have expected him to employ bayān to support that
argument, as does al-Shāfiʿī. However, it appears that, for al-Ṭaḥāwī, bayān has become
firmly associated with communicative clarity, a concern that anticipates later jurists’
conviction of the centrality of linguistic interpretation to uṣūl al-fiqh.237 While al-Ṭaḥāwī
still shares many of al-Shāfiʿī’s concerns about the authority and status of adīth, his
arguments nonetheless draw on the tools and concepts of his own time.
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brogation between the Qurʾān and Sunna
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of abrogation (naskh) provides further evidence for his
understanding of the relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunna. None of his extant
works contains a definition of abrogation, but we may piece one together from relevant
discussions: abrogation is a process in which the revelation of a new rule238 in the Qurʾān
or Sunna lifts (rafʿ)239 the obligation to apply an earlier rule240 established in either of the
two sources.241 What concerns us here is the interaction of Qurʾān and Sunna within this
theory. Like most authors of later uṣūl al-fiqh texts, al-Ṭaḥāwī holds that there are four
possible modes of abrogation: (1) the Qurʾān abrogating the Qurʾān; (2) the Qurʾān
abrogating the Sunna; (3) the Sunna abrogating the Qurʾān, and (4) the Sunna abrogating
the Sunna.242
In contrast, al-Shāfiʿī famously held that only the Qurʾān could abrogate the
Qurʾān and the Sunna abrogate the Sunna. He writes in the Risāla that “God stated to
them [in the Qurʾān] that He only abrogates things in the Book by means of the Book,
and that the Prophetic Practice does not abrogate the Book. It is instead subordinate to the
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Book.”243 Al-Shāfiʿī thus claims that his theory of abrogation is that of the Qurʾān itself.
Lowry further argues that al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of abrogation rests on his belief that the
Qurʾān and Sunna are “ontologically distinct” as well as on anxieties that the Qurʾān
would “overwhelm the Sunna in all cases of asserted conflict between the two” as a result
of the Qurʾān’s superior epistemological status.244
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, employs his discussions of abrogation to assert the
ontological similarity of Qurʾān and Sunna. In one passage he states that “it is our
position that the Sunna can abrogate the Qurʾān, because each one of them is from God.
He may abrogate what He wishes of them using what He wishes of them.”245 Here his
emphasis is on the similarity of Qurʾān and Sunna in terms of their shared status as
revelation. Likewise, in the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān, al-Ṭaḥāwī explicitly states

that the Sunna is of the same ‘form’ as the Qurʾān. He writes:
The legal rulings (a ā ) preceding the revelation of a [certain] Qurʾānic verse in
Islam [that is, legal rulings derived from the Sunna] were legally effective and
were not invalidated (yanquḍ) by the revelation of a Qurʾānic verse conflicting
with them. Instead, they were abrogated (yansakh) by it, because they were of the
same form (shakl). Therefore, when something appears from the Prophet after the
revelation of a Qurʾānic verse it likewise abrogates that verse in cases where they
conflict.246
This statement may be contrasted with al-Shāfiʿī’s argument that “the Sunna may only be
abrogated by its like (mithl), and it has no like except the Sunna.”247 Although al-Shāfiʿī
uses the term ‘mithl’ while al-Ṭaḥāwī uses ‘shakl,’ these statements reveal the quite
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different stances of al-Ṭaḥāwī and al-Shāfiʿī on the ontological relationship between
Qurʾān and Sunna.
To support his argument that the Qurʾān may abrogate the Sunna and the Sunna
the Qurʾān, al-Ṭaḥāwī appeals to historical evidence, giving examples of known laws
which can only be justified by positing that the Qurʾān was abrogated by the Sunna. In
both passages mentioned above al-Ṭaḥāwī discusses Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:15 (“Those of your
women who commit indecency – call four of you as witnesses against them. If [the four]
give their testimony, confine them in their houses until death takes them or God appoints
a way for them”), arguing that ‘the way’ referred to in the verse was indicated in a
Prophetic adīth. The adīth constituted an abrogation of the verse because it changed
the prescribed punishment.248
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not say so directly, his second example of the Qurʾān
being abrogated by the Sunna demonstrates that he held that khabar al-wā id (a report
transmitted by fewer than the number required to achieve epistemological certainty) also
had the power to abrogate the Qurʾān, a position which elevates the khabar al-wā id to
the epistemological status of the Qurʾān and the khabar al- utawātir (a report
transmitted by sufficient numbers to assure its authenticity).249 In an example commonly
adduced by other jurists espousing this opinion, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Q 2/al-Baqara:180
(“Prescribed for you, when death comes to one of you, if he leaves goods, are bequests
for parents and kinsmen according to what is recognized as proper, as a duty to those who
248
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protect themselves”) was abrogated by the Prophetic adīth “There is no bequest in favor
of a Qurʾānic heir.”250 For al-Ṭaḥāwī, the two examples he adduces constitute selfevident proof that abrogation of the Qurʾān by the Sunna has actually occurred, and
therefore must be possible. After each, he cites the objections of an unnamed interlocutor,
whom we may assume to be al-Shāfiʿī, claiming that in each case the verse in question
was in fact abrogated by another Qurʾānic verse.251 In both cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī responds by
demonstrating how the Qurʾānic verse his interlocutor adduces is insufficient to explain
the law as it stands, and therefore abrogation of the Qurʾān by the Sunna must have
occurred.252
The self-evidence of the occurrence of Qurʾān-Sunna and Sunna-Qurʾān
abrogation for al-Ṭaḥāwī is crucial for understanding the function of this passage within
the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s purpose is not to make an argument

for the various possible modes of abrogation; he does not even mention the possibility of
Qurʾān-Qurʾān or Sunna-Sunna abrogation here, aside from criticizing those who say that
only the Qurʾān can abrogate the Qurʾān. Instead, he introduces the topic of QurʾānSunna and Sunna-Qurʾān abrogation in order to provide evidence for his central argument
that the Sunna is revelation and has legal force. After a two and a half page discussion of
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the necessity of obeying the Sunna, al-Ṭaḥāwī introduces the topic of abrogation by
saying:
God’s Messenger, from whom we received the Qurʾān, informed us that we must
accept what he says to us, what he commands, and what he prohibits, even if it is
not a Qurʾānic verse, just as we must accept the Qurʾānic verses he recites to us.
We also find things practiced as an obligation in Islam that are not mentioned in
the Qurʾān…which God then abrogated by what He revealed in the Book.253
The argument that follows is that if the Qurʾān can abrogate the Sunna (and the Sunna the
Qurʾān), that is because they are of the same form (shakl)—i.e., the Sunna is
revelation.254
That al-Ṭaḥāwī’s purpose in discussing abrogation is to assert the ontological
equivalence of Qurʾān and Sunna is again reinforced at the end of this passage, when alṬaḥāwī’s interlocutor suggests that the meaning of Q 10/Yūnus:15 (“Say, ‘It is not for me
to change it of my own accord. I follow only what is revealed to me’”) is that only
something from God, that is, the Qurʾān, may change the Qurʾān. Al-Ṭaḥāwī responds,
“And who told you that the rule which abrogated the Qurʾānic verses is not from God, or
that the Sunna is not from God? Rather, they are both from Him, and He abrogates the
Qurʾān with whichever of them He wishes, just as He abrogates the Sunna with
whichever of them He wishes.”255 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s entire discussion of abrogation is thus an
argument for the status of the Sunna: the Sunna must be obeyed because it is like the
Qurʾān—it is of its shakl. We know that because the Qurʾān and Sunna can and do
abrogate each other.
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brogation of the Qurʾān
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of abrogation provides one further piece of evidence
concerning the relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunna, related specifically to the
abrogation of the Qurʾān. John Burton identifies three modes of Qurʾānic abrogation
discussed in mature uṣūl texts:
1) The abrogation of both the verse and the ruling (naskh al- ukm wa-l-tilāwa)
2) The abrogation of the ruling but not the verse (naskh al- u dūn al-tilāwa)
3) The abrogation of the verse but not the ruling (naskh al-tilāwa dūn alukm)256
The most controversial of these is the third mode, the abrogation of the verse but not the
ruling. Burton argues that this mode was only necessary for jurists like al-Shāfiʿī, who
denied the possibility of the Sunna abrogating the Qurʾān, but who still needed to explain
how certain rules (i.e., stoning for adultery) were justified.257
We may compare with Burton’s model of Qurʾānic abrogation al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
discussion in a very unusual chapter of Shar mushkil al-āthār. While most chapters in
this book set out one or more contradictory or otherwise problematic adīths and then
resolve the apparent difficulties, this chapter cites Q 2/al-Baqara:106 (“Whatever signs
we annul or cause to be forgotten, We bring better or the like”) and then proceeds to set
out a typology of Qurʾānic abrogation with examples of each type. He states that there are
two kinds of abrogation of the Qurʾān:
1) The abrogation of the practices in the abrogated verses while the verses
remain part of the Qurʾān (nusikha al-ʿamal bi- ā fī al-āy al- ansū ha, wa-in
ānat al-āy al- ansū ha qurʾānan a ā hiya)
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2) The removal of the verse from the Qurʾān (i hrājuhā in al-Qurʾān)
a. preserved in memory (ma fūẓa fī al-qulūb)
or
b. not preserved in memory ( hārija in al-qulūb, ghayr a fūẓa)258
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not use the language of the later uṣūl scholars, his first category
is clearly equivalent to Burton’s second mode (abrogation of the rule but not the verse),
and Category 2b is equivalent to Burton’s first mode (abrogation of both the rule and the
verse).
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Category 2a (abrogation of the verse but not the memory), however,
is not quite the same as Burton’s third mode (abrogation of the verse but not the rule).
The importance of the third mode for the jurists who subscribe to it is the continuance of
the ruling—they need to explain how a law that does not appear to be Qurʾānic actually is
based on a Qurʾānic verse.259 Al-Ṭaḥāwī would not disagree that the ruling remains in
effect, as evidenced by his citation of the stoning verse and the verse concerning the
number of breastfeedings necessary to establish a blood relationship as examples of this
category of abrogation.260 However, he never states that the ruling remains in effect, and
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that is not the crucial point for him. Instead, he is concerned with the preservation of the
verse in memory.
What al-Ṭaḥāwī means by ‘preservation’ is revealed in three chapters appearing
shortly after his typology of abrogation. In each chapter he argues that, after a certain
verse was abrogated from the Qurʾān, it became part of the Sunna.261 At the end of the
last of these chapters, he concludes that
It is the same for everything which is reported as being part of the Qurʾān, but
which we do not find in our physical Qurʾāns (maṣā ifunā). All such verses were
part of the Qurʾān, but were abrogated and removed from it, then returned to the
Sunna and made part of it.262
This claim is important for what it says about al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the
relationship between Qurʾān and Sunna. Other jurists discussing the third mode content
themselves with stating that the ruling remains while the verse is abrogated, without
getting into the details of the form in which it remains.263 Al-Taftazānī, for instance, still
considers an abrogated verse part of the Qurʾān.264 Al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts clearly and
repeatedly that the verse is transformed into a Sunna, thus implying that the boundary
between Qurʾān and Sunna is, at least in some cases, permeable.

The Per eability of the Boundary between Qurʾān and Sunna
In the section above we established that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the
relationship between Qurʾān and Sunna is radically different from that of al-Shāfiʿī.
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Where al-Shāfiʿī views the two as “ontologically distinct,”265 al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that they
are of the same form (shakl)266 and that in certain cases Qurʾānic verses may be
transformed into Sunna, apparently without needing to be revealed a second time.267 In
another passage Al-Ṭaḥāwī further blurs the boundaries between Qurʾān and Sunna by
arguing that “What is in God’s Book is what is textually stipulated (manṣūṣ) in it or what
God’s Messenger said.” 268 This rather startling statement defines the Sunna as part of the
Qurʾān. It appears in response to the Prophetic adīth “Every condition (sharṭ) that is not
in God’s Book is invalid” as a way of accepting the adīth while still preserving for
Muslims the right to make contract stipulations not mentioned in the Qurʾān. Al-Ṭaḥāwī
then goes on to explain why the Sunna may be considered part of the Kitāb: it is because
the acceptance of the Sunna is mandated by the Kitāb in Q 59/al-Ḥashr:7 (“Whatever the
messenger gives you, take it. Whatever he forbids you to have, leave it alone”).
Almost the same argument appears as in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of the
Companion adīth “there is no revelation but the Qurʾān.” Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that by the
Qurʾān, Ibn ʿAbbās meant “the Qurʾān and what the Qurʾān commands that is accepted
only because of Q 59/al-Ḥashr:7.” Shortly afterward he states that the Sunna is included
within the scope of the Qurʾān (dā hilan fī al-Qurʾān) because of that verse.269 While alṬaḥāwī generally makes a firm distinction between the Qurʾān and the Sunna, it is
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striking that he is willing to include one within the scope of the other for the purposes of
making his argument in these two passages.270

The Episte ological Status of Qurʾān and Sunna
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s portrayal of the relationship between the Qurʾān and Sunna is
unusual in one further sense. For most legal theorists, a major distinction between the two
kinds of revelation is that the entirety of the Qurʾānic text is epistemologically certain
while the authenticity of individual adīths is open to doubt.271 For the most part, alṬaḥāwī concurs, objecting to adīths suggesting that certain verses might be missing
from the canonized Qurʾānic text. He argues that, if that were the case, it would be
possible that something missing from the canonized Qurʾān would abrogate something
currently within it, and the obligation to act would be lifted.272 However, a number of
chapters in Shar mushkil al-āthār blur the distinction in epistemological status between
the Qurʾān and Sunna. Some examples suggest insecurity in the bounds of the Qurʾānic
corpus by recounting the Companions’ confusion regarding what belongs within the
Qurʾān, while others point to that same insecurity by describing the somewhat messy
process of compiling the Qurʾān.273
Undoubtedly, the reason that al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces so many adīths suggesting
insecurity in the text of the Qurʾān while other legal theorists do not is that Shar mushkil
al-āthār is primarily a work on problematic adīths, to which category the traditions in
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question certainly belong. The effect is somewhat jarring in a work which also treats a
great deal of legal theory, however—so much so that the modern editor of Shar mushkil
al-āthār felt moved to quote Aḥmad Shākir on the necessity of rejecting one of the
adīths in question, because it casts doubt on our knowledge of the chapters of the
Qurʾān, which knowledge is epistemologically certain (qaṭʿī) by means of multiple
transmission (tawātur).274
Al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to have no such qualms about transmitting material that casts
doubt on the text of the Qurʾān, as is evident from a discussion of the meaning of the verb
‘istaʾnasa’ in Q 24/al-Nūr: 27 (“Do not enter houses other than your own until you have
tastaʾnisū”). In explanation, al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces a tradition from Ibn ʿAbbās saying that
the copyist of the Qurʾān made a mistake (akhṭaʾat al- ātib), and the verb should be
‘tastaʾdhinū’ (to ask permission).275 Al-Ṭaḥāwī concludes his chapter by citing several
versions of this tradition, content to record without comment the suggestion that there is a
mistake in the text of the Qurʾān as we know it.276 While al-Ṭaḥāwī clearly did not
adduce these adīths with the explicit intent to assert the epistemological equivalence of
the Qurʾān and Sunna, their presence contributes to the impression that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
theory of the sources of revelation does not depend on an ontological distinction between
Qurʾān and Sunna.
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The Hierarchy of Qurʾān and Sunna
Despite the occasional blurring of the boundaries between the two, we may ask whether
al-Ṭaḥāwī viewed the Qurʾān and Sunna as forming a hierarchy. The mature uṣūl al-fiqh
tradition, while fully embracing the Sunna as a form of revelation, nonetheless held that
the Qurʾān is a higher source of law. This claim is made especially strongly by the mature
Ḥanafī school.277 For a much earlier period Lowry finds this same attitude implicit in alShāfiʿī’s Risāla.278 Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ṭaḥāwī is not generally explicit about the relative
status of the Qurʾān and Sunna, although he, like al-Shāfiʿī, does consistently list the
Qurʾān before Sunna in the thirty or so lists of legal sources scattered throughout his
books, which suggests its primacy.279 Few passages explicitly indicate the relationship
between the two sources, however. In one, after discussing a adīth on how to give
witness, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that he will turn to “something higher ( ā huwa aʿlā), which is
what God said in His Book.”280 This example is inconclusive, because it is not clear
whether al-Ṭaḥāwī is suggesting that the Qurʾān is a higher source than Sunna in general,
or if that is merely true of their relative usefulness for settling the question at hand.
The only unambiguous statement of the superiority of the Qurʾān that I have been
able to locate in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works appears in his discussion of a Companion
report in which Ibn ʿAbbās states that “there is no revelation except for the Qurʾān (lā
wa y illā al-Qurʾān).”281 This claim appears to be in serious contradiction with other
adīths asserting that Muḥammad’s Sunna is also revelation. We have already
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encountered above one of the solutions which al-Ṭaḥāwī offers for this embarrassment:
he argues that the Sunna is within the scope of the Qurʾān. Al-Ṭaḥāwī also offers a
second explanation, however, appealing to a linguistic principle which appears many
times in his works: statements in the form ‘there is no X but Y’ mean that other things
than Y can also be X, but not the very highest form of X. In this case, Muḥammad’s
Sunna can also be revelation, but not the very highest form of revelation.282 By invoking
this principle al-Ṭaḥāwī has explained how Ibn ʿAbbās’s statement does not preclude
Sunna being revelation, but he has also conceded the inferiority of Sunna to the Qurʾān.
While it may appear that it was only al-Ṭaḥāwī’s consistent application of his linguistic
principle that led him to this conclusion, it also seems clear that he need not have made
this argument at all, since he had already resolved the difficulty by claiming the Sunna as
within the scope of the Qurʾān. His willingness to apply his linguistic principle in this
case suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī does indeed at some level consider the Qurʾān a higher
source of law, even if statements to that effect are extremely rare in his works.
It appears, then, that for al-Ṭaḥāwī the relationship between the Qurʾān and the
Sunna was more complex than it was for either al-Shāfiʿī or for the later tradition. While
the Qurʾān and Sunna on the whole constitute two separate and identifiable bodies of
revelation and relate to each other hierarchically, they are nonetheless neither
epistemologically nor ontologically completely separate from each other. In asking why
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of their relationship is so distinct from that of al-Shāfiʿī or the
later tradition, we may observe that al-Ṭaḥāwī was writing with quite different goals and
constraints than either al-Shāfiʿī or later theorists. In the case of later uṣūl al-fiqh,
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theorists were writing at a remove from the actual texts of the Qurʾān and Sunna, and
therefore may have been able to create neat, clearly defined categories with considerably
more freedom than that afforded al-Ṭaḥāwī, whose theoretical discussions almost without
exception arise in response to issues within the sources. His theories are not driven by
theological concerns (although he is sensitive to these) or by a desire to create order, but
rather by the need to make sense of texts. Although it is true that most of al-Shāfiʿī’s
Risāla is taken up with example problems, and that these examples do not always neatly
illustrate his theories, it is nonetheless also the case that it is theory that controls the
Risāla’s structure. Al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, is engaged in practical hermeneutics, the
messy business of deriving meaning from revelation. Neat, clearly differentiated
categories may only have been possible for jurists who formulated their theories in
conversation with, but nonetheless slightly removed from, the raw material of revelation.

Ḥadīth Epistemology
Beyond the question of the relative epistemological statuses of Qurʾān and Sunna,
Muslim jurists devoted significant attention to the question of the epistemological
certainty engendered by different types of adīth. Considering the central role that
evaluating the soundness of individual adīths plays in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments, it is
noteworthy that this type of discussion is almost entirely absent from his extant works. In
this sense his approach is akin to that of the adīth scholars, who tend to be more
interested in individual adīth transmitters and less in epistemological questions related
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to transmission than the uṣūl scholars.283 From various passing mentions, we may glean
that al-Ṭaḥāwī posited two grades of adīth corresponding to the uṣūl scholars’ khabar
utawātir (a report transmitted by a number so large as to engender epistemological
certainty) and khabar al-wā id (a report transmitted by fewer than the number required to
engender epistemological certainty). Unlike his Ḥanafī predecessor ʿĪsā b. Abān as well
as later Ḥanafīs including al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not appear to recognize a third,
intermediate category, the ashhūr tradition (a report which began as a habar wā id but
then became widespread among the early generations of Muslims).284 In at least some
cases, he describes as mutawātir traditions that later Ḥanafīs would call ashhūr.285
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s terminology for discussing the two grades of adīth is not entirely
stable. He does employ khabar al-wā id and al-ā ād as technical terms,286 although the
rarity with which he does so is notable considering how frequently his arguments consist
of preferring one adīth over another due to a greater number of transmitters. More often,
he simply states that someone was alone (tafarrada bi-, etc.) in transmitting a certain
adīth.287 While ‘tawātur’ and ‘ utawātir’ appear more frequently than khabar al-wā id
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it is not clear if they are technical terms for al-Ṭaḥāwī. Like other 3rd/9th century scholars
including al-Shāfiʿī, he uses words derived from the w-t-r root to indicate widespread
transmission, but not obviously in the technical sense of later theorists.288 Nowhere in his
extant works does he explain what constitutes utawātir transmission, although we do
learn that he is in agreement with the later tradition that the transmission of a adīth may
still be considered utawātir even if certain individuals in their chains of transmission
are suspect.289
Concerning the level of certainty engendered by each grade of adīth and the
connection between a adīth’s epistemological status and the requirement to act upon it,
al-Ṭaḥāwī is oblique. In one passage he argues that a certain adīth has been transmitted
in a utawātir fashion, and so it is obligatory (wajiba) to adopt the position outlined in
it.290 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not state explicitly here or elsewhere that utawātir
reports engender epistemological certainty, that seems to be the implication. Similarly, in
another passage we learn that naql al-ja āʿa (group transmission) is exempt (barīʾ) from
the possibility of omitting part of Muḥammad’s message on a certain topic, unlike naql
al-ā ād.291 Again, the implication is that utawātir transmission leads to certainty.
Finally, in the most important passage concerning the distinction between the two grades
of transmission, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that transmission by consensus (al-naql bi-l-ij āʿ) has
legal force ( ujja) such that anyone who disbelieves (kafara) in the smallest part of it is
an infidel who may be killed unless he repents. This ruling does not apply, however, to
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those who disbelieve in something transmitted by al-a hbār al-ā ād, only to transmission
by al-ja āʿa.292 The attribution of unbelief to those who reject a utawātir transmission
is a feature of later uṣūl discussions.293
While many of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments rest on the acceptance or rejection of
individual a hbār ā ād, he makes few general statements concerning the conditions
under which they should be acted upon. In one chapter, he argues that a habar wā id
(although he does not use the term) from ʿAlī should be accepted, although he knows of
no one else who accepts it, because the opinions is a sound one (qawl asan) and putting
the adīth into practice revives a sunna of the Prophet.294 This appears to be an argument
in favor of acting upon khabar al-wā id even in the absence of epistemological certainty.
His optimism concerning khabar al-wā id aligns with that of his later Ḥanafī colleague
al-Sarakhsī, who argued for the presumption of trustworthiness on the part of traditions
and transmitters; the Ḥanafī al-Dabūsī, on the other hand, was hesitant to act upon khabar
al-wā id in the absence of firm evidence for fear of improperly attributing words to the
Prophet.295
In other places al-Ṭaḥāwī refers obliquely to the controversies surrounding the
khabar al-wā id by mentioning ‘those who accept the legal force ( ujja) of the khabar
al-wā id.’296 This may be a reference to the Shāfiʿīs, whom the later Ḥanafīs portrayed as
elevating the khabar al-wā id almost to the level of the Qurʾān.297 His point in these
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passages is not to support or refute their position, however, but rather to make an
argument concerning what that position commits them to regarding a certain legal
question. One such passage contains the clearest evidence in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extent works
that he understood al-khabar al- utawātir and khabar al-wā id as opposing categories.
While arguing that a certain adīth from Ibn Masʿūd should be discarded, al-Ṭaḥāwī
states that its transmission is such that it has legal force ( ujja) neither for those who
accept the khabar al-wā id nor for those who [only] act upon reports whose transmission
is plural (tawātara).298

Ḥadīth Terminology
In addition to the epistemological terms khabar al-ā ād and tawātur/ utawātir,
al-Ṭaḥāwī employs a range of terminology related to adīth and Sunna. At the most
general level, he opposes revelation in the form of the Kitāb (Book) to revelation through
the words (ʿalā lisān) of Muḥammad. This pairing, found also in al-Shāfiʿī’s exposition
of his concept of bayān in the Risāla,299 is used to introduce the discussion of nonQurʾānic revelation in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān.300 The same pairing

serves as a structuring device in many chapters of

ā al-Qurʾān: after quoting a

Qurʾānic verse, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that a certain part of the verse was not explained (lam
yubayyan) in the Kitāb, but it was explained (yubayyan) in the words of the Prophet.301
This transitional statement then allows him to enter into the main work of most chapters
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of A ā al-Qurʾān, which is in fact to discuss the Sunna, not the Qurʾān. Most of alṬaḥāwī’s language, however, does not so clearly distinguish between Prophetic and postProphetic material.
The word ‘ adīth,’ for instance, invariably refers to a specific report consisting of
an isnād (chain of authorities) and matn (stable verbal form of a report).302 Similar to Abū
Yūsuf in his al-Radd ʿalā Siyar al- w āʿī,303 al-Ṭaḥāwī usually but not exclusively
applies the term ‘ adīth’ to Prophetic reports; at other times he cites a “ adīth of ʿAlī” or
a “ adīth of Salmān.”304 This usage stands in contrast with that of later jurists, among
whom ‘ adīth’ would come to be exclusively associated with Prophetic reports.305
Apparently synonymous with ‘ adīth’ is the rarer ‘khabar.’306 More than once al-Ṭaḥāwī
successively labels the same Prophetic report “ adīth” and “khabar,” demonstrating that
he, like Ibn Qutayba, does not make a distinction between ‘ adīth’ as religious reports
and ‘khabar’ as secular reports.307 Like ‘ adīth,’ ‘khabar’ can refer to Companion as
well as Prophetic reports.308
Where later jurists would come to use ‘ adīth’ as a collective term for Prophetic
reports, al-Ṭaḥāwī only employs ‘ adīth’ to designate the specific report under
discussion. Very rarely, he uses the plural ‘a ādīth’ to refer to multiple reports, but even
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then he intends only a few specific reports.309 To refer to a larger body of reports relevant
to a legal topic or to the phenomenon of reports in general, he uses ‘āthār.’310 This
abstract usage of ‘āthār’ to refer to the general phenomenon of reports appears as a
structuring device in many chapters of Shar

aʿānī al-āthār. After weighing the adīth

evidence for different positions on a legal question and stating his conclusion, al-Ṭaḥāwī
frequently states that “this is the ruling ( ukm) on this topic according to the method
(ṭarīq) of āthār.” He almost invariably then goes on to discuss what the ruling on the
same question would be according to naẓar (reasoned speculation).311 While āthār
sometimes refers to post-Prophetic reports,312 it more often refers to Prophetic material.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s definition of ‘āthār’ contrasts sharply with that of both al-Shāfiʿī and later
jurists, for most of whom ‘āthār’ refers to non-Prophetic reports. For al-Shāfiʿī, ‘āthār’
were generally post-Companion reports which fell outside of the bounds of revelation.313
For other jurists āthār was either a wider category including Prophetic and non-Prophetic
reports or else a term restricted to Companion reports.314 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s equation of āthār
with adīth is therefore unusual.
While ‘ adīth’, ‘khabar’ and ‘āthār’ refer to verbal reports, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs
‘sunna’ more generally to encompass the practices concretized in those reports.315
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Frequently, the term appears as a pair with ‘Qurʾān’ or ‘Kitāb,’316 and in one instance alṬaḥāwī explicitly contrasts them by asserting that a sunna is something that was not
revealed in the Kitāb.317 In the overwhelming majority of cases al-Ṭaḥāwī implicitly or
explicitly uses the term ‘sunna’ to refer to the exemplary practice of the Prophet (sunnat
rasūl llāh).318 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s habitual association of sunna with the Prophet represents a
late stage in the evolution of this pre-Islamic term, which originally seems to have
referred to the practice or traditions of the community or of individuals. While the
Prophet’s practice gained a special status early in Islamic history, it is not until the
beginning of the 3rd/9th century that the association with Muḥammad became
predominant.319 The Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī, for example, strongly associates sunna with the
Prophet and argues for its authority.320
Al-Ṭaḥāwī follows al-Shāfiʿī in his overwhelming association of sunna with
Muḥammad, and yet he occasionally refers to the sunna of ʿUmar, the Companions, or
the first four caliphs (al-rāshidūn).321 Very rarely, he employs sunna without reference to
a person to mean the legal practice concerning a certain thing, i.e., the sunna of the call to
prayer (adhān).322 One passage in Shar

aʿānī al-āthār captures this controversy: a

group of jurists claims that the reference to sunna in a adīth means that the adīth must
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be Prophetic, even though it does not appear to be, because sunna only comes from the
Prophet. Their opponents, with whom al-Ṭaḥāwī implicitly agrees, argues that the term
sunna can also indicate that person’s opinion (raʾy) or something they took from
someone after the time of the Prophet.323 It is notable that, while al-Shāfiʿī argues for the
exclusive association of sunna with the Prophet, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that that need not
always be the case.
The pattern that emerges from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of all of these terms is that they
usually, but not exclusively, refer to Prophetic reports. This pattern indicates the central
importance of Prophetic material to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s conception of the law and its sources. At
the same time, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not feel the need to make the absolute distinction
between Prophetic and post-Prophetic material that would be indicated by separate
technical terms. His disinterest in doing so suggests that, as we will see in the following
chapter, Prophetic and post-Prophetic materials do not fall into two epistemologically
distinct categories for al-Ṭaḥāwī representing revelation and non-revelation.

The Status of Muḥammad’s Words and Actions
While al-Ṭaḥāwī gives little attention to describing the varieties of adīth and
their respective levels of epistemological certainty, he is considerably more concerned
with another issue related to the authoritativeness of adīth as a source of law, and that is
determining which kinds of reports about Muḥammad’s words and actions establish legal
obligations. Like al-Shāfiʿī as well as authors of mature uṣūl al-fiqh works, al-Ṭaḥāwī
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held that Muḥammad could not act against God’s commands.324 However, where both alShāfiʿī and later authors use the root ʿ-ṣ-m ( aʿṣū , ʿiṣma) to indicate Muḥammad’s
infallibility, al-Ṭaḥāwī simply states that it is impossible (mu āl) that Muḥammad do
something that God had prohibited.325 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s statement is categorical in a way that
many other jurists’ discussions of infallibility are not. He does not entertain the
possibility of Muḥammad temporarily disobeying God, although already in his time many
jurists held that the concept of Muḥammad’s infallibility prevented only his persisting in
error.326 For all of these jurists, the claim of prophetic infallibility is fundamental to
assuring the status of adīth as a source of law; if Muḥammad could disobey God, then
his actions would not be a reliable means of discovering the law.
Prophetic infallibility does not imply that all of Muḥammad’s actions represent
legal obligations, however. Al-Ṭaḥāwī, like later jurists, denies evidentiary value to
anything Muḥammad did or said while asleep.327 In al-Fuṣūl, al-Jaṣṣāṣ considers whether
the presumptive approach to Muḥammad’s actions should be to consider those actions
obligatory, recommended or merely permitted. He concludes that they are merely
324
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permitted in the absence of an indication (dalīl) to the contrary.328 Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not
explicitly discuss any of these possibilities in his extant works. Nonetheless, we can
surmise that he, like his fellow Ḥanafī al-Jaṣṣāṣ, held that Muḥammad’s actions indicate
the mere permissibility of performing that action in the absence of a further indication. At
several points in Shar

aʿānī al-āthār he argues that his opponents have no evidence for

holding that a certain adīth entails obligation, since there is nothing in that adīth that
indicates (yadull) that Muḥammad’s action is not simply showing his personal inclination
or establishing a preferred, but not obligatory, course of action.329
Where al-Ṭaḥāwī diverges most from his Ḥanafī successors is in his discussion of
Muḥammad’s words and actions that are not inspired by God. Al-Ṭaḥāwī, al-Jaṣṣāṣ and
al-Sarakhsī all affirm that Muḥammad could and did sometimes speak from ijtihād alraʾy (the exertion of effort to come to a correct reasoned opinion) in situations where
there was no revealed text to provide guidance.330 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s motivations for making
this claim differ significantly from those of al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī, however. The latter
two jurists are interested in explaining, first, why Muḥammad sometimes consulted
( ushāwara) with his Companions and took their advice when his status as a prophet
might seem to preclude that331 and, second, how it is that Muḥammad was permitted to
use his reasoning to make statements concerning rules of positive law (a ā ) that were
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later changed by revelation.332 The crucial point for both jurists is that, although
Muḥammad may have employed ijtihād, his ijtihād was not really like that of other
people, since God would not allow him to continue in an error. Given that his ijtihād
must either be correct to begin with or would be corrected by God, it is in effect not
ijtihād at all, but in fact something akin to revelation.333 Thus, no one may act against
Muḥammad’s ijtihād.334
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of Muḥammad’s ijtihād is largely the opposite. He
writes that “God’s messenger informed us that he is like the rest of humanity in what he
says by way of reasoned speculation (ẓann). It is what he says from God that does not
permit opposition.”335 In other words, Muḥammad’s ijtihād is entirely unlike revelation
and creates no legal obligations for other Muslims. The discussions of Muḥammad’s
ijtihād in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works fall into two related categories. In the first, al-Ṭaḥāwī
appeals to Muḥammad’s ijtihād in order to explain away a potentially embarrassing
adīth, such as a report in which Muḥammad expresses doubt about the benefit of
pollinating date palms. When the Muslims heed him and cease to pollinate them, the
dates do not grow properly. Confronted with this result, Muḥammad’s response is that he
is no farmer, and the Muslims should go ahead and pollinate their trees.336 In his
discussion of this adīth, al-Ṭaḥāwī proposes that Muḥammad probably thought that nonhuman females do not require anything from the male in order to be fertile. In this he
spoke from speculation (ẓann), in which he is equal to other humans. In this kind of
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statement people may disagree, and it will become clear who is knowledgeable and who
is not. Here, the Prophet was not one of those who are knowledgeable, since he came
from Mecca, a city with no date palms at that time.337
In another adīth Muḥammad warns men not to have sexual intercourse with their
pregnant wives (lit., to kill their children secretly) lest they be overtaken by the dead fetus
while they are on horseback and be thrown from their horses.338 A separate adīth
revokes the warning, saying that the Persians and Anatolians (al-Rū ) come to no harm
from the practice, and therefore Muslims will not either.339 Al-Ṭaḥāwī comments that
Muḥammad stated the original prohibition on intercourse during pregnancy out of fear of
the harm it could cause, but this was not a prohibition like that found in revelation or law.
Rather, it was based on what was in Muḥammad’s heart and was merely a warning.340 AlṬaḥāwī suspects that Muḥammad took his original view from what was commonly held
among the Arabs, a claim he also makes in other cases where Muḥammad’s statement or
action is not meant to set a precedent.341 Both of the above examples show Muḥammad
giving orders unsupported by fact. Al-Ṭaḥāwī neutralizes these potentially embarrassing
reports by appealing to Muḥammad’s ijtihād and by portraying that ijtihād as radically
opposed to revelation, and therefore non-threatening to the status of the adīth as a
source of law.
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī also appeals to Muḥammad’s ijtihād as a technique to neutralize
apparently contradictory adīths. When confronted with a adīth in which Muḥammad
gives the command not to take oaths (qasam), al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that this case is like the
one in which Muḥammad ordered men not to have intercourse with their pregnant wives:
he was speaking out of concern for his addressee, not establishing a legal standard. Other
adīths establish the permissibility of taking oaths.342 Similarly, concerning a adīth
which appears to set a legal obligation concerning what a man owes to his divorced wife
during her waiting period (ʿidda), al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Muḥammad was not making a
legal ruling (ya kum) but rather giving a legal opinion (futyā). The ruling concerning
divorced women comes from other, revelatory adīth.343
While revelation does establish a correct answer in the above questions, alṬaḥāwī does not suggest that God revealed new adīths in order to correct any erroneous
ijtihād on the part of Muḥammad; in fact, al-Ṭaḥāwī never states that God must correct
Muḥammad’s errant opinions, indicating that he considers them ontologically distinct
from revelation. Returning to the idea of prophetic infallibility, we might say that alṬaḥāwī’s categorical tone in stating that it is impossible for Muḥammad to disobey God
or to be in error comes from his conviction that incorrect ijtihād is not error.344 Humans,
including Muḥammad, are tasked with undertaking ijtihād in the absence of revelation,
but they are not tasked with arriving at the objectively correct answer.345 In contrast, al-
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Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī have Muḥammad’s ijtihād in mind when they state that the
Prophet cannot continue in an error, but will instead be corrected by God.
The differences in these two positions suggest a significant difference in how these jurists
view Muḥammad’s prophethood. Al-Ṭaḥāwī understands Muḥammad as being both a
prophet, who infallibly conveys God’s speech and follows God’s commands, and an
ordinary human, who can make mistakes and speak contrary to fact just like anyone else.
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī, in contrast, seek to erase the fallible, ordinary side of
Muḥammad by arguing that his ijtihād amounts to a form of revelation. Changing
perceptions of Muḥammad no doubt contribute to this disparity in views; the section on
the revelatory status of Muḥammad’s ijtihād is much more extensive and strongly stated
in al-Sarakhsī (d. ca. 483/1090) than in al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980-981).
It is also likely, however, that the difference is due in part to the different genres
in which these jurists are writing. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī are composing manuals of
legal theory. While they do adduce adīths in support of and as examples of their claims,
the power of selection is in their own hands. In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī has set out in his
works of practical hermeneutics to tackle a very large body of problematic adīth in order
to demonstrate that apparent conflicts among them are not real. His materials are not
selected to support elegant theoretical discussions; rather, his theories are constantly
forced to grapple with the raw material of revelation. It is questionable whether the
elegant, comprehensive theories of Islamic law characteristic of the later legal theorists
could have coexisted in the same texts with such a diverse body of material. There may
be something necessary about the fact that legal theory was written in a genre of texts
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separate from, though closely related to, the messy business of confronting the raw
material of revelation.
Here, in order to accommodate certain problematic Prophetic adīths without
calling the authority of all Prophetic adīths into question, al-Ṭaḥāwī has posited a
fundamental distinction between adīths that result from revelatory instruction and those
that represent the Prophet’s personal inference. In asserting this instruction/inference
divide, al-Ṭaḥāwī has effectively created a two-tiered system: Prophetic adīths which
represent revelation are authoritative legal sources, while those which record the
Prophet’s own legal reasoning have no special authority. There is, then, no single degree
of legal authority that can be assigned a priori to Prophetic adīth as a category. Of
course, legal theorists also recognized different degrees of authority in adīth based upon
epistemological certainty, as we have seen above. However, when legal theorists claim
that a habar wā id does not possess the same authority as a habar utawātir, they are
concerned only with how the report was transmitted after Muḥammad’s death; both
singly and widely transmitted adīths originally represented the same kind of
authority.346
In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s typology of Prophetic adīths is based upon content.
Some adīths, from the moment of their inception, cannot serve as the basis for deriving
the law, because they merely preserve Muḥammad’s own inference. In his discussion of
Prophetic adīths, then, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs an instruction/inference binary as a kind of
safety valve that allows him to downplay the authority of a certain set of problematic
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adīths. In the following chapter, we will see that he draws upon the very same binary to
augment the authority of certain Companion and Successor adīths such that they
represent revelatory authority. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s repeated invocations of the
instruction/inference divide in different contexts suggest that this binary is fundamental
to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s vision of the structure of the Divine Law.
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Chapter Two: Companion and Successor Ḥadīths

Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works are overwhelmingly concerned with
demonstrating the mechanics of how Prophetic adīths may be interpreted in light of
other Prophetic adīths and the Qurʾān in order to reveal coherent rules of positive law.
347
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aʿānī al-āthār.348 They play a lesser but still notable role in his third

hermeneutical work, Shar mushkil al-āthār.349 In the course of these three texts, alṬaḥāwī cites adīths from well over a hundred different Companions and Successors,
many of whom feature habitually in his arguments.350 In most chapters, Companion and
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Successor adīths serve simply as evidence for those individuals’ legal opinions on a
similar level of authority to the opinions of later jurists. In other chapters, however,
Companion and Successor adīths stand in for legally authoritative Prophetic adīths in a
way that suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s willingness to blur boundaries between categories of
legal sources extends beyond the revealed sources of Qurʾān and Sunna.
This chapter examines the nature of Companion and Successor authority and the
function of Companion and Successor adīths in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works. It
argues that al-Ṭaḥāwī almost always understands the special authority of the Companions
and Successors to derive from their role in mimetically preserving knowledge of
Prophetic practice. Crucially, this function points to his assumption of the failure of the
corpus of Prophetic adīths to adequately capture Prophetic practice. In cases where alṬaḥāwī does hold that the Companions or Successors are mimetically preserving
Prophetic practice, he invokes the instruction/inference divide described in the previous
chapter in order to claim revelatory authority for the adīths in question. In a very few
places, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought also preserves traces of an older conception of religious
authority which places the Companions in competition with the Prophet. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
ambivalent approach to the Companions and his heavy reliance on post-Prophetic adīth,
after the time when established narratives of Islamic legal history report that juristic
dependence on Companion reports had ceased,351 suggests that existing accounts of the
triumph of Prophetic adīth in the later 3rd/9th century give too neat a picture of this
351
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period. This chapter adds complexity to our understanding of this pivotal time by
suggesting the ways in which the question of the authority of post-Prophetic adīths was
tied to changing conceptions of what it meant to preserve Prophetic practice.

Historical Background
By al-Ṭaḥāwī’s lifetime, both jurists and traditionists had come to perceive a clear
distinction between Prophetic and post-Prophetic adīths and to accord the former the
status of revelation. As discussed in the previous chapter, during the 1st/7th and 2nd/8th
centuries the sunna of Muḥammad was in competition with the sunan of other exemplary
individuals and previous generations as a model for the Muslim community.352 Although
the sunna of the Companions, the first caliphs or the Muslims of a particular locale was
generally understood to be an extension of the Prophet’s practice, this early concept of
sunna valorized the continuous yet evolving practice of the Muslim Community in a way
that the later concept of Prophetic Sunna as an unchanging and mimetic textual record of
Muḥammad’s practice would not. The growth of the concept of Prophetic authority can
be traced to the late 2nd/8th and early 3rd/9th centuries, when jurists began more
systematically to justify their legal doctrines on the basis of Prophetic adīth.353
Nonetheless, jurists of that period still had relatively few Prophetic adīths available to
them and continued to rely heavily upon Companion and Successors adīths.354 As a
corollary to the rise in Prophetic authority, many opinions and statements which had
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previously been associated with the Companions, Successors and others began to be
attributed to the Prophet in the form of Prophetic adīths,355 thus preserving the authority
of material which had not previously needed to be labeled Prophetic in order to be
normative.
Although the growth of Prophetic authority and the appeal to Prophetic adīth
were related processes, it is important to distinguish between the Prophet as sole locus of
authority and Prophetic adīth as the form in which that authority was transmitted. A
jurist might, for example, subscribe to a Prophetic model of authority while holding that
the Prophet’s words and actions are known not only through Prophetic adīths, but also
through Companion or Successor adīths, consensus or the practice of the community.
Indeed, it was deference to Prophetic authority without a concomitant exclusive devotion
to Prophetic adīths that characterized what Hallaq labels the “practice-based sunna” of
the jurists of the 1st/7th and 2nd/8th centuries. While these jurists looked to Companion
practice as a source of law, Companion practice in turn preserved Prophetic practice.356
Thus, the authority underlying “practice-based sunna” was ultimately understood to be
Prophetic, even if, for them, Companion practice was an evolving extension of Prophetic
practice rather than a stable record of it.357 Even when jurists began to articulate more
forcefully the idea of an exclusively Prophetic authority at the end of the 2nd/8th century,
that authority was not necessarily embodied only in Prophetic adīth form. As Schacht
and Hallaq have noted, al-Shaybānī held that the Qurʾān and the Prophet were the sole
355
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legal authorities, yet he employed a significant number of Companion adīths in his legal
arguments.358
In the early 3rd/9th century, al-Shāfiʿī’s theory of bayān for the first time asserted
that Prophetic authority and Prophetic adīth were necessarily linked. All law, he argued,
was revealed by God to humans through Muḥammad in the form of recited revelation or
in the speech and actions of the Prophet. Al-Shāfiʿī held that Qurʾān and Prophetic adīth
are the complete and exclusive sources through which later generations may come to
know revelation and the law, although he did struggle to account for apparently extrarevelatory sources such as Companion reports and consensus within his account of the
structure of the law.359
Reliance upon Companion and Successor reports did not immediately cease,
however. Until the appearance of al-Bukhārī’s (d. 256/870) Ṣa ī in the late 3rd/9th
century, even traditionists freely mingled Companion and Successor reports with
Prophetic material in their adīth compilations.360 While al-Bukhārī, too, included
Companion and Successor reports in his Ṣa ī , for him their authority was clearly
358
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distinguished from and secondary to that of the Prophet’s Sunna. Hallaq and Melchert
identify this same period, the second half of the 3rd/9th century, as the time when jurists
abandoned Companion adīths in favor of exclusively citing Prophetic adīths.361
Vishanoff largely agrees, although he characterizes the late 3rd/9th century as the time
when jurists ceased to “rely heavily” on post-Prophetic reports, leaving open the
possibility of some degree of reliance.362

Post-Prophetic Ḥadīths in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Works
Writing in the early 4th/10th century, al-Ṭaḥāwī understood Prophetic adīth as
revelation and a source of law equal to the Qurʾān. Despite his acceptance of the superior
status of Prophetic adīth, however, post-Prophetic adīths appear with great frequency
in his works. He habitually cites Companion and Successor opinions along with those of
later jurists as corroborating authority for his own position or as evidence of opposing
positions.363 While the later jurists are simply listed, he provides at least one adīth with
a full isnād for each Companion or Successor opinion he cites, meaning that the
Companions and Successors occupy a physical space on the pages of his works far
greater than that of later jurists, including the jurists of his own school.364
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Further, al-Ṭaḥāwī frames many chapters of his hermeneutical works as
disagreements among Companions and Successors, citing them at the outset of the
chapter as proponents of the various opinions he will evaluate.365 Only after resolving the
disagreement among the Companions and Successors in such chapters does he conclude
by mentioning the later jurists who are in agreement with him. While there certainly are
plenty of chapters in his hermeneutical works which frame debates as conflicts between
legal schools, the presence of so many chapters in which the narrative drama is based
upon the conflicts among Companions and Successors indicates their centrality to alṬaḥāwī’s vision of the field of juristic debate.
The preceding observations concern the juxtaposition of Companion or Successor
adīths with the opinions of later jurists and the way in which the Companions and
Successors often appear to physically crowd out later jurists within the pages of alṬaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works. The primary interest of this chapter, however, is the
juxtaposition of Prophetic and post-Prophetic adīths in these same works. On the whole,
the relative authority of Prophetic and post-Prophetic adīths appears to be a settled issue
for al-Ṭaḥāwī, in keeping with the narrative presented above. Neither he nor his
interlocutors suggest that individual Companions or Successors possess authority
independent from or in competition with that of the Prophet, although, as we will see
below, he is less categorical about the collective authority of the Companions.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī refers to the superior authority of Prophetic over post-Prophetic
adīths in the course of a number of discussions of discrete legal issues. In one, an
unnamed interlocutor argues that a report from Ibn ʿUmar provides the best practice for
365
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supererogatory prayer. Al-Ṭaḥāwī responds that, first, his interlocutor has misinterpreted
Ibn ʿUmar’s report and, second, what has been transmitted from the Prophet is better
(awlā) than the report from Ibn ʿUmar.366 In several other passages detailing Companion
disagreement on legal questions, al-Ṭaḥāwī adopts the Companion opinion that is in
agreement with a Prophetic adīth.367 In two of these passages, he cites the conflicting
Companion adīths before stating that “since they disagreed” (la

ā i htalafū) he will

look to what has been transmitted from the Prophet.368 In another, he writes that “this is
one of the things on which disagreement occurred among the Companions of God’s
Messenger. The best of what they said is that which is in agreement with what we have
transmitted from the Prophet.”369 In a different example concerning disagreement among
later jurists rather than among the Companions, al-Ṭaḥāwī concludes that the best opinion
is that which is supported by what has been transmitted from the Prophet, and then what
has been transmitted from the Companions.370
In all of these discussions al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts the authority of Prophetic adīths
over post-Prophetic adīths in cases where they conflict. What is notable, however, is the
degree to which these passages also emphasize the importance that al-Ṭaḥāwī grants
Companion adīths. In the first example, al-Ṭaḥāwī could merely have stated that the
Prophetic adīth is more authoritative than the opinion of Ibn ʿUmar. Instead, he pauses
to argue that his interlocutor has misinterpreted Ibn ʿUmar’s adīth, and it is in fact in
agreement with his own opinion. In other examples, al-Ṭaḥāwī has Prophetic adīth
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available to settle an issue, yet he takes the time to adduce Companion opinions and only
looks to the Prophetic example “since they disagreed.” Although the final example
asserts the priority of Prophetic adīth, it also instructs jurists to look to Companion
adīths to settle their disagreements.
Likewise, in a chapter of Shar mushkil al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī presents Companion
adīths apparently in conflict with a Prophetic adīth. Rather than simply dismissing the
Companion adīths as inferior to the Prophetic adīth and therefore irrelevant to
determining the law, al-Ṭaḥāwī applies the harmonization techniques to them that he
generally uses on apparently conflicting Prophetic adīths. His application of
harmonization techniques to apparent conflicts between Companion and Prophetic
adīths stands in stark contrast to the position of al-Shāfiʿī, who held that Companion
adīths could not be harmonized with Prophetic adīths because the latter were
revelation while the former were not.371 Al-Ṭaḥāwī concludes the chapter by stating that,
“Thanks be to God, what we have transmitted from the Companions of God’s Messenger
emerges as being in agreement with what we have transmitted from God’s
Messenger.”372 In this example and those previous, al-Ṭaḥāwī evinces a notable concern
for Companion adīths and their agreement with Prophetic adīths even while assuming
the superior authority of Prophetic material.
In a striking example of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s deference to Companion adīths, he devotes
a chapter of Shar mushkil al-āthār to explaining Ibn ʿAbbās’s statement that “there is no
revelation except for the Qurʾān.” As discussed in the previous chapter of this study, al-
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Ṭaḥāwī harmonizes Ibn ʿAbbās’s assertion with Prophetic adīths stating that the
Prophet’s Sunna is also revelation by arguing that the Sunna falls within the scope of the
Qurʾān.373 The fact that al-Ṭaḥāwī elected to dedicate a chapter to harmonizing Ibn
ʿAbbās’s statement with Prophetic adīth, as well as the unusual argument he employs to
do so, suggests that he does not understand Companion adīths as being so ontologically
distinct from Prophetic adīths that they can simply be dismissed when they contradict
established Prophetic adīths.374 Further, by framing the chapter as one about Ibn
ʿAbbās’s adīth, rather than the Prophetic adīths with which it is apparently in conflict,
al-Ṭaḥāwī makes a Companion report his central concern.375

The Relative Status of the Companions and the Successors
We will see in this chapter that al-Ṭaḥāwī claims special authority for both
Companion and Successor adīths, although Successors represent Prophetic authority
much less frequently than do the Companions. In the authority he grants to Successor
adīths, al-Ṭaḥāwī departs from the later tradition; while the earliest Ḥanafī uṣūl works
contain chapters on aspects of the authority of the Companions, the Successors appear to
hold no special status. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s elevation of Successor adīths does appear to have at
least some elements in common with the thought of one of his contemporaries, the
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traditionist Ibn Abī Ḥātim al-Rāzī (d. 327/939), however.376 In his introduction to Kitāb
al-Jar wa-l-taʿdīl Ibn Abī Ḥātim argues for the probity of both the Companions and the
Successors. As is the case with the Companions, he states, there is no distinction among
the Successors, for they are all imams.377 Although Ibn Abī Ḥātim was concerned with
asserting the soundness of the corpus of Prophetic adīths while al-Ṭaḥāwī sought to
expand the corpus of available adīths by labeling post-Prophetic adīths as Prophetic,
both argued for the authority of the Successors in a way that was not continued by the
later tradition.378
In addition to elevating the status of the Successors, al-Ṭaḥāwī and Ibn Abī Ḥātim
are also alike in using the term qudwa (model, exemplar) exclusively in connection with
the Companions. Ibn Abī Ḥātim writes that God “made [the Companions] signs (aʿlā )
and an exemplar (qudwa) for us,” a claim he does not make in his discussion of the
Successors, despite his general elevation of their status as transmitters.379 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, too,
appears to restrict the status of qudwa to the Companions, although his usage is
somewhat more ambiguous. In a chapter of Shar mushkil al-āthār concerning Q 54/alQamar:1 (“The Hour has drawn near—the moon has been split”), al-Ṭaḥāwī criticizes
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those who claim that the moon will split on Judgment Day rather than relying on
Companion āthār from ʿAlī, Ibn Masʿūd, Ḥudhayfa, Ibn ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās and Anas
establishing that it had already split during the lifetime of the Prophet. He writes that “we
know of nothing else transmitted from other scholars on this matter. They are the
exemplars (qudwa) and the authorities ( ujja) whom only an ignoramus would oppose,
and only a profligate would despise.”380 Here the term qudwa appears to be restricted to
the Companions he has just listed, although in the next paragraph he condemns those who
rely on their own raʾy over what has been transmitted from the Companions and their
Successors without indicating why the Successors are now being mentioned along with
the Companions.
A similar ambivalence concerning the relative status of the Companions and the
Successors appears later in the same chapter, where al-Ṭaḥāwī writes that:
We seek refuge in God from opposition to the Companions of God’s Messenger
and deviation from their doctrines ( adhāhib). [Such deviation] is like holding
oneself above (al-isti bār ʿan) God’s Book. Whoever holds himself above God’s
Book and the doctrines of the Companions of God’s Messenger and their
Successors is deserving of God denying him understanding.381
Here, as above, al-Ṭaḥāwī first refers only to the Companions, but then apparently
expands the scope of his claim to include the Successors. Thus, it appears that neither for
Ibn Abī Ḥātim nor for al-Ṭaḥāwī does the claim that Successor transmission can fulfill
the same functions as Companion transmission necessarily indicate that the two groups
are precisely equivalent in status.
380
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The passage translated above makes a strong claim for the authority of
Companion—and to a lesser degree, Successor—doctrines. The Companions’ status as
qudwa in both al-Ṭaḥāwī and Ibn Abī Ḥātim might also appear to indicate that the
Companions held a normative authority of their own. A close study of the relevant
passages, however, indicates that the status of qudwa claimed by both scholars and the
authority al-Ṭaḥāwī envisions for the Companions’ doctrines is not any sort of
independent authority, but rather derives directly from their status as witnesses to
revelation. In both passages from the chapter on the splitting of the moon citing above,
what al-Ṭaḥāwī criticizes is later scholars’ rejection of Companion reports confirming a
historical event—the splitting of the moon. Thus, when he speaks of their doctrines
( adhāhib), he is not referring to their legal opinions, but rather to their recounting of
events they witnessed, a recounting which serves as exegesis for the Qurʾān. Likewise, in
the earlier passage the Companions are exemplars only in the sense that they preserve
knowledge of the meaning of the Qurʾānic verse in question. Wheeler observes that Ibn
Abī Ḥātim’s understanding of the authority of the Companions’ practice (and thus their
role as qudwa) is also based on their status as witnesses to revelation and to the Prophet’s
practice.382 Thus, the authority that both al-Ṭaḥāwī and Ibn Abī Ḥātim attribute to the
Companions in labeling them qudwa is merely the faithful transmission of knowledge of
Prophetic practice.
A hierarchy of the Companions and Successors is also indicated elsewhere in alṬaḥāwī’s thought. Below, we will see that al-Ṭaḥāwī claims Prophetic authority for far
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more Companion adīths than Successor adīths and that the Successors appear in only
one of the three lists of legal sources mentioning Companion opinions. Additionally, we
will observe that he holds the mere fact of being a Companion sufficient to allay fears of
that person’s contravening Prophetic practice, while no such claims are made about the
Successors. Instead, he points to the personal qualities of individual Successors to explain
their authority. A hierarchy of Companion and Successor authority—at least in the area
of Qurʾānic exegesis—is established in a chapter of Shar mushkil al-āthār in which the
Successor Mujāhid’s exegesis of a Qurʾānic verse differs from that of the Companion Ibn
Masʿūd. Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Ibn Masʿūd’s exegesis receives precedence over
Mujāhid’s because of Ibn Masʿūd’s position (mawḍiʿ) relative to the Prophet.383 That is,
Ibn Masʿūd witnessed revelation and is therefore better qualified to interpret it than
Mujāhid.
That al-Ṭaḥāwī gave precedence to the Companions over the Successors may be
understood as reflecting an ongoing process of defining the boundaries and nature of
Companionship. This process is evident as early as the beginning of the 3rd/9th century
with al-Wāqidī’s (d. 207/822) definition of a Companion384 and continues through the
final crystallization of the doctrine of the collective probity of the Companions (ʿadālat
al-ṣa āba) in the 5th/11th century.385 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s ʿ qīda is one of the earliest statements
of the theological requirement to revere all of the Companions,386 and a number of
chapters in Shar mushkil al-āthār are concerned with working out the collective status
383
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of the Companions by addressing adīths that appear to suggest that only some
Companions possessed important virtues387 or imply that Companions acted wrongly in a
certain case.388 Other chapters argue for the superiority of the Companions over all later
Muslims while recognizing the possibility that some Companions may be superior to
others in certain areas.389
Al-Ṭaḥāwī thus theorizes about the status of the Companions in a way that he
does not do with the Successors, even though the Successors perform all the same
functions in his legal arguments as the Companions. In this approach, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears
to represent an intermediary stage between a time when the earliest generations of
Muslims were vested with the authority to extend and develop Prophetic practice and the
later concept of ʿadālat al-ṣa aba, which served primarily to guarantee the corpus of
Prophetic adīth by precluding criticism of any of its original transmitters.

The Prophetic Authority of Post-Prophetic Ḥadīths
Claims of Prophetic Status for Post-Prophetic Ḥadīths
Al-Ṭaḥāwī understood only the Prophet’s Sunna as revelation and thus in theory
made a firm distinction between the status of Prophetic and post-Prophetic adīths.
However, as we saw in the previous chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not distinguish between
Prophetic and post-Prophetic reports in his terminology; khabar, adīth, āthār and sunna
are all used in reference to both Prophetic and post-Prophetic material, while many later
387
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jurists would carefully distinguish between Prophetic adīth and post-Prophetic āthār in
their terminology.390 Further, in approximately fifty passages in

ā al-Qurʾān and

Shar mushkil al-āthār, al-Ṭaḥāwī blurs the boundaries between Prophetic and nonProphetic material by claiming Prophetic status for a post-Prophetic adīth.391
For example, no Prophetic adīth indicates any limit to when it is permissible to
perform the ʿUmra (minor pilgrimage). According to qiyās, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes, it should
be permissible on any day of the year. However, he has discovered a statement from
ʿĀʾisha that there are four days of the year when the ʿUmra may not be performed. AlṬaḥāwī argues that:
We know that [ʿĀʾisha] did not speak based upon her own legal reasoning (raʾy),
but rather spoke what had been confirmed by the Prophet’s instruction (tawqīf),
because this kind of thing cannot be based upon legal reasoning. Therefore we
hold that her statement on this is like a continuously attested Prophetic adīth
( adīth uttaṣil).392
By deeming ʿĀʾisha’s statement evidence of revelation, al-Ṭaḥāwī has in effect elevated
a post-Prophetic adīth to the status of a revealed text. Crucially, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument
in support of ʿĀʾisha’s position depends on the instruction/inference binary we have
already encountered in the previous chapter, although here that binary is expressed using
the language of raʾy (legal reasoning) and tawqīf (Prophetic instruction). While a
Companion or Successor’s legal reasoning—most commonly termed raʾy, but also
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occasionally istinbāṭ, isti hrāj or qiyās393—can justifiably serve as the basis for some
kinds of statements regarding the law, other types of legislative statements can only be
based upon instruction from the Prophet (tawqīf or, occasionally, akhdh).394 Precisely
which types of statements require tawqīf is never explicitly and comprehensively stated,
although I suggest some parameters later in this section, abstracted from passages in
which al-Ṭaḥāwī employs this argument. In addition to this binary, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument
in this passage assumes a second major premise: that a Companion or Successor would
never make a statement concerning the law for which they did not possess the necessary
authority.395 In effect, the tawqīf:raʾy binary transforms a pious optimism about the
trustworthiness of the Companions and Successors into the basis for an inference
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concerning the origins of their legal doctrines. By appealing to this binary, al-Ṭaḥāwī is
able to claim revelatory status for many apparently non-Prophetic statements of the law.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī similarly elevates post-Prophetic adīths to Prophetic status in many
other passages of his hermeneutical works. In a chapter containing both Prophetic and
Companion versions of an exegesis of a Qurʾānic verse, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that, even if not
a single transmitter had elevated (rafʿ) a certain adīth from Ibn ʿAbbās to the Prophet,
we would know that Ibn ʿAbbās must have received this statement from the Prophet.396
On another occasion, when faced with an ambiguous report in which it is not clear
whether a certain phrase is quoting the speech of Abū Hurayra or the Prophet, al-Ṭaḥāwī
concludes that, in either case, the speech is originally that of the Prophet. That is true
even if Abū Hurayra did not receive it directly from the Prophet, but instead reported it
indirectly from someone else who had received it from the Prophet.397
Once al-Ṭaḥāwī has claimed Prophetic status for a Companion adīth, he holds
that adīth equal to other Prophetic adīths in every way. Concerning one report from the
wives of the Prophet, al-Ṭaḥāwī says that he “includes it among the Prophetic adīths”
(ad halnā hādhihi al- adīth fī a ādīth rasūl llāh”).398 In another place, he argues that a
adīth from ʿAlī falls under the ruling ( ukm) of something transmitted from the
Prophet.399 After elevating Companion reports from ʿAlī and Abū Hurayra to Prophetic
status, al-Ṭaḥāwī uses the term u āfiʾ (equivalent) to describe their relationship to
another relevant Prophetic adīth, the same term he uses when two Prophetic adīths
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cannot be harmonized and therefore must both be discarded.400 Finally, in a chapter
where al-Ṭaḥāwī has claimed Prophetic status for a report from Abū Hurayra, he
proceeds to harmonize that report with both the Qurʾān and Prophetic adīths on the
grounds that they are equally authoritative sources.401 In a strong sense, then, the reports
in question are no longer truly Companion adīths at all, but have fully entered the realm
of Prophetic revelation.
Only rarely does al-Ṭaḥāwī elevate a post-Companion adīth to Prophetic status.
One passage identified concerns the Successor Ṭāwūs, while another concerns the jurist
al-Awzāʿī (d.158/774). In the chapter on the ʿUmra discussed above, shortly after
claiming for ʿĀʾisha’s report the status of a adīth uttaṣil, al-Ṭaḥāwī cites a adīth from
Ṭāwūs. He writes that Ṭāwūs “must have had tawqīf from someone who came before
him, because this is the kind of thing not taken from raʾy, isti hrāj or istinbāṭ.”402 That is,
Ṭāwūs must have heard it from a Companion, who must have heard it from the Prophet.
The other example concerns a Prophetic adīth in which it is unclear whether a certain
addition to the adīth by al-Awzāʿī was intended to be part of the Prophet’s speech or
was al-Awzāʿī’s own speech. Al-Ṭaḥāwī concludes that the question is unimportant,
because someone as knowledgeable and virtuous as al-Awzāʿī would not inappropriately
add his own interpretation to the adīth, and what he said could not be based upon raʾy,
isti hrāj or istinbāṭ.403 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments concerning these post-Companion reports
thus follow the same pattern and use the same language as many of his arguments
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concerning the Prophetic status of Companion adīths; however, his stronger claims
discussed above, such as that a post-Prophetic adīth should be counted among the
Prophetic adīths, are limited to the Companions.
In many cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s claims of authority for post-Prophetic adīths are in
agreement with principles described by other jurists and traditionists. For instance, alṬaḥāwī accepts a adīth from Abū Mulayḥ concerning the amount of the damages (diya)
for the killing of a viable fetus on the grounds that the adīth mentions a specific sum for
the damages, and such a sum can only be known through Prophetic instruction.404 In their
chapters on taqlīd al-Ṣa ābī,405 al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī similarly note that even those
jurists who deny the precedence of a Companion report over qiyās accept the legal
authority of a single Companion report on issues related to quantity. Like al-Ṭaḥāwī, they
take the Ḥanafī principle that enumerated quantities and defined amounts cannot be the
outcome of analogy and make that principle the basis for an inference about the
provenance of a Companion adīth. That is, because quantities cannot be known through
qiyās, a Companion adīth establishing such a rule must have been based upon Prophetic
instruction (tawqīf).406 Nyazee observes that the Ḥanafīs apply the same rule to time
periods.407 We have already seen al-Ṭaḥāwī claiming Prophetic status for ʿĀʾisha’s
adīth about the time period during which Muslims may perform the ʿUmra, and alṬaḥāwī states explicitly elsewhere that the defining of time periods (tawqīt) requires
404
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instruction (tawqīf) from the Prophet.408 However, while later Ḥanafī jurists may accept
the legal authority of such Companion adīths, they do not appear to reclassify
Companion adīths as Prophetic or discuss the authority of post-Companion adīths in
the manner of al-Ṭaḥāwī.
Nor does al-Ṭaḥāwī limit his use of this argument to cases involving numbers or
time periods. In a few cases, he establishes principles concerning other kinds of
legislative statements that require tawqīf. For instance, we learn that statements in the
grammatical form of a threat and statements which particularize ( hāṣṣ) the general
(ʿāmm) must have been the result of Prophetic instruction.409 In most cases, however, alṬaḥāwī merely states that a certain legislative statement in a post-Prophetic adīth could
not be based upon legal reasoning without explaining what it is about the statement that
precludes that possibility.410 The rules that al-Ṭaḥāwī supports on the basis of this
argument include, for example, the impermissibility of performing Congregational prayer
on Fridays and the three days of ʿĪd al-Aḍḥā outside of a garrison town or Friday mosque
(jā iʿ);411 the permissibility of wearing a garment embroidered in silk;412 the
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Qurʾānic exegesis must have come from the Prophet, he does not join the traditionists in applying the label
arfūʿ to them.
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impermissibility of slaves calling their masters ‘rabbī’ (my lord);413 the practice of
calling out a greeting before asking permission to enter a house;414 the permissibility of
interceding for someone who has committed a add crime before the charge is brought to
the ruler;415 and the impermissibility of two people conferring secretly together while
traveling with a third person.416 Surveying other cases in which he employs this
argument, we may surmise that al-Ṭaḥāwī also holds that Companion opinions
establishing ritual practices must have originated with the Prophet, since a number of his
examples involve prayer417 and pilgrimage practices.418
On the whole, however, while it is possible to abstract from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
discussions some limited set of principles concerning the kind of legislative statement
that requires tawqīf, in practice, these principles cannot account for nearly all of alṬaḥāwī’s appeals to the idea of an underlying instance of tawqīf. Indeed, it appears that
any legislative statement by a Companion that is not explicitly labeled an instance of
qiyās may be subsumed under this argument and reclassified as Prophetic, a move which
permits al-Ṭaḥāwī wide latitude in claiming divine origins for practices not recorded in
the Qurʾān and Prophetic Sunna. The question arises, then, on what basis does al-Ṭaḥāwī
identify particular Companion and Successor adīths as representing Prophetic authority,
and to what end?
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In many cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts the Prophetic status of Companion adīths in
order to justify established rules of Ḥanafī positive law that cannot be accounted for
under the source rubric of Qurʾān, Sunna and consensus. Such cases reveal that alṬaḥāwī’s hermeneutical project is at least to some extent instrumental, serving the
ultimate purpose of tethering Ḥanafī fiqh to revelation. For example, in a discussion
defining the area of ʿArafat within which pilgrims must halt, al-Ṭaḥāwī first cites a
Prophetic adīth saying that all of ʿArafat is a halting place (mawqif). He next notes that
scholars including Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī
exclude a certain area from the permissible halting place for the pilgrimage, but that he
has not found a continuously attested Prophetic adīth giving that exception. He has,
however, identified a Companion hadith from Ibn ʿAbbās, supported by other reports
from ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr and ʿUrwa, stating the exception. Because we know that
they would not have spoken from raʾy, istinbāṭ, aqāyīs, or ḍarb al-a thāl, they must
have taken this exception from the Prophet. Al-Ṭaḥāwī goes on to state that he later found
a version of the adīth from Ibn ʿAbbās which was elevated to the Prophet ( arfūʿ);419
however, even before discovering the Prophetic adīth stating the exception, al-Ṭaḥāwī
was willing to base his opinion on the authority of the presumed Prophetic origins of
Companion adīths. Significantly, the authority that al-Ṭaḥāwī grants these Companion
adīths outweighs the authority of the original Prophetic adīth stating that all of ʿArafat
is the halting place. The argument for the Prophetic status of Companion adīth thus
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allows al-Ṭaḥāwī to claim a basis in revelation even for rules which conflict with
Prophetic adīth.
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s elevation of
Companion adīths to Prophetic status is merely a tool in the service of justifying Ḥanafī
fiqh. While the majority of such arguments do serve to support an established rule of
Ḥanafī positive law, at other times al-Ṭaḥāwī’s deference to Companion adīths leads
him to oppose established Ḥanafī positions, revealing a fundamental struggle in alṬaḥāwī’s works between instrumental and philosophical reasoning.420 For instance, in a
chapter concerning someone who had the opportunity to make up missed fast days from a
previous Ramadan but failed to do so before the arrival of a new Ramadan, al-Ṭaḥāwī
spends most of the chapter arguing in support of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and alShaybānī, who hold that nothing more is required of the person than that he or she should
make up the missed fast days. In response to the claim of Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, Ibn ʿAbbās
and Abū Hurayra that the individual must also feed a poor person for every day of fasting
missed, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that nothing more than making up the missed obligation is
required of someone who misses a prayer. By analogy, nothing more should be required
of someone who misses a fast day. Further, the Qurʾān does not mention feeding the poor
in its discussion of making up missed fast days. Al-Ṭaḥāwī counters several more
arguments from an unnamed interlocutor representing the position of Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī,
Ibn ʿAbbās and Abū Hurayra.421
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To this point in the argument, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to agree with the Ḥanafī
position. At the very end of the discussion, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that he could not
find support for the legislative content of the adīths from Ibn ʿAbbās and Abū Hurayra
in the Qurʾān, the Sunna, or qiyās. They could not have spoken from raʾy or istinbāṭ, but
only on the basis of tawqīf from the Prophet. No other Companion is known to disagree
with them. Therefore, he will oppose Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī and adopt
the opinion of Ibn ʿAbbās and Abū Hurayra, even though analogy and the apparent
meaning of the Qurʾān are in conflict with their position.422 Although he does not say so
directly, he is also now in agreement with Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī over the members of his
own legal school.
We see here that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s deference to Companion reports goes considerably
deeper than a mere need to justify Ḥanafī positive law on the basis of revealed texts.
Instead, he elevates the Companions’ status such that any discrepancy between certain
Companion adīths and the Qurʾān or Sunna indicates special knowledge on the part of
the Companions. In effect, it is the apparent baselessness of the Companion reports which
al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts as his justification for accepting them as Prophetic, a procedure which
relies upon the underlying premise that it is impossible that the Companions would ever
knowingly depart from correct legal practice or speak on matters for which they do not
have the necessary authority, such as basic ritual matters. Thus, within the
instruction/inference divide which makes up the tawqīf:raʾy binary, all that is necessary
to confirm the presence of tawqīf is the absence of an undisputed instance of raʾy. That is,
the affirmation of tawqīf is the result of a lack of evidence (or permission) for raʾy, rather
422
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than any positive indication that tawqīf actually occurred. Nonetheless, in the example
above, al-Ṭaḥāwī considers his inference of an original tawqīf strong enough to outweigh
the apparent evidence of Qurʾān and Sunna as well as established Ḥanafī law.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī also sometimes defers to Companion adīths over Ḥanafī doctrine in
cases where he does not argue that those Companion adīths have Prophetic status. For
example, in a chapter of Shar mushkil al-āthār concerning the requirements of i rā (a
prolonged state of ritual purification for the Pilgrimage), al-Ṭaḥāwī proposes an
interpretation of apparently contradictory Prophetic adīths such that they refer to
different situations, and are thus in harmony with each other. He asserts that his
harmonization is supported by adīths showing the Companions acting in accordance
with his interpretation. He concludes the chapter by noting that his position opposes that
of the Ḥanafīs and the Mālikīs.423
In another chapter of Shar mushkil al-āthār on whether Q 5/al-Māʾida:106 (“[let
there be] witnessing between you when death comes to one of you”) was abrogated, alṬaḥāwī adduces several Companion reports indicating that the verse was not abrogated
and then writes that he knows of no Companion who opposed them. He likewise cites a
large number of Successors who held that the verse was not abrogated, while conceding
that at least one Successor, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, held that it was abrogated. Although the
later Ḥanafīs, Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs held that the verse was indeed abrogated, al-Ṭaḥāwī
argues that their argument does not provide certainty of the abrogation of what was in the
Qurʾān and then was practiced by the Prophet and many of his Companions.424 In each of
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the examples above, al-Ṭaḥāwī appeals to Companion adīths to support an argument
against the jurists of his own legal school.
In light of these passages, we may evaluate Schacht’s characterization of alṬaḥāwī’s use of Companion adīths as merely instrumental. In a discussion of
Companion adīths in The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, Schacht comments
that the early Iraqi jurists “usually chose seemingly arbitrarily one out of several
contradictory traditions,” depending on which best supported their school tradition. He
continues, “This acceptance or rejection of traditions, according to whether they agree or
disagree with the previously established doctrine of the school, was later developed into a
fine art by Ṭaḥāwī whose efforts at harmonizing are overshadowed by his tendency to
find contradictions, so that he can eliminate those traditions which do not agree with the
doctrine of the Ḥanafī school, by assuming their repeal.”425
It is quite true that in the majority of cases al-Ṭaḥāwī harmonizes Prophetic and
Companion adīths or dismisses them as weak in ways that support established Ḥanafī
doctrine. That is, his legal arguments throughout all of his works of practical
hermeneutics are most often based on instrumental reasoning, meant to achieve a
specific, predetermined end. However, the existence of passages like those cited above,
as well as others we have encountered or will encounter in which al-Ṭaḥāwī departs from
accepted Ḥanafī positions in order to follow Prophetic or Companion practice, suggests
that Schacht’s portrayal of al-Ṭaḥāwī is overly simplistic and perhaps overly cynical.
Certainly, al-Ṭaḥāwī understood himself to participate in a Ḥanafī tradition—indicated by
425

Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 30. It is unclear whether Schacht means to continue to
discuss only Companion reports in this passage, or whether he is now including Prophetic reports as well.
My comments above apply in either case.

129
his frequent reference to Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī as aṣ ābunā (our
colleagues)—which subscribed to a particular body of positive law, albeit a nebulous one.
However, to dismiss al-Ṭaḥāwī’s efforts at harmonization as the mere justification of
Ḥanafī positive law is to ignore the way in which his works of practical hermeneutics
embody a very real struggle to reconcile his commitment to a body of positive law with
his apparently sincere ascription to relatively newly-developed ideas about the sources of
the law and legal authority.426 While al-Ṭaḥāwī is often able to martial his theories of
legal sources and legal hermeneutics in ways that support Ḥanafī doctrine, he is not
invariably successful. In cases where his commitment to Prophetic and Companion
adīths are irreconcilable with Ḥanafī doctrine, he evinces a willingness to depart from
that doctrine in a way not admitted by Schacht.427 In addition to reflecting al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
commitment to adīth, his departures from Ḥanafī doctrine in favor of Prophetic or
Companion adīth may also be a consequence of a more expansive understanding of
what it means to belong to a madhhab than Schacht envisions. While Schacht portrays alṬaḥāwī as callously dismissing revealed texts in order to protect Ḥanafī doctrine, alṬaḥāwī does not appear to feel that his not infrequent departures from Ḥanafī doctrine
make him any less Ḥanafī.

426

The degree to which this struggle is characteristic of a wider genre of practical hermeneutics is a
question in need of a future study.
427
The same criticism may be leveled at Norman Calder’s assertion that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments in Shar
mushkil al-āthār are “intended to demonstrate that the principles of Ḥanafī law can be established by
reference to Prophetic hadith and, conversely, that, whatever the appearances to the contrary, there are no
reliable Prophetic hadith that contradict Ḥanafī law” (Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence, 235). While
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s overall goal is indeed to demonstrate the compatibility of Ḥanafī law and Prophetic adīth,
Calder’s statement overstates al-Ṭaḥāwī’s commitment to the Ḥanafī madhhab at the cost of portraying his
commitment to adīth as merely instrumental or strategic.

130
Abrogation Known through Post-Prophetic Ḥadīths
In addition to claiming Prophetic status for certain post-Prophetic adīth, alṬaḥāwī also relies on post-Prophetic adīth as the sole evidence for instances of
abrogation not preserved in the corpus of Prophetic adīth. His argument is that the
existence of a post-Prophetic opinion in conflict with a Prophetic adīth transmitted by
the same individual is sound evidence that that individual knew of the adīth’s
abrogation. As was the case with the elevation of post-Prophetic adīths to Prophetic
status, Companion adīths are the basis for his argument in the great majority of the
approximately twenty passages in question. Nonetheless, this argument appears twice in
connection with the Successor ʿUrwa ibn al-Zubayr and once concerning the Successor
al-Shaʿbī.428
In one example, al-Ṭaḥāwī reports that Ibn ʿAbbās transmitted a Prophetic adīth
saying that a man who commits bestiality should be killed, as should the animal involved.
However, Ibn ʿAbbās later stated that there is no add punishment for bestiality.429 In
response, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes that “Ibn ʿAbbās would not have said anything after the [time
of the] Prophet that contradicted what he had received from the Prophet unless he had
Prophetic instruction (tawqīf) that it was abrogated.” Shortly afterward he affirms that
this argument is sufficient ( ifāya) and authoritative ( ujja) for refuting the legal
effectiveness of the original Prophetic adīth.430 In other passages al-Ṭaḥāwī claims the
actions of ʿAlī431 and Ibn ʿUmar432 as evidence for the abrogation of aspects of ritual

428

Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 7.426, 11.486; Maʿānī, 4.100.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 9.437-441.
430
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 9.442.
431
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 15.34.
429

131
prayer; the opinions of ʿĀʾisha and Ibn ʿAbbās as evidence for the abrogation of fasting
on behalf of the deceased;433 another report from Ibn ʿUmar as evidence for the
abrogation of the permissibility of seclusion in a mosque (iʿti āf) without an
accompanying fast;434 and the actions of Abū Ṭalḥa and Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī as
evidence of the abrogation of the requirement to renew ablutions after eating.435 From
these examples we may observe that Companion actions and opinions provide alṬaḥāwī’s evidence for a number of major ritual practices.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī thus considers that the actions and opinions of individual Companions
and Successors preserve a memory of instances of abrogation that are not reflected in the
canon of Prophetic adīth. The significance of their role in preserving knowledge of
abrogation becomes apparent if we recall from the previous chapter al-Ṭaḥāwī’s anxieties
related to the loss of the text of the Qurʾān.436 His primary argument against reports that
verses are missing from the canonized text of the Qurʾān is that, if that were the case, it
would be possible that the missing verses would abrogate verses preserved in the
canonized text, and the requirement to perform certain duties would be lifted.437 Despite
his anxiety about losing abrogating texts, al-Ṭaḥāwī is willing to relegate to the
Companions and Successors the function of preserving knowledge of the abrogation of
the Sunna.438

432

Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 15.50.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī,
ā , 1.428-429.
434
Al-Ṭaḥāwī,
ā , 1.472.
435
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 1.69.
436
See p. 81.
437
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 5.313, 11.491.
438
Interestingly, one of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments for a Companion preserving knowledge of an abrogating
Prophetic adīth appears in the very same chapter as the above argument against the possibility of missing
abrogating texts in the Qurʾān (Mushkil, 11.486, 11.491).
433

132
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s acceptance that some instances of abrogation can be known only
through post-Prophetic adīths amounts to an admission that the corpus of Prophetic
adīths does not adequately convey Prophetic practice to later generations. It is for this
reason that Saʿd Bashīr Asʿad Sharaf, the author of bū Jaʿfar al-Ṭa āwī wa anhajuhu
fī al-fiqh al-Islā ī, condemns al-Ṭaḥāwī’s preference for a Companion action over a
Prophetic adīth narrated by the same Companion, despite Sharaf’s generally positive
stance toward al-Ṭaḥāwī. He argues that for a Companion to suppress an abrogating
Prophetic adīth would be a form of unbelief (kufr).439 This view seems to be a distortion
of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s position, however; presumably al-Ṭaḥāwī would argue that the abrogating
adīth is not suppressed, but is instead adequately preserved in post-Prophetic adīth
form.

Explanations for Companion and Successor Authority
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument for abrogation based on post-Prophetic adīth maps onto a
larger debate among legal theorists about conflicts between a Companion’s action and his
or her transmission from the Prophet.440 As in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of abrogation, one
question at stake in this debate is whether the Companions can be trusted invariably to
follow the Prophet’s practice. Al-Ṭaḥāwī, as we shall see below, holds that they can be.
Equally importantly, the debate is one about whether Prophetic authority is adequately
439
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and exclusively conveyed by Prophetic adīths. Al-Shāfiʿī, who attempted fully to
identify Prophetic authority with Prophetic adīth, characteristically gives priority to the
Prophetic adīth transmitted by a Companion over that same Companion’s action.441
Later Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs would do the same.442
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s position is largely in agreement with both earlier and later Ḥanafīs,
however, including ʿĪsā ibn Abān and al-Jaṣṣāṣ.443 The latter adds a caveat: the Prophetic
adīth must not be open to interpretation (taʾwīl). If it is, then the Companion action,
representing his taʾwīl, has no special interpretive authority.444 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does
not address this issue in his discussions of the conflict between a Companion’s
transmission and his action, he holds as a general principle that the person who transmits
a adīth is the most qualified to interpret it—that is, the transmitter of a hadith has a
special insight into its meaning—and would therefore most likely disagree with alJaṣṣāṣ.445 As we have seen, al-Ṭaḥāwī also departs from al-Jaṣṣāṣ by looking to Successor
adīths for evidence of abrogation, a situation not envisioned in later uṣūl al-fiqh
discussions.
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s initial description of the cases in which a Companion’s action takes
precedence over a Prophetic adīth contains no explanation of why it should do so.
However, in a later discussion of a specific example of abrogation known by a
Companion’s action, he explains that it is inconceivable (ghayr jāʾi ) that Ibn ʿUmar
441

Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 18.
Sharaf, bū Jaʿfar al-Ṭa āwī, 72.
443
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 2.68ff. Cf. Kamali, who states that the Ḥanafīs considered that a Companion’s
failure to act upon a adīth he transmitted indicated that the adīth was unreliable (rather than abrogated)
(Textbook of Ḥadīth Studies, 174).
444
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 2.68.
445
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 13.304; Maʿānī, 4.100.
442

134
would contravene the sunna he had transmitted from the Prophet in a case where that
particular sunna left no room for interpretation.446 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī is consistently
concerned with explaining why a post-Prophetic adīth can be trusted as evidence for the
abrogation of a Prophetic adīth. His explanations fall into several categories, some of
which provide important insights into his understanding of the status of the Companions
and Successors and the nature of probity (ʿadl). Because al-Ṭaḥāwī relies upon the same
set of explanations for both abrogation known by post-Prophetic adīth and the elevation
of post-Prophetic adīth to Prophetic status, I have included examples from both types of
argument below. Rather than justifying a single function of Companion and Successor
adīths, this range of arguments appears to constitute al-Ṭaḥāwī’s general justification for
his heavy reliance on post-Prophetic adīths in his hermeneutical works.
In the first type of explanation, al-Ṭaḥāwī attributes his confidence in the
trustworthiness of a post-Prophetic adīth to his knowledge of an individual transmitter’s
character: Ibn ʿUmar’s virtue (faḍl), piety (waraʿ) and knowledge (ʿilm) would prevent
him from particularizing (takhṣīṣ) what the Prophet had made general (ʿāmm) without
Prophetic authority,447 and individuals of ʿAlī’s stature (mithluhu) do not speak on certain
matters based merely on their own opinion.448 Similarly, in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of two
of the four Successor adīths mentioned above and the single adīth from a later jurist,
we learn that it was those individuals’ great knowledge or other personal qualities that
would not permit them to act in a certain way without certainty of the abrogation of an
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earlier rule.449 This first category of explanation is thus restricted to the qualities of
individuals and may apply to members of any group: Companions, Successors or later
jurists.
Another category of explanation anticipates al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s discussion by emphasizing
the sheer inconceivability of an individual abandoning Prophetic practice or speaking
without Prophetic authority, using phrases such as mu āl/ista āla (it is impossible or
inconceivable) or lā yajū (it is inconceivable).450 Unlike the previous category, the
argument from inconceivability is exclusively connected with Companions. In most
examples, al-Ṭaḥāwī simply states that it is inconceivable that a particular Companion
would undertake a certain action or make a certain statement in the absence of Prophetic
authority, thus leaving open the possibility that the impossibility stems from the personal
qualities of that Companion.451
In two cases, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī reveals that it is the very fact of being a
Companion that prevents individuals from abandoning Prophetic practice.452 Given his
449
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companionship (ṣu ba) with the Prophet, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes, it is unimaginable that
Salama ibn Ṣakhr would pronounce a ẓihār divorce in a certain way unless he knew an
earlier ruling on the practice had been abrogated.453 Likewise, concerning Companion
adīths on turning a Greater Pilgrimage into a Lesser Pilgrimage (faskh al- ajj bi-ʿumra),
al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that it is inconceivable that anyone who experienced companionship
with the Prophet would make such a statement based merely on opinion.454 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
argument from inconceivability forms an interesting parallel with the doctrine of the
collective probity of the Companions (taʿdīl al-Ṣa āba), to which al-Ṭaḥāwī also
subscribed.455 While the doctrine of taʿdīl al-Ṣa āba functioned to preserve the
maximum amount of Prophetic material that could be used to justify the law by refraining
from discrediting the transmission of any Companion,456 al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument from
inconceivability functions effectively to expand the Prophetic corpus by granting
Prophetic authority to any Companion material whose contradiction with Prophetic
material cannot otherwise be explained.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s third and final category of explanation for the authority of postProphetic adīths likewise centers on notions of probity and transmission. These
explanations are characterized by a shifting constellation of statements and terms related
to the ideas of amn (trustworthiness, reliability) and ʿadl (probity). Unlike the previous
category, however, these statements do not concern only the Companions. The same
453
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language is used to describe the authority of Successor reports and, as we will discuss in
the next chapter, the collective opinion of later jurists.457 That being the case, the
statements on the Companions analyzed below are best understood not as part of a
conception of taʿdīl al-Ṣa āba, but rather as part of a wider theory of the relationship
between probity, transmission and legal reasoning.
The explanations in this category are comprised of two basic building blocks
appearing separately or in combination. The first, most frequently-appearing building
block consists of the statement that someone is aʾ ūn (trustworthy). Individual
Companions are described as aʾ ūn in their transmission from the Prophet458 and in
what they opine (qāla) that is in conflict with Prophetic adīth.459 Collectively, the
Companions are described as “trusted in what they do (faʿalū), just as they are trusted in
what they transmit,”460 a formulation also used to describe later jurists as a group.461 In
these and other passages, al-Ṭaḥāwī describes Companions, Successors or later jurists as
aʾ ūn in some combination of transmission, legal opinion, action and knowledge of
abrogation.462 In many passages, statements concerning amn are immediately followed by
the assertion that a loss of probity (ʿadl) entails the loss of reliability in transmission463
or, in one case, the loss of reliability in transmission and legal opinions.464
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Two passages explicitly connect the threat of a loss of probity not only to a loss of
someone’s reliability as a transmitter of adīth, but also to a loss of trust in his legal
opinions. In one, al-Ṭaḥāwī says that, if al-Shaʿbī had given an opinion in conflict with a
Prophetic adīth he transmitted without knowing it to be abrogated, then his legal
opinions (raʾy) would become suspect (muttaham). If his legal opinions were suspect,
then his transmission of adīth (riwāya) would also be suspect. Because his probity
(ʿadāla) in transmission is confirmed, his probity in avoiding contravening those
transmissions is also confirmed. If one supposes (in wuhiba) the voiding of one of these
matters, one must suppose the voiding of the other as well.465 That is to say, probity in
transmitting adīth and probity in acting in accordance with adīth are inseparable; you
cannot have one without the other. In the other passage, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that, if Abū
Hurayra contravened what he had transmitted from the Prophet, then his probity would be
voided such that neither his legal opinion (qawl) nor his transmission (riwāya) would be
accepted.466
Probity (ʿadl, ʿadāla) for al-Ṭaḥāwī thus consists of three inseparable factors. The
first is reliability in the transmission of adīth, alternatively expressed as ‘probity in
transmission’ (al-ʿadāla fī al-riwāya)467 or more commonly simply as ‘transmission’
(riwāya).468 The second factor is authority in legal opinions (qawl, raʾy), and the final
factor, termed ‘ʿadl’ or ‘ʿadāla,’ is the uprightness that precludes abandonment of a
Prophetic adīth without just cause. In all of the passages about the conflict between a
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Companion’s opinion and his transmission from the Prophet, al-Ṭaḥāwī takes for granted
that the Companions’ transmission of adīth—their riwāya—is beyond suspicion. It is in
fact their riwāya which he uses as evidence that they would not have contravened a
Prophetic adīth unless they knew it to be abrogated. If they had done so, then their
riwāya would be voided, and “God forbid that such should be the case.” Because we are
confident in the Companions’ riwāya, al-Ṭaḥāwī insists that we may also have
confidence in the ʿadl, the uprightness, which guarantees that riwāya. Likewise, we may
have confidence in the Companion’s legal opinions, because a lack of probity there
would void their probity in riwāya, and we know that their probity in riwāya is
unquestioned. For al-Ṭaḥāwī, then, the trustworthiness of the Companions as transmitters
is assumed. Far from arguing to establish the principle of taʿdīl al-Ṣa āba, al-Ṭaḥāwī
points to scholars’ confidence in the Companions’ and other figures’ probity as
transmitters to establish their probity in other matters. The precedence of a Companion or
Successor action over their transmission from the Prophet is thus guaranteed by our
knowledge of their probity as transmitters.

The Relative Authority of Post-Prophetic Ḥadīths and Later Jurists’ Qiyās
While the superior authority of Prophetic over post-Prophetic adīth was asserted
as part of the elevation of Prophetic authority in the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th centuries, some
questions remained concerning the relative status of Companion or Successor adīths and
later jurists’ legal opinions. In this section I assess the degree to which al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
understanding of their relative authority aligns with discussions among legal theorists.
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The later uṣūl tradition would frame the issue primarily in terms of the competition
between the qiyās (analogy) of later jurists and a Companion opinion in cases where no
opposition from other Companions is reported and no relevant Prophetic adīth is
known.469 According to the Shāfiʿīs and to the Ḥanafī al-Karkhī, jurists need not give
preference to a Companion report over their own qiyās. Mālik and the majority of
Ḥanafīs, in contrast, held that later jurists must adopt the Companion report, a process
they labeled taqlīd al-Ṣa ābī (following the precedent of a Companion).470
In their discussions of taqlīd al-Ṣa ābī, both al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī concur with
the argument of Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī (d. 317/929-930), a Ḥanafī jurist active in
Baghdad.471 Abū Saʿīd asserts that the unopposed opinion of a Companion is a ujja
(proof) because it might have been based on a revealed text that was otherwise lost.
Something that might have been revealed (a Companion report) is superior to something
which certainly was not revealed (the qiyās of a later jurist). Further, even if the
Companion’s opinion were not based on revelation, the ijtihād of a Companion is
superior to the ijtihād of a later jurist, and therefore the Companion opinion must be
adopted. The central issues for Abū Saʿīd, al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī are thus the
possibility that a Companion report may preserve Prophetic material and the relative
value of the ijtihād of the Companions and later jurists.

469

See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Islamic Texts
Society, 2003), 313.
470
Nyazee, Islamic Jurisprudence, 253-254; al-Sarakhsī, al-Mu arrar, 2.82. Al-Shāfiʿī’s early doctrine
was that a Companion opinion is to be preferred to qiyās. Kamali attributes the preference for Companion
adīth to Abū Ḥanīfa himself (Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 320), although al-Jaṣṣāṣ states that he
knows of no statement from Abū Ḥanīfa on this matter and instead traces the opinion to Abū Yūsuf (alFuṣūl, 2.172).
471
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 2.172ff; al-Sarakhsī, al-Mu arrar, 2.84.

141
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī was a close contemporary of Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī, he does
not replicate his fellow Ḥanafī’s arguments for the superiority of the Companions’ qiyās
as the basis for the authority of their opinions. Instances in which he explicitly opposes
opinions of the Companions and later jurists are rare. In one passage concerning the
status of the marriage of a woman who converts to Islam while outside of Islamic lands,
he demonstrates an awareness of the doctrine that Companion adīths may be preferred
over later jurists’ analogy by noting that Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and Muḥammad follow
(qalladū) a Companion adīth from ʿUmar over naẓar (reasoned argument) in their
opinion that irrevocable divorce does not take effect immediately upon her conversion.472
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s own opinion is in agreement with naẓar as well as another Companion
opinion, that of Ibn ʿAbbās.473 However, the authority he claims for his position is neither
that of naẓar nor of the opinion of Ibn ʿAbbās, but is instead Prophetic. Here, as in other
passages we have encountered, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Ibn ʿAbbās’s position in the
Companion adīth is in conflict with a Prophetic adīth that Ibn ʿAbbās himself
transmitted, thereby demonstrating that he knew the adīth to be abrogated and his own
position to be affirmed. Where al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Ḥanafī predecessors argue this question on
the basis of the inherent authority of a Companion opinion, al-Ṭaḥāwī claims as Prophetic
the authority of the Companion adīth he adduces.
A similar tendency is apparent in other passages relevant to the uṣūl debate over
Companion reports and later jurists’ reasoning. In a discussion of whether it is
472
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permissible to take back a gift, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that he knows of no reports contradicting
those he adduces from Companions and Successors including ʿUmar, Shurayḥ and
Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, each of whom serves as the authority for a different aspect of his
argument. Therefore he will abandon naẓar and follow (qallada) their āthār. He admits
that naẓar would lead to a different result than the one found in āthār, but “following
(ittibāʿ) āthār and following the precedent of (taqlīd) the foremost scholars (aʾi

at ahl

al-ʿilm) is better [than naẓar].474
The final example we will consider is one we have already encountered above
concerning ʿĀʾisha’s statement about when it is permissible to perform the ʿUmra (lesser
pilgrimage). According to qiyās, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes, it should be permissible on every day
of the year. However, he has discovered an athr from ʿĀʾisha which states that there are
four days of the year when the ʿUmra may not be performed. The adīth of ʿĀʾisha is the
only statement he has found from the Companions on this issue. Concerning ʿĀʾisha’s
adīth, he argues that:
We know that she did not merely opine on her own (raʾy), but rather spoke what
had been confirmed (tawqīf), because this kind of thing cannot be based upon
raʾy. Therefore we hold that her statement on this is like adīth with a continuous
chain of transmitters reaching back to the Prophet ( adīth uttaṣil).475
In both of these examples, al-Ṭaḥāwī follows Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī and later
jurists in emphasizing that these reports were unopposed by other Companions and
therefore authoritative. Al-Ṭaḥāwī departs from the later Ḥanafī tradition, however, in his
willingness to grant the same precedence to Successor adīths as he does to Companion
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adīths.476 Al-Ṭaḥāwī further diverges from Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī and later Ḥanafīs in his
understanding of why post-Prophetic adīth take precedence over later jurists’ qiyās.
Where his fellow Ḥanafīs are concerned with the status of the Companions’ ijtihād versus
the ijtihād of later jurists,477 al-Ṭaḥāwī does not portray the Companion or Successor
reports as examples of their ijtihād, with the exception of a single report from Shurayḥ in
a chapter on gifts.478 This difference is emphasized by the language employed by each:
Abū Saʿīd al-Bardaʿī frames the issue as one concerning the opinion (qawl) of a
Companion,479 while al-Ṭaḥāwī mentions following āthār or adīth, thus connecting this
issue to the general duty of obeying transmitted reports.480 Further, he portrays the
Companion adīths as faithful reflections of Prophetic practice, rather than as examples
of the superiority of Companion legal reasoning.481

The Companions and Successors in al-Ṭa āwī’s Lists of Legal Sources
Another place we might look for evidence of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the
authority of Companion and Successor adīths in relation to the legal opinions of later
476
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jurists is in the lists of legal sources which appear across his hermeneutical works and alMukhtaṣar (The Concise Manual of Legal Doctrine).482 Notably, the Companions or
Successors are mentioned in only three of the approximately thirty lists found in these
four works. Lists which do mention the Companions or Successors provide somewhat
ambiguous evidence for the nature of the Companions’ and Successors’ authority. The
first list, which appears in the two-paragraph introduction to Shar

aʿānī al-āthār,

describes the sources that al-Ṭaḥāwī will use to establish which of scholars’ proposed
interpretations of apparently conflicting adīths is correct: the Qurʾān, Sunna, consensus,
and widely transmitted opinions of the Companions or Successors (tawātur in aqāwīl
al-ṣa āba aw tābiʿīhi ).483 We learn from this passage that widely-held opinions of the
Companions and Successors may support an interpretation, but the passage provides no
clear indication of whether these opinions preserve otherwise unknown Prophetic
material—as is so often the function of Companion and Successor adīths in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
works—or whether they represent those individuals’ legal reasoning. The mention of
widespread transmission (tawātur) also raises interesting questions about the individual
or collective nature of Companion and Successor authority as well as the boundary
between widespread transmission and consensus.
The Companions also appear in a list of sources in a chapter of

ā al-Qurʾān

on whether seclusion in a mosque (iʿti āf) must be accompanied by fasting. Here alṬaḥāwī argues against those who claim that fasting is not required by stating that
evidence for their view is not found in the Book, the Prophet’s Sunna, the doctrines

482
483

On these lists, see p. 23 of this study.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 1.11.

145
(aqwāl) of the Companions, speculative legal reasoning (naẓar) or analogy (qiyās).484 In
support of his own view, he adduces a Companion adīth reporting the legal opinion of
Ibn ʿUmar.485 Earlier in the chapter, he had argued that Ibn ʿUmar’s opinion can only
have been based on knowledge from the Prophet.486 From this equating of the qawl of Ibn
ʿUmar with knowledge taken from the Prophet, we may conclude that what al-Ṭaḥāwī
intends by the aqwāl of the Companions in the list of sources in this chapter is not the
superior legal reasoning of the Companions, but rather their special knowledge of the
Prophet’s practice as preserved in Companion adīths.
In contrast, the final list of sources we will consider does portray Companion
legal opinions as more authoritative than the legal reasoning of later jurists. In a
significant passage in al-Mukhtaṣar, al-Ṭaḥāwī describes the methodology which judges
should follow in determining a ruling:
[A judge] should rule according to what is in the Book of God. If a matter should
come before him that is not in the Book of God, then he should rule according to
what has come down from God’s Messenger. If he does not find it, then he should
look to what has come to him from the Companions of God’s Messenger and rule
according to that. If they disagreed, then the best of their opinions (aqāwīl) should
be selected. He may not oppose all of [the Companions] and contrive (yabtadiʿ)
something from his personal reasoning (raʾy). If he does not find it in the Book of
God, nor in what has come from God’s Messenger, nor from any of the
Companions of God’s Messenger, then he should employ legal reasoning
(ijtahada raʾyahu) in the matter and analogize from what has been transmitted
from them…487
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s insistence that jurists must look to Companion reports before engaging in
their own legal reasoning reveals that he does indeed give precedence to Companion
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legal opinions over those of later jurists, although it is not the way in which he generally
frames the question of Companion authority.
The debate over the relative authority of Companion adīths and later jurists’
qiyās may be understood as one manifestation of a wider debate over the nature of
Companion authority. Al-Shāfiʿī favored later jurists’ legal reasoning because he
understood all revelatory authority to reside in the Qurʾān and Prophetic Sunna and
sought fully to identify the Prophetic Sunna with the body of Prophetic adīth. In
contrast, both the Mālikī and Ḥanafī schools understood Prophetic authority to reside not
only in Prophetic adīth but also in the continuing practice of the Companions, which
both preserved Prophetic practice and served as its natural extension, a topic I will
discuss in the next chapter. Given their understanding of Prophetic practice as embodied
in the Companions’ applications of that practice to new situations, it is reasonable that the
Mālikīs and many Ḥanafīs should prefer Companion reports based in Companion legal
reasoning to later jurists’ qiyās.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, however, understood Companion practice and, indeed, the idea of
practice in general, differently than the other Ḥanafīs we have discussed. For him, in
almost all cases the Companion practice which is authoritative over later jurists’ legal
reasoning is an exact record of Prophetic practice. Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ṭaḥāwī emphasizes
an exclusively Prophetic authority in most of his writing. However, unlike al-Shāfiʿī, he
does not seek to identify Prophetic authority only with Prophetic adīth. Instead, alṬaḥāwī understands Prophetic practice to be preserved faithfully in a spectrum of forms
ranging from the directly textual (Prophetic adīth) to the progressively more ephemeral

147
(Companion and Successor adīth, the practice of the jurists or the Community, and
certain forms of consensus).488 While Prophetic adīths by definition represent Prophetic
authority, the other sources on this spectrum are only held to stand in for Prophetic
authority in certain cases. Nonetheless, in those cases where al-Ṭaḥāwī does claim
Prophetic authority for other sources, their epistemological status is equal to that of
Prophetic adīths themselves—an equivalence that we have already observed in the
ability of Companion adīths to indicate the abrogation of Prophetic adīths.489
The result of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s elevation of some, but not all, Companion and
Successor adīths to Prophetic status is a disjunction between the surface rhetoric of his
lists of legal sources and the actual functioning of his hermeneutical arguments. While alṬaḥāwī repeatedly appeals to the list ‘Qurʾān, Sunna, consensus’ as the prototypical
sources required to justify interpretive moves,490 the passages that I analyze in this
chapter concerning Companion and Successor adīths reveal that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal
reasoning often rests instead upon a deeper distinction between what post-Prophetic
figures must have known from the Prophet and what they could have worked out for
themselves by inference—that is, the tawqīf:raʾy binary.
As a result, the Companion and Successor adīths that should be a marginal
source of law according to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s own rhetoric sometimes overpower in practice the
sources of Qurʾān, Sunna and consensus that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s explicit theorizing favors. In
fact, it is the ‘sometimes’ nature of the Prophetic authority of Companion adīths that
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reveals the fundamental gulf between the surface rhetoric of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s conception of
the structure of the law and its functioning in practice. Al-Ṭaḥāwī—and, indeed, later
legal theorists—outwardly describe a hierarchy of sources of legal authority based on
form: Prophetic adīth represents a certain level of authority, while consensus represents
another, lesser level of authority, as suggested by the fact that consensus always comes
after Prophetic adīth in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s list of legal sources, etc.
However, in his actual legal arguments al-Ṭaḥāwī assigns authority to sources
based not on their form, but rather on their function. Thus, Companion adīths have a
certain authority when they represent raʾy, but a much higher level of authority when
they represent tawqīf. There is, then, no single type of authority that can be assigned to
post-Prophetic adīths in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works. Further, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s binary view of what is
generally thought of as a single ‘source’ of law is not limited to post-Prophetic adīths.
Although the technical term ‘tawqīf’ is almost exclusively associated with post-Prophetic
adīth, the instruction/inference binary that tawqīf evokes is latent in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
discussion of other sources of legal authority. In the following chapter, we will see that
al-Ṭaḥāwī holds that the authority of jurists’ consensus is dependent on whether a
particular case of consensus represents inference or instruction.491 Like Companion
adīths based upon tawqīf, instances of instruction-based consensus have the authority to
abrogate Prophetic adīths. Indeed, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, the
concept, if not the language, of the instruction/inference binary extends even to the
authority of Prophetic adīths themselves; al-Ṭaḥāwī grants no special authority to
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Prophetic adīths he deems to be based upon the Prophet’s own inference.492 AlṬaḥāwī’s vision of the structure of the law, then, is based upon a binary division between
what may be known through inference and what must be known through instruction, a
division that transcends traditional categories and hierarchies of legal sources.

Competing Conceptions of Religious Authority
This chapter has argued that al-Ṭaḥāwī understands Companion and Successor
adīths to provide stronger evidence of Prophetic practice than Prophetic adīths
themselves in some cases, and that the special authority of this subset of post-Prophetic
adīths is grounded in the Companions and Successors’ role as mimetic preservers of the
Prophet’s words and actions. That is, although the practices they transmit may not be
preserved in the form of Prophetic adīth, the Companions and Successors nonetheless
are merely transmitting the Prophet’s practice by means of their own practice in the
adīths we have discussed, without adding anything to it or further developing it.
Individual Companions and Successors do, of course, engage in legal reasoning to
produce new rulings for novel situations, but in this area their authority is portrayed as
being largely of the same type as that of other jurists; al-Ṭaḥāwī is in any case not greatly
interested in the authority of the legal reasoning of individual Companions and
Successors in relation to that of later jurists.
In several passages, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought preserves lingering traces of an
earlier conception of religious authority which holds that the earliest generations of
Muslims represent a natural and evolving extension of the Prophet’s authority that is
492
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sometimes even in competition with Prophetic practice. This tendency is evident in alṬaḥāwī’s occasional use of the term sunna in connection with the Companions
individually and collectively, as well as in reference to the first four caliphs.493 His
willingness to associate sunna with figures other than the Prophet is suggestive of what
Hallaq labels the “practice-based sunna” of earlier centuries, in which post-Prophetic
figures both preserved and extended Prophetic practice by applying Prophetic precepts to
new situations.494 The degree to which the association of the term sunna with postProphetic figures would become unacceptable in the later tradition may be judged by the
lengthy footnote that the modern editor of Shar

aʿānī al-āthār, Muḥammad Zuhrī al-

Najjār, dedicates to condemning al-Ṭaḥāwī’s usage of it in connection with the first four
caliphs.495
Despite his occasional mentions of the sunna of Companions, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī
nowhere suggests that a post-Prophetic sunna is in conflict with a Prophetic sunna.
Instead, the post-Prophetic sunnas he appeals to either give evidence of the Prophet’s
own sunna496 or are dismissed as less authoritative than Prophetic practice. Indeed, in one
passage al-Ṭaḥāwī agrees with those who argue against a adīth’s claim that a certain
practice is a sunna by stating that it is merely the sunna of ʿUmar, not that of the Prophet,
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and is therefore not authoritative in the face of conflicting evidence.497 Thus, while alṬaḥāwī, like the jurists of the 1st/7th and 2nd/8th centuries, occasionally uses the term
sunna in association with non-Prophetic figures, he does not claim for these figures the
kind of authority indicated by earlier jurists’ references to non-Prophetic sunna. Instead,
his works appear to represent a transitional phase in which the term sunna could still be
used in connection with the Companions, but did not imply that their practice had a
normative status of its own.
More strikingly, al-Ṭaḥāwī claims in several passages of Shar

aʿānī al-āthār

that the consensus of the Companions has the power to abrogate Prophetic practice and to
establish a new practice different from the Prophet’s practice.498 These passages, which I
analyze in the following chapter, appear to portray the Companions not merely as
mimetic preservers of the Prophet’s practice, but as possessing an authority in legal
reasoning that allows them to alter established Prophetic practices—an authority which
goes beyond merely establishing what the Prophet might have done in a novel situation.
That al-Ṭaḥāwī could make such a claim must be attributed at least in part to lingering
ideas of normative authority vested in figures others than the Prophet. The passages
arguing for abrogation by Companion consensus thus emerge as relatively isolated
examples of an older conception of what it means to preserve Prophetic practice and
serve as further evidence that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought represents a transitional stage in the
development of the idea of Prophetic authority during which the meaning of Prophetic
practice was changing. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s ability to defend abrogation of Prophetic adīth by
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Companion consensus as late as the early 4th/10th century suggests that the field of
Islamic law is in need of a more complicated model of the evolving relationship between
Prophetic text, Prophetic practice and Prophetic authority.
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Chapter Three: Consensus and the Practice of the Community

The uṣūl al-fiqh doctrine of consensus (ij āʿ) holds that the unanimous
agreement of the jurists of an era on a legal question constitutes an infallible and binding
proof for all future Muslims.
499

This definition portrays consensus first and foremost as a practical tool for generating

law and confirming the permanence of legal doctrine. Indeed, consensus is often
described in modern discussions as the “third source” of the law after the Qurʾān and
Sunna.500 However, the doctrine also served a number of theological and ideological ends
for the legal theorists who elaborated the requirements of consensus in their works of uṣūl
al-fiqh. By asserting the infallibility of the Muslim Community as a whole and then
deeming both existing legal doctrine and the corpus of Prophetic texts to have been
confirmed by that infallible community, theorists both affirmed the saved character of the
Muslim Community and projected backwards an image of a united ur-Community that
had never existed historically.501
At the same time, the doctrine of consensus guarantees the unity of the
Community in ages to come by guarding against the possibility of dissent. The doctrine
499
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of consensus thus serves the theological purpose of affirming the nature of the Muslim
Community both historically and in the future. Ideologically, the doctrine of consensus
also justifies the authority of the jurists, for it is they—not the caliphs, the members of the
Prophet’s family, or the Muslim Community as a whole—who speak in unison on behalf
of the Community. The doctrine of consensus therefore supports a particular power
relationship among jurists, Muslim rulers and the Muslim Community.502
These ideological and theological functions of consensus generated their own
doctrinal imperatives that shaped and constrained jurists’ discussions of consensus in
works of uṣūl al-fiqh. In particular, the centrality of the concept of unanimity to the
theological aspirations of consensus led to a situation in which consensus became
difficult to achieve or prove in practice. To a large extent, the elaboration of a theory of
consensus able to support a certain theological view of the Muslim Community and the
role of jurists within it, led to a doctrine that existed in tension with consensus as a
practical tool for discovering the law. This tension becomes clear when comparing
appeals to consensus in the practical hermeneutics of al-Ṭaḥāwī with the theoretical
discussions of the doctrine found in works of uṣūl al-fiqh.503 Like the authors of uṣūl
texts, al-Ṭaḥāwī understood consensus as an authoritative and binding source of law,504
and yet he was largely unencumbered by many of the theological and ideological
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concerns surrounding the doctrine which would cause legal theorists to restrict its
practice. As a result, consensus becomes in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hands a powerful tool for
advancing legal arguments and formulating new rules of law.
This chapter first reconstructs al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of consensus and the
circumstances under which it may be claimed, arguing that that it was the flexibility of alṬaḥāwī’s approach to consensus which made it so useful in his legal arguments. In the
second half of the chapter, I examine three of the many functions that consensus fills in
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works. In the first, which treats the resolution of juristic disagreements, I
demonstrate how al-Ṭaḥāwī relies on a principle of inferred or implicit consensus to
claim agreement on apparently disputed questions and thus advance his own positions. In
the second, I explore the relationship between al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understandings of consensus
and ʿamal (practice) in the context of the abrogation of Prophetic adīths and conclude
that both ʿamal and ij āʿ in this context represent for al-Ṭaḥāwī an exclusively
Prophetic, though non-textual, authority. Notably, al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts the Prophetic
authority of juristic ʿamal and ij āʿ by invoking the instruction/inference binary that we
have already encountered in his discussions of the Prophet’s ijtihād and of the authority
of post-Prophetic adīths. Finally, I suggest the ways in which conceptions of religious
authority were in flux during the late 3rd/9th and early 4th/10th centuries by analyzing a
number of passages in which al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Companion consensus may directly
abrogate Prophetic practice.
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Theory
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī frequently appeals to consensus in his legal arguments, his
surviving works contain almost no theoretical discussion of the doctrine, and certainly
none of the elaborate detail that serves in uṣūl works to anchor the theological and
ideological implications of consensus. Abstract statements on consensus are considerably
less frequent in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works than those on Sunna or ijtihād (legal reasoning), for
example. Presumably, al-Ṭaḥāwī considered his use of consensus unproblematic and
therefore not in need of discussion.505 Nonetheless, we can infer much of his theory of
consensus from references to particular instances of it as well as from the few theoretical
statements on the doctrine preserved in Shar

aʿānī al-āthār,

ā al-Qurʾān, and

Shar mushkil al-āthār.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī knows the verb ‘aj aʿa’ and the noun ‘ij āʿ’ as technical terms for
consensus and employs them regularly; they appear about two hundred times in Shar
aʿānī al-āthār alone.506 His rare statements on the theoretical basis of consensus
consistently use the term ij āʿ. However, like the jurists of earlier centuries, he also
employs non-technical phrases to indicate consensus, including ittafaqū (they agreed)507
and lā ya htalifūn (they do not disagree).508 Nowhere does al-Ṭaḥāwī suggest that these
non-technical phrases indicate a different grade of consensus than that of ij āʿ. Indeed,
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he sometimes uses both aj aʿū and either ittafaqū or bilā i hilāf to refer to the same
instance of consensus.509 It seems probable that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s retention of some of the
terminological diversity of an earlier period reflects his practical, almost casual approach
to consensus, which is not particularly concerned with defining what does and does not
constitute ij āʿ in a technical sense.510

The Authority of Consensus
For al-Ṭaḥāwī, consensus is an independent source of law which can provide legal
rulings for cases in which nothing relevant is found in the Qurʾān or Sunna. In this claim
he agrees with most of the later uṣūl al-fiqh tradition, but differs from al-Shāfiʿī, who
held that consensus is a tool for interpreting the Qurʾān and Sunna, but not an
independent source of law.511 Concerning the types of property on which alms must be
paid, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that a certain rule “is one of those for which we find no mention
in the Book or the Sunna, but rather we found an indication of it in consensus alone.”512
His statement implies that there exists a whole class of rules known only through
consensus. The basis for such rules is scholars’ raʾy (legal opinion), upon which they
eventually reach consensus. This process is suggested in a chapter in which al-Ṭaḥāwī
509
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details jurists’ initial disagreement concerning what should be done with Muḥammad’s
rightful share of the spoils of war after his death. He describes jurists’ later agreement by
stating that “then they reached consensus on their opinion” (thu

a aj aʿū raʾyahu ),

indicating that their consensus was based upon raʾy.513
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s assertions of the authority of consensus anticipate the language that
would later be used by the mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition. In several passages he labels
consensus a “ ujja,” or authoritative proof, a characterization which appears in the very
first sentence of al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s definition of consensus in al-Fuṣūl.514 In one discussion alṬaḥāwī labels a particular instance of consensus a ujja qāṭiʿa, or certain proof.515 Later
theorists would understand the term qāṭʿ to indicate epistemologically certain knowledge.
For instance, al-Jaṣṣāṣ would hold that the achievement of consensus after disagreement
produced epistemologically certain (qāṭiʿ) knowledge, and al-Sarakhsī defines consensus
in general as producing qaṭʿ.516 However, as we have already seen in our discussion of
varieties of adīth,517 al-Ṭaḥāwī is not interested in defining degrees of certainty in the
same way that later jurists would be, and I therefore have chosen here to translate “ ujja
qāṭiʿa” conservatively as ‘certain proof.’ In either case, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s language regarding
consensus is closely related to that of the later tradition.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī further holds that consensus has the power to elevate a ruling to the
status of a revealed text. He states that the scholars’ consensus upon considering a certain
513
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case an exception to a rule constitutes an authoritative proof ( ujja), just as the Prophet’s
own exception to the rule would.518 The equivalence of consensus to a text of revelation
is confirmed in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s observation that “opinion (raʾy) is employed in cases for
which the rulings are not found to be textually stipulated (manṣūṣ) in the Book, the Sunna
or in the consensus of the Community.”519 Al-Ṭaḥāwī here includes consensus within the
definition of textual stipulation (naṣṣ), effectively making it a third source of law. Lists
containing the same sequence—Book, Sunna, consensus—appear approximately twenty
times across Shar

aʿānī al-āthār,

ā al-Qurʾān and Shar mushkil al-āthār.520

The stability of these lists suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī does indeed view consensus as a third
source of law equivalent in status to the Qurʾān and Sunna.521
Although most later jurists would, like al-Ṭaḥāwī, acknowledge consensus as an
independent source of law, they would not find it easy to establish its authority on the
basis of other revealed texts, as no Qurʾānic verse or widely transmitted ( utawātir)
Prophetic adīth makes a clear statement on the issue. The earliest known attempt to
justify consensus is that of al-Shaybānī, who claimed support from the unitary Prophetic
adīth, “Whatever the Muslims see as good is good ( asan) in the eyes of God, and
whatever they see as bad is bad in the eyes of God.”522 Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not follow his
Ḥanafī predecessor in his justification of consensus, however. The only justification he
offers is a variation on a principle earlier stated by al-Shāfiʿī: that the Muslim
518
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Community as a whole could not be in error. Significantly, neither al-Shāfiʿī nor alṬaḥāwī provides this justification in the form of a Prophetic adīth in Muḥammad’s
voice, although al-Shāfiʿī adduces other adīths in support of consensus, and al-Ṭaḥāwī
consistently provides chains of authority for adīths.523 Thus, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s failure to
provide an isnād for the statement that the Muslim community cannot agree upon an
error, suggests that he did not understand the principle to have been spoken by the
Prophet.
It is unlikely that al-Ṭaḥāwī took his justification of consensus from al-Shāfiʿī,
however. In the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī asserts that “the entirety of them (ʿāmmatuhum) will
not agree (tajta iʿ) upon an error (khaṭaʾ).”524 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, consistently states
some variation on the idea that God would not unite Muslims upon an error ( llāh la
yakun la-yaj aʿuhu ʿalā ḍalāl).525 Al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ṭaḥāwī thus differ concerning the
subject of the sentence (the Community or God) and the term for ‘error’ (khaṭaʾ or
ḍalāl(a)). While this principle may not have been canonized as a Prophetic adīth by the
time of al-Shāfiʿī,526 during al-Ṭaḥāwī’s lifetime it was recorded as a Prophetic adīth
with slight linguistic variations in the Musnad of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), the
Sunan of al-Dārimī (d. 255/869), the Sunan of Ibn Mājah (d. 273/887), and the Sunan of
al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892); it was also cited by Ibn Qutayba in Prophetic adīth form as a
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justification for consensus.527 Notably, Ibn Qutayba’s adīth is linguistically similar to
that of al-Shāfiʿī, making the Muslims the subject of the sentence and employing the term
‘khaṭaʾ’ for ‘error.’ Al-Tirmidhī, al-Dārimī and Ibn Ḥanbal, in contrast, use the same
linguistic markers as al-Ṭaḥāwī. That al-Ṭaḥāwī would cite as a principle a text which
had already been canonized as a adīth suggests that the process of canonization was
gradual, and that both the abstract principle and the Prophetic adīth were in general
circulation at the time.
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ represents the culmination of the process in which the principle of
communal infallibility was canonized in adīth form and made a standard justification for
consensus. In a chapter of al-Fuṣūl arguing for the Qurʾānic and Sunnaic roots of
consensus, he provides the Prophetic adīth in question with the wording it was to retain
in most later uṣūl al-fiqh discussions and classical adīth compilations: “My Community
(u

atī) will not agree (tajta iʿ) upon an error (ḍalāl).”528 We see here that the typical

form of the classical adīth combines the linguistic markers in the al-Shāfiʿī/Ibn Qutayba
tradition and the al-Tirmidhī/al-Ṭaḥāwī tradition. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works thus represent a
transitional stage in the justification of the authority of consensus on the basis of
revelation. Within fifty years of his death, the primary adīth that jurists cite to support
consensus would have taken its characteristic linguistic form and be fully understood as
Prophetic. In the early 4th/10th century, however, it was still possible to cite this adīth as
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a non-Prophetic principle and to assert the authority of consensus without rooting that
authority in a text of revelation.529

The Participants in Forming Consensus
In many cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not specify whose agreement is considered in
establishing consensus: he frequently employs the anonymous “aj aʿū” (they reached
consensus)530 or the passive “uj iʿa” (consensus was reached).531 In other cases, he refers
to the consensus of the Companions,532 the scholars (ahl al-ʿilm, ʿula āʾ, fuqahāʾ),533 the
adīth scholars (ahl al- adīth),534 the Muslims (al-Musli ūn),535 the Community (alumma),536 everyone (kull)537 or the people (al-nās).538 Even when al-Ṭaḥāwī refers to ‘the
people,’ ‘the Community,’ or ‘the Muslims,’ however, it appears that in the
overwhelming majority of cases he intends only jurists, a phenomenon that is also
characteristic of al-Shāfiʿī’s discussions of consensus.539
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That al-Ṭaḥāwī intends jurists when he mentions the groups listed above is
suggested by the fact that in similar statements about consensus, he sometimes refers to
jurists and sometimes to other groups. For example, in a chapter concerning the
permissibility of riding seated upon the hide of a predatory animal, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that
no one may exclude anything from the scope of what God has made general (ʿāmm)
except on the basis of evidence from the Qurʾān, Sunna, or the consensus of the scholars
(ahl al-ʿilm).540 In another chapter in the same book concerning hunting during the
pilgrimage, al-Ṭaḥāwī states the same principle, but specifies the consensus of the
Community (umma), rather than that of scholars.541 Likewise, in some chapters al-Ṭaḥāwī
writes that the “consensus of the Muslims” has established a technical legal rule of the
sort that he usually attributes to the consensus of the scholars.542 In these and many
similar cases we may safely conclude that al-Ṭaḥāwī envisions the consensus of the
jurists only.
In a few, ambiguous cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī may in fact have in mind a consensus which
includes all Muslims, in keeping with the Ḥanafī principle that all Muslims participate in
the consensus on foundational matters like the obligation to perform the Ramadan fast
and the pilgrimage.543 Specifically, in several passages asserting that ijtihād is used in
cases where nothing is found in the Qurʾān, Sunna or consensus, the consensus he
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mentions is that of the Community (umma).544 It may be that he has in mind the basic
obligations which have been established on the authority of the Muslim community as a
whole. Similarly, when al-Ṭaḥāwī states that “the people” (al-nās) have reached
consensus that the occasion of revelation for a certain Qurʾānic verse was a specific
battle, he may be referring to a collective memory of the Community.545
In almost every case, al-Ṭaḥāwī portrays his claims of consensus as
geographically universal, rather than restricted to the scholars of a particular locale.546
When he mentions the fuqahāʾ al-amṣār (jurists of the garrison towns), he often takes
care to specify that he includes the Ḥaramayn (Mecca and Medina), as well as the
garrison towns in all other countries (sāʾir al-buldān).547 Intriguingly, the single example
that I was able to identify in which al-Ṭaḥāwī could be interpreted as favoring the
consensus of the scholars of a certain region concerns the ahl al- adīna (people of
Medina), a group for whom some jurists claimed special authority on the grounds that
they preserved the continuous and authentic practice of Muslim Community from the
time of the Prophet.548 In a chapter concerning whether a matter that has already been
decided by a judge or arbitrator ( akam) may then be referred to the ruler for a de novo
ruling, al-Ṭaḥāwī describes the opposition between Abū Ḥanīfa and his disciples on the
544
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one hand and Ibn Abī Laylā and the jurists (fuqahāʾ) of Medina on the other. He holds
that the best opinion is that of Ibn Abī Laylā and the ahl al- adīna “because of their
consensus.” He concludes the chapter with an analogical argument refuting the opinion of
the Ḥanafīs.549
While this passage might seem to suggest that al-Ṭaḥāwī privileges the consensus
of the ahl al- adīna over the opinion of the Ḥanafīs, in the context of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
thought as a whole, it seems considerably more likely that he is using the term
‘consensus’ to refer to the agreement between the ahl al- adīna and Ibn Abī Laylā, a
Kūfan, rather than to the simple consensus of the Medinese. Given that no other passage
in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works favors the consensus or legal opinions of the Medinese, this
discussion is best understood in the context of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s willingness to apply the term
‘consensus’ to an agreement that is not entirely unanimous, a topic I will discuss in more
detail below.

The Boundaries of Consensus
Many of the questions that preoccupied legal theorists about the circumstances
under which consensus may be said to have been reached are entirely absent from alṬaḥāwī’s extant works. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ devotes individual chapters to issues including the
moral qualities required to participate in forming a consensus;550 whether a consensus
becomes effective immediately or only upon the death of the generation of scholars that
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formed it;551 whether a Successor who became a jurist during the time of the Companions
must be counted as part of Companion consensus;552 and whether it is possible for a later
generation to reach consensus on a question on which the Companions held several
known opinions.553 None of these questions are raised in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works.
A crucial question debated during al-Ṭaḥāwī’s time asks whether scholars must
actively state their consent to a position, or whether a tacit consensus may be claimed
based on an absence of explicit disagreement. The Ḥanafīs ʿĪsā ibn Abān and al-Karkhī
rejected tacit consensus, as did al-Shāfiʿī.554 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ and the later Ḥanafī tradition
would largely accept it as necessary, given the difficulty of determining the active assent
to a doctrine of every scholar alive during a certain time.555 Al-Ṭaḥāwī claims a tacit
consensus on several occasions by noting that a Companion indicated a ruling by speech
or action in the presence of other Companions, and they did not object.556
In fact, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to discuss tacit consensus exclusively in connection
with the Companions, a type of tacit consensus which some later jurists would consider a
special case because the Companions represented a fairly small community with better
knowledge of each other’s opinions than would be possible as the Muslim community
grew in size and geographical extent.557 Considerations such as the relative degrees of
certainty inspired by active and tacit consensus are not addressed in his extant works.
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Although it seems probable that al-Ṭaḥāwī would accept the tacit consensus of postCompanion generations given his consistently optimistic approach to consensus, the
absence of any explicit discussion of the matter relieves al-Ṭaḥāwī of having to justify
specific claims of consensus in later generations on the basis of active or tacit assent.558
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s expansive definition of consensus is also apparent in passages which
indicate that he agreed with the view that consensus need not be unanimous in order to be
valid.559 In a discussion of the Pilgrimage rites, he claims that “the Muslims have reached
consensus” and that “they all participate in the consensus” (innāhu ja īʿan uj iʿīn)
while acknowledging in the very same paragraph the disagreement of Ibn ʿAbbās.560
Shortly afterward, he acknowledges that some other scholars followed the opinion of Ibn
ʿAbbās.561 He thus applies the term ij āʿ to a non-unanimous consensus, a phenomenon
we also saw above when al-Ṭaḥāwī claimed the consensus of the Medinese and Ibn Abī
Laylā against the Ḥanafī opinion. Similarly, he states elsewhere that “a group” (ja āʿa)
of Companions reached consensus on a question.562 He uses this restricted consensus as
evidence in favor of his position.
On the other hand, al-Ṭaḥāwī does know the principle of unanimous consensus
and employs it himself on at least one occasion. In a chapter in Mukhtaṣar I htilāf alʿula āʾ on whether a Muslim may be killed in recompense for the killing of an infidel,
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al-Shāfiʿī says that there is “no disagreement” (lā hilāf) on a certain principle. AlṬaḥāwī’s response as reported by al-Jaṣṣāṣ is that what al-Shāfiʿī transmits is not
consensus (ij āʿ), because Abū Yūsuf disagreed.563 While this polemical passage
demonstrates al-Ṭaḥāwī’s awareness of the argument that consensus must be unanimous,
the claim is not typical of al-Ṭaḥāwī and appears nowhere else in his extant works that I
was able to locate. In general, his acceptance of non-unanimous ij āʿ permits him to
claim consensus in the maximum number of cases.
The principle of majority consensus is most famously associated with alṬabarī,564 although al-Shāfiʿī’s understanding of consensus also did not require
unanimity.565 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ accepted majority consensus, but the opinion died out among
most later Ḥanafīs.566 Given that the understanding of consensus among jurists of the first
two centuries of Islamic history likewise did not rely upon unanimity,567 it seems
plausible that al-Ṭabarī and al-Ṭaḥāwī were not expressing an unusual view in accepting
the consensus of the majority. Rather, al-Ṭabarī is remembered for a doctrine which was
for a long time the most widespread, until the increasing emphasis on the communal
unity implied by the doctrine of consensus made the concept of a non-unanimous
consensus untenable.
In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī sharply diverges from the later uṣūl al-fiqh tradition in his
willingness to accept that consensus may be abrogated. In general, the term naskh
563
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(abrogation) is reserved for the temporal and legislative supersession of a Qurʾānic verse
or adīth; ordinarily, later jurists would speak of a change in ij āʿ, or a new ij āʿ, rather
than its abrogation. Indeed, among later jurists it was widely held that consensus could
neither abrogate nor be abrogated, because abrogation was only possible during the
lifetime of Muḥammad, and consensus was only effective after it.568 Al-Ṭaḥāwī,
however, twice entertains the possibility of the abrogation of a consensus, although he
denies that abrogation actually occurred in either case. In the first example, the Ḥanafīs,
Mālikīs and Shāfiʿīs569 claim that Q 5/al-Māʾida:106 (“O you who believe, [let there be]
witnessing between you when death comes to one of you”) was abrogated by Q 65/alṬalāq:2 (“Call as witnesses two just men”). Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s response is that “it is not
permissible (lā yajū ) to abrogate something upon whose certainty (thubūt) consensus has
been reached unless there exists an authoritative proof ( ujja) requiring that.”570 In other
words, jurists have reached consensus on the effectiveness of the rule stated in Q 5/alMāʾida:106. It is possible for such a consensus to be abrogated, but only in cases where
there is a new, authoritative proof ( ujja). In this case, he finds no such authoritative
proof, and so he follows the consensus of the Companions and Successors over the
opinion of most later jurists. Neither here nor elsewhere does al-Ṭaḥāwī specify what sort
of authoritative proof could abrogate consensus, but the fact that he understands such
abrogation to be possible places him at odds with the later tradition.
The second example is similar. It concerns a claim that Q 5/al-Māʾida:6 (“your
feet up to the ankles”) abrogated the earlier permission to wipe the feet that had been
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established by a Prophetic adīth. Jurists who hold that the Qurʾān abrogated the earlier
adīth argue that this verse replaces washing the feet with wiping the feet. Al-Ṭaḥāwī
responds that “the necessary course of action is that we adhere to that upon whose
obligation consensus has been reached until its abrogation is known (yuʿla ).”571 Once
again, his argument is that there is consensus upon the effectiveness of the wiping rule as
established in the Prophetic adīth. Although that consensus may be abrogated, such
abrogation has to be known through some other (unspecified) proof. Since no such proof
is known, the permission to wipe the feet stands.
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī denies that abrogation has actually occurred in either case, he
leaves open the possibility that consensus could be abrogated if an authoritative proof is
found, or if it is “known.” At the same time, he confirms the authority of consensus by
requiring proof in order to set it aside. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s claim that consensus may be
abrogated reflects a general approach which seeks to establish the occurrence of
consensus in the maximum number of cases by refraining from setting up any
unnecessary barriers to attaining it. Al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to feel confident in claiming the
authority of consensus for cases in which later jurists would hesitate for fear of falling
into inconsistencies or of undermining the theological claims that the doctrine of a
unanimous and unalterable consensus supported.
Another passage demonstrates how al-Ṭaḥāwī gains flexibility in the application
of consensus by avoiding a definitive statement concerning when it becomes binding. In a
discussion of whether the relatives of the Prophet receive a share of the khums tax, al-
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Ṭaḥāwī states that Abū Bakr and ʿUmar did not distribute the khums to the Prophet’s
relatives after his death. He first writes:
This confirms that this is the rule in our opinion. Since none of the other
Companions of God’s Messenger opposed them, it confirms that it was [the other
Companions’] opinion as well. Since consensus has been confirmed (thabata) in
this from Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and all the Companions of God’s Messenger, the
doctrine (al-qawl bihi) has been confirmed. It is obligatory to practice it and to
abandon what opposes it.572
To this point in the passage al-Ṭaḥāwī has strongly affirmed the obligation to act
upon the Companions’ tacit consensus on this matter. He continues: “Then, when ʿAlī
came to power, he similarly confirmed this ruling.” He is now discussing a period after
the consensus had already been established. After adducing a Companion report from
ʿAlī, al-Ṭaḥāwī observes that “had his opinion been different, he would have restored [the
matter] (raddahu ilā) to what he opined, given his knowledge, his piety and his virtue.”573
What is notable about this passage is that al-Ṭaḥāwī contemplates with equanimity the
possibility that ʿAlī could oppose a consensus that had already been formed (thabata).
What is more, had ʿAlī opposed the confirmed consensus of the Companions, his action
would have been the praiseworthy result of his knowledge, his piety and his virtue. From
this discussion, it appears that the prior consensus was not binding on ʿAlī, perhaps
because of his role as an early caliph or the rough equivalence of his stature with that of
Abū Bakr and ʿUmar. Nonetheless, in this passage al-Ṭaḥāwī both states that a consensus
had already been formed (thabata) and that it might permissibly later have been
challenged.

572
573

Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 3.234.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 3.234.

172
Similar situations in which a Companion is reported to have opposed a consensus
led other jurists to develop the doctrine of inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr, which held that a consensus
does not become effective until all of the jurists involved in forming it have passed away.
Under this theory ʿAlī would be permitted to give a share of khums to the Prophet’s
relatives because the earlier consensus had not yet become binding. This doctrine, which
was in effect a way of excusing an otherwise impermissible breach of consensus, was
held by Ḥanbalīs, Shāfiʿīs, Muʿtazilīs and Ashʿarīs, and was already known in alṬaḥāwī’s time and attributed to Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal.574 This principle cannot be what alṬaḥāwī was envisioning, however, because he states clearly that the consensus was
confirmed by the actions of Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and the other Companions, and that it was
obligatory to act upon it. Further, he is not excusing a breach of consensus by ʿAlī, but is
instead portraying his potential opposition in a positive light. Nor is there any indication
in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion that he considered the original consensus to be provisional,
such that the objection of ʿAlī would have revealed that there was in fact no consensus.
Notions of provisional instances of consensus, or discussions of the point where instances
of consensus become irrevocable, are simply absent from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s work.
Other jurists, including most Ḥanafīs, would deny the doctrine of inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr
and would hold that a consensus becomes binding in the moment that it occurs. They
recognized that, by trying to solve the problem of the existence of reports of Companions
acting in opposition to established consensus, the proponents of inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr had
created other problems. When new individuals were constantly joining the ranks of the
jurists, what would it mean for a generation to pass away? The opponents of inqirāḍ al574
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ʿaṣr would reject the idea that ʿAlī’s piety could cause him to oppose a confirmed
consensus. Confronted with a similar situation in which ʿUmar is said to have opposed a
consensus established under Abū Bakr, al-Jaṣṣāṣ denies that there was any valid
consensus in the first place, such that ʿUmar could have opposed it.575
The Ḥanafī denial of the doctrine of inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr, however, also does not
adequately account for the passage under discussion. Al-Ṭaḥāwī clearly states that a
consensus had occurred under Abū Bakr and ʿUmar. By declining to recognize a conflict
between his initial assertion that the consensus of Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and the other
Companions is binding and his later assertion that ʿAlī could have acted upon his own
raʾy, al-Ṭaḥāwī claims the authority of consensus while still permitting a kind of
dynamism that the uṣūl tradition excluded by its insistence upon the binding nature of
consensus and the impossibility of its abrogation. It may well be that al-Ṭaḥāwī often has
in mind something less than a permanently binding, unanimous agreement when he
claims consensus. Nonetheless, by using the term ij āʿ both when making possibly
casual claims of consensus and while asserting the status of consensus as a certain proof
( ujja qāṭiʿa), al-Ṭaḥāwī elevates the status of all of his other claims of consensus.
One result of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s comparative disinterest in many of the questions that
later theorists considered integral to a discussion of consensus is that he is not burdened
by a detailed set of requirements when making his own claims of consensus. While alṬaḥāwī does address various theoretical issues related to consensus, he also makes claims
of consensus without rigorous justification, sometimes in ways that later theorists would
find unacceptable. Consensus is a powerful tool for al-Ṭaḥāwī because he is able to use
575
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the language of uṣūl al-fiqh to claim ij āʿ as a certain and authoritative proof, and yet he
does not feel constrained to take positions on the entire “checklist” of questions that
would characterize discussions of the doctrine in later uṣūl al-fiqh works.
In part, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s approach must be understood as reflecting the historical
development of the doctrine of consensus. As we have seen above, al-Ṭaḥāwī wrote
before many aspects of the classical doctrine on consensus had crystallized. He also
shares in a general Ḥanafī optimism concerning consensus, expressed in a tendency to
“consistently [adopt] those positions that were felt to facilitate the application of the
doctrine.”576 His approach to consensus also reflects the genre in which he worked,
however. His goal as the author of works of practical hermeneutics was to establish and
justify the law on discrete issues. In contrast, we may understand the complexity of later
theorists’ discussions of consensus as the product of their attempts to extrapolate a
rigorous and coherent theory from the Qurʾānic verses and Prophetic adīths that had
come to be understood as underpinning the authority of consensus as a source of law. As
we have seen above, this theory of consensus was also employed to uphold ideological
and theological claims. The overtly theoretical aspirations of the uṣūl genre thus
generated their own imperatives of systematicity that are entirely absent from alṬaḥāwī’s practical approach to consensus.
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While jurists in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s time and before did also develop doctrines like
inqirāḍ al-ʿaṣr, it was only the uṣūl al-fiqh genre which sought to bring all aspects of
consensus together into a single, coherent whole. The result of legal theorists’ efforts to
produce a coherent account of the doctrine was a definition of consensus of such
specificity and rigor that theorists came to question whether consensus had ever actually
occurred in practice.577 Indeed, Bernard Weiss writes that, “on the whole, I think it is fair
to say that the actual impact of consensus on the formulation of the law was seen by the
classical jurists as rather minimal.”578 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī understands consensus to be
a routine occurrence and integral to the process of formulating the law, as we shall see
below.
The disparate goals of practical hermeneutics and legal theory may then be
identified as the reason for the gap which Kamali and others have noted between the
theory and practice of consensus.579 Ahmad Hasan has suggested that the existence of
claims of non-unanimous consensus demonstrates that “either the classical definition of
Ij āʿ is defective, or Ij āʿ is only a theoretical concept.”580 In response, we may suggest
from our reading of al-Ṭaḥāwī and later works of theory that the classical definition of
consensus in uṣūl al-fiqh works reflects one set of theological and ideological goals,
while the operation of consensus in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics reflects
the imperatives of law creation in practice. The question of the relationship between the
genres of legal theory and practical hermeneutics requires further study, however. In
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particular, it would be instructive to examine whether and how the use of consensus in
works of practical hermeneutics changed in response to the maturation of the doctrine in
uṣūl al-fiqh works. While the maturity of al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s Fuṣūl certainly suggests that there
were earlier works in the genre which have been lost, it is nonetheless fair to say that alṬaḥāwī lived before the genre became canonized to the extent it would later. It seems
possible that authors of works of practical hermeneutics a few centuries after al-Ṭaḥāwī
would need to engage with uṣūl al-fiqh approaches to consensus to a degree that alṬaḥāwī did not. A chronological survey of approaches to consensus in works of practical
hermeneutics could thus provide us with important insights on the relationship between
that genre and uṣūl al-fiqh.

Function
Consensus as a Tool for Resolving Disagreement
As stated above, consensus is not merely discussed as a theoretical possibility in
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, but instead plays a major, practical role in his legal arguments. Far
from doubting the possibility of obtaining consensus in real-life situations, al-Ṭaḥāwī
claims consensus as the basis for establishing the occasion of revelation for a Qurʾānic
verse;581 restricting an apparently general (ʿāmm) meaning to a specific ( hāṣṣ)
meaning;582 affirming the authenticity of an apparently weak adīth;583 providing the
explanation (taʾwīl) of the intent of a Qurʾānic verse or adīth;584 setting out a rule of
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positive law;585 and many other kinds of claims. Often, consensus on one question
becomes the basis for an analogy by which another rule is derived.586
The flexible quality of consensus in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought is perhaps most apparent
in his use of it as a technique for resolving reported disagreements (i htilāf) among
jurists. The impression gained from uṣūl al-fiqh discussions of consensus, which are
largely concerned with determining when and how consensus may be said to have been
reached, is that jurists either have reached consensus on a certain question or they have
not.587 The existence of disagreement (i htilāf) on an issue would therefore seem to
preclude any claim of consensus.588 Al-Ṭaḥāwī, however, frequently appeals to an
inferred consensus when identifying points of agreement within a larger debate.
For example, in a chapter concerning how many extra ta bīrs (that declaration
that ‘God is great’) should be said during prayers for the two major festival days, alṬaḥāwī first sets out conflicting opinions from various Companions and Successors. One
major faction holds that there should be nine ta bīrs, while the other argues that it should
be twelve; both claim support from adīths.589 After listing the proponents of each
opinion, al-Ṭaḥāwī signals the transition to the discussion portion of his chapter in his
usual way. He writes, “Because they disagreed on takbīr for the two festival prayers, we
wanted to examine it (nanẓur fīhi) in order to derive (nastakhrij) the correct opinion
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(qawl ṣa ī ) from their various opinions.”590 After resolving a side issue, he returns to the
question of the number of ta bīrs in the two festival prayers. Although he has previously
acknowledged that scholars disagree on the issue, he now claims that within their
disagreement they have reached consensus that there are indeed additional ta bīrs for the
festival prayers in comparison with non-festival prayers. He further argues that the two
groups have reached consensus on nine additional ta bīrs, since that is a number on
which all groups agree, i.e., nine ta bīrs are included within the twelve ta bīrs of the
second group. He affirms that he will adopt the additional ta bīrs that everyone agrees on
and deny those on which there is disagreement.591 Thus, although the stated opinions of
the Companions and Successors express disagreement on this question, al-Ṭaḥāwī infers
a consensus which serves as an authoritative proof and resolves the dispute.592
Likewise, in a chapter on shortening prayers while traveling al-Ṭaḥāwī first
describes scholars’ various opinions on how long someone must travel in order to qualify
for the reduced obligation. He next infers that the proponents of all of these positions
have reached consensus that the relevant Qurʾānic verse intends only a specific ( hāṣṣ)
kind of traveler, despite the apparently general (ʿāmm) meaning of the verse, since no
jurist holds that all travelers may shorten their prayers. Within this consensus, some say
that three days is the minimum length of travel which merits shortened prayers, while
others name shorter travel times. Since they would all agree that someone traveling for
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three days may shorten his or her prayer, that is what they have reached consensus
upon.593
As in the previous example, al-Ṭaḥāwī first infers the existence of consensus on a
larger scale—here, that the meaning of the Qurʾānic verse is hāṣṣ—and then identifies a
point of commonality among the competing opinions. Al-Ṭaḥāwī similarly resolves
disagreements by identifying an implicit consensus on questions such as the disagreement
over the minimum amount a thief must steal before he is subject to the punishment of
amputation, how many people may share in the sacrifice of a single animal during the
Pilgrimage and the maximum time that may pass between the minor and major
Pilgrimage such that one may still be considered to be doing ta attuʿ (a way of
combining the minor and major Pilgrimages).594 In all of these cases, al-Ṭaḥāwī validates
one opinion over another by arguing that it represents a sort of ‘lowest common
denominator’ of consensus.
In other chapters, al-Ṭaḥāwī resolves juristic disagreement not by claiming that a
consensus already exists among apparently contradictory opinions, but by appealing to
another issue on which scholars have already reached consensus for a solution to the
current problem.595 In a chapter on the legal effectiveness of sales concluded during the
Friday prayer, a time when commerce is ostensibly prohibited, al-Ṭaḥāwī first describes
the opposition between Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf, al-Shaybānī and al-Shāfiʿī, who validate
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such a sale, and Mālik ibn Anas, who rejects it.596 Al-Ṭaḥāwī then observes that “because
they disagreed, we looked to what they had reached consensus upon that was of the same
type as what they disagreed upon, in order that the disagreement be brought into
alignment (li-tuʿṭaf ʿalayhi) with it.”597 He finds that scholars have reached consensus
that sales made during other prayer periods when commerce is prohibited are still legally
effective, and so therefore should the sale in question be. Here al-Ṭaḥāwī is relying on
analogical reasoning to resolve the disagreement; however, his language is that of
consensus, not analogy.
The principle at work here is stated most clearly in a chapter on prayer under
circumstances in which worshippers fear for their safety (ṣalāt al-khawf). There, alṬaḥāwī refutes the opinion (raʾy) of Yaḥyā ibn Saʿīd on how this prayer should be
performed on the grounds that there is no parallel for his opinion in any other kind of
prayer. His opinion is therefore without basis, because “knowledge (ʿilm) of [the
resolution of] disagreements is sought from [questions] on which consensus has been
reached.”598 Similarly, we learn in another chapter that “[the resolutions to] disputed
issues are confirmed if they resemble issues on which consensus has been reached. If
they do not resemble them, they are not confirmed except by means of the establishment
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of a limit in another revealed text (tawqīt) that serves an authoritative proof ( ujja).”599
Like the example above, both of these passages are discussing the use of a kind of qiyās
to resolve juristic disagreements, but they do so using the language of consensus.
Above we have considered two ways in which al-Ṭaḥāwī employs consensus to
resolve disagreements among jurists. What these passages highlight is the way in which
al-Ṭaḥāwī appeals to consensus to advance his legal arguments, even in cases in which it
might have seemed that no consensus could exist. Reading manuals of uṣūl al-fiqh, one
gains the impression that theorists primarily envisioned consensus as an end point, the
conclusion of a process. This impression is supported by the fact that the chapters on
consensus in legal theory manuals are dedicated to defining the circumstances under
which consensus may said to have been attained and to emphasizing the permanence of
consensus once achieved. In contrast, for al-Ṭaḥāwī as a writer engaged in the work of
practical hermeneutics, the establishment of consensus is rarely an ending or an end in
itself, but instead only a stage in a larger argument. As we have seen, consensus in alṬaḥāwī’s works does not have the same universal, immutable qualities that are
envisioned in the uṣūl al-fiqh tradition. As a result, it is a much more useful tool for
demonstrating the relationship between text and law.

Consensus Indicating Abrogation
To this point, we have been discussing a kind of consensus that allows jurists to
discover the law in cases where nothing relevant is found in the Qurʾān or Sunna—that is,
consensus that ‘fills in the gaps’ of revelation. Some jurists also discussed another kind of
599
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consensus, however, a consensus that had the potential to compete for authority with
accepted Prophetic adīths. Discussions of this type of consensus are framed in legal
theory works in terms of whether consensus may abrogate (al-naskh bi-l-ij āʿ).600 In alṬaḥāwī’s works, the issue of abrogation by the consensus of the jurists arises in seven
chapters in Shar

aʿānī al-āthār and Shar mushkil al-āthār.601 We may assume that

this topic is absent from

ā al-Qurʾān because al-Ṭaḥāwī, like other jurists, never

contemplates the possibility that consensus could abrogate the Qurʾān.602
Six of the seven passages in question concern cases in which al-Ṭaḥāwī is faced
with conflicting Prophetic adīths containing no reference to the order in which they
were revealed.603 In each case, he argues that the consensus against following the practice
detailed in one of the adīths indicates that that adīth is abrogated. In the final passage,
al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that scholars’ consensus against practicing the rule contained in a
adīth indicates its abrogation, even though no other Prophetic adīth on the topic is
known.604 In the first group of passages, consensus confirms one Prophetic adīth even
while overriding another; in this last passage, consensus functions to negate the authority
of a Prophetic adīth without appealing to any other Prophetic or Qurʾānic text.
Perhaps surprisingly, discussions of abrogation by consensus in later uṣūl works
do not appear to be concerned with the distinction between cases in which consensus
600
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affirms one Prophetic adīth over another as opposed to times when the consensus
reached has no obvious basis in a revealed text. Instead, these discussions are focused
almost entirely on whether consensus has the power to abrogate revealed texts at all. The
nearly universal answer is that it does not. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Zarkashī report that the
Ḥanafī ʿĪsā ibn Abān held that consensus may abrogate (“al-ij āʿ nāsi h”),605 and alSarakhsī refers to unnamed Ḥanafīs who held the same view. However, al-Jaṣṣāṣ and alSarakhsī themselves are categorical in their assertion that consensus may not abrogate, as
is al-Zarkashī and the many other scholars he cites in al-Ba r al-mu īṭ.606
The major argument against abrogation by consensus adduced by al-Jaṣṣāṣ, alSarakhsī, al-Zarkashī and many of the scholars he discusses is that abrogation only
occurred during the Prophet’s lifetime and consensus only became operative after it, so
therefore consensus may neither abrogate nor be abrogated; the two processes have no
interaction with each other.607 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ also argues that abrogation requires revelatory
instruction (tawqīf),608 which cannot be obtained after the death of the Prophet. AlSarakhsī, on the other hand, emphasizes that consensus is not based in revelation; he
writes that “consensus consists of (ʿibāra ʿan) the confluence of opinions (arāʾ) on a
topic, and we have shown that there is no place for mere opinion in knowing the time
605
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after which doing a thing becomes good or bad according to God,” that is, there is no
place for mere opinion in knowing when a text is abrogating or abrogated.609
While it was widely held that consensus could not itself abrogate a text of
revelation, many jurists did accept that consensus may indicate (yadull ʿalā/dalīl) that
abrogation had already occurred. In this case, consensus effectively preserves revelation
that has not come down in the form of a Prophetic adīth.610 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ accepts this form
of consensus. He writes that “we do not say that consensus causes (awjaba) abrogation.”
However, he affirms that “consensus indicates to us that [a adīth] is abrogated by
revelatory confirmation (tawqīf), even if the abrogating text (lafẓ nāsi h) has not been
transmitted to us.”611 This function of consensus is accepted by a variety of non-Ḥanafī
jurists as well, including Shāfiʿīs and Ḥanbalīs listed in al-Ba r al-mu īṭ, the Mālikī
jurist al-Tilimsānī (d. 771/1369) and the Ẓāhirī Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064).612 Al-Sarakhsī
rejects even this limited definition of abrogation by consensus.613
It is this consensus that merely indicates a previous abrogation that al-Ṭaḥāwī has
in mind in the passages mentioned above. In none of them does he refer to consensus as
itself abrogating (nāsi h). Instead, he writes that scholars reached consensus that a adīth
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was abrogated ( ansū h)614 or that “we reason” (ʿaqalnā) from their consensus that the
adīth was abrogated, implying that the abrogation had occurred before their consensus
upon it was reached.615 In other cases, he uses derivations from the root d-l-l also used by
later jurists to claim that consensus indicates (yadull ʿalā, dalīl) a adīth’s abrogation.616
That al-Ṭaḥāwī rejected the possibility that scholars’ consensus could itself abrogate
revealed texts is emphasized by the justifications he gives for his claims of consensus in
four of the seven passages under discussion. In one he writes that:
They would not reach consensus against what the Prophet did without
confirmation (thubūt) of its abrogation. That is because they are trustworthy
( aʾ ūnūn) in what they do (faʿalū) just as they are trustworthy in what they
transmit.617
In another passage, al-Ṭaḥāwī makes a very similar argument and then adds that:
The opinions (qawl) and transmission (riwāya) of anyone who abandons what the
Prophet said or ruled can no longer be accepted, and God forbid that such should
be the case for [the jurists of the garrison towns].618
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument is that it is inconceivable that scholars would reach
consensus inappropriately, and therefore their consensus against a adīth must be based
upon other revelatory authority. They cannot all abandon what the Prophet commanded,
because their trustworthiness in following the Prophet is inextricably linked to their
trustworthiness in transmitting the texts of revelation. Because it is unthinkable that
scholars could be collectively untrustworthy as transmitters, it is impossible to suppose
that they would collectively and knowingly contravene a Prophetic adīth that was still in
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effect. The categorical impossibility of scholars reaching consensus inappropriately is
further emphasized in three other passages where al-Ṭaḥāwī justifies his claim of
abrogation by saying that God would not cause His Community to agree upon an error, a
statement of principle which we have already discussed above, and one which suggests a
form of communal infallibility.619 Indeed, three of the four assertions of this principle in
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works occur in the context of justifying an abrogation known only through
consensus, suggesting that al-Ṭaḥāwī feels that this is an area of his theory of consensus
strongly in need of justification.
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not directly argue in these passages that consensus
cannot itself abrogate, that is the unspoken premise underlying his argument that scholars
must have had confirmation from revelation before reaching consensus. Comparing alṬaḥāwī’s discussions of abrogation by consensus with those of later legal theorists, we
can see that he does not share in their widespread assertion that abrogation only occurred
during the life of the Prophet and consensus only became operative after it. Indeed, we
have already seen in a previous section that al-Ṭaḥāwī accepts that consensus may be
abrogated by an (unspecified) authoritative proof, thus negating the firm boundary that
other jurists erect between abrogation and consensus. Nor does he state his objections in
terms of al-Sarakhsī’s concern that consensus is based on a confluence of opinion, and
therefore has no place abrogating a text of revelation. Instead, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s primary
concern with abrogation by consensus alone is that it means abandoning the Prophet’s
practice, a consideration not directly addressed by other theorists we have mentioned.
Because he links scholars’ trustworthiness as transmitters to their trustworthiness in
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following the Prophet’s practice, the entire edifice of revelation and the law is dependent
upon the upright conduct of those who transmit religious texts.
In claiming that some instances of consensus have a special authority to indicate
the abrogation of Prophetic adīths, al-Ṭaḥāwī is applying the same instruction/inference
distinction that we have encountered in previous chapters: in cases where consensus must
represent a memory about revelatory instruction that has not otherwise been preserved, it
has the special authority to indicate the abrogation of Prophetic adīths. On the other
hand, where consensus might permissibly be based upon scholars’ collective legal
reasoning, it cannot impinge upon the application of revealed texts. In contrast to his
discussions of post-Prophetic adīth, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not use the term ‘tawqīf’ to describe
the revelatory instruction that must underlie such instances of consensus, although he
does employ the related term ‘wuqūf’ in one passage.620 Nevertheless, consensus
represents a third legal source for which al-Ṭaḥāwī posits a two-tiered system of authority
on the basis of what may be discovered by reasoning and what may only be known
through revelation.

The Practice (ʿAmal/Istiʿmāl) of the Scholars and the Muslims
In the passages analyzed above, it is the consensus (ij āʿ) of the scholars that
indicates that a Prophetic adīth has been abrogated. In a strikingly similar set of
passages, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī claims that abrogation is indicated not by scholars’ ij āʿ,
but by the fact that the rule scholars or Muslims actually put into practice
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(ʿa ila/istaʿ ala) is in conflict with the rule indicated by a Prophetic adīth.621 In such
cases, that adīth is known to have been abrogated by another Prophetic adīth, even
when the abrogating adīth has not been preserved. For example, in a chapter on whether
women may wear kohl during their ʿidda (waiting period after a divorce or bereavement)
in cases of medical necessity, al-Ṭaḥāwī cites a Prophetic adīth prohibiting the custom.
He then observes that:
This adīth has been transmitted from God’s Messenger through multiple
pathways ( utawātir) of the kind which scholars accept as sound (wujūh ṣi ā ).
Their abandonment (tark) of it after it had reached them and their putting into
practice (istiʿ āl) something else is an indication of its abrogation. This is
because they are trustworthy ( aʾ ūn) in regard to its abrogation just as they are
trustworthy in regard to what they transmit. That being the case, they could only
have abandoned something whose manner of transmission they approved because
something caused them to abandon it in favor of what they held was better than
it—that is, something that had abrogated it. If that were not the case, then their
probity (ʿadl) would be voided. In the voiding of their probity would be the
voiding of their status as transmitters, and God forbid that such should be the true
state of their affairs.622
If we compare this passage with al-Ṭaḥāwī’s justification for consensus indicating
abrogation in the passages above, we see that they contain the same argument: scholars
must have known that the abandoned adīth had been abrogated, because they are
trustworthy. If they did abandon the rule expressed in a Prophetic practice without cause,
they would no longer be trustworthy transmitters of revelation, an unthinkable
occurrence.
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The major difference between this passage and passages discussed in the previous
section is that earlier al-Ṭaḥāwī was speaking of consensus (ij āʿ), whereas here he is
interested in whether scholars put a rule expressed in a Prophetic adīth into practice
(ʿa al/istiʿ āl) or refrain from putting that rule into practice (tark). That is, for alṬaḥāwī, ‘practice’ concerns the application or non-application of a certain rule. In most
cases, what al-Ṭaḥāwī seems to be envisioning when he speaks of ‘putting [the rule
contained in] a Prophetic adīth into practice’ is, in fact, whether that rule is reflected in
the positive law applied by jurists as legal practitioners. In a smaller number of cases,
discussed below, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs the term ʿamal to refer to what Muslims actually do
in their daily lives—that is, to lived practice rather than doctrine.
In other examples of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the link between ʿamal and
abrogation, we learn that scholars are trustworthy ( aʾ ūn) in what they practice
(ʿa ilū), thus indicating a adīth’s abrogation, or that they are trustworthy in their
abandonment of one rule instituted by a adīth and their practice (ʿamal) of another,
again indicating abrogation.623 Elsewhere, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that, in cases where
Prophetic adīths conflict, we should look to the practice (ʿamal) of the Muslims. The
adīth they follow is confirmed and abrogates the adīth they abandoned.624 That ʿamal
is the application of Prophetic practice is emphasized in other chapters which invoke the
ʿamal of the scholars or Muslims, usually in order to support a Prophetic adīth. In one
chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes that Abū Bakr and ʿUmar practiced (ʿamila) this adīth after
the Prophet, and its practice (ʿamal) has continued uninterruptedly (tawātara) to this
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day.625 In another chapter, he criticizes those who would abandon Qurʾānic verses and
widely attested Prophetic adīths which the Community has accepted and practiced
(ʿamilat) to this day in favor of another adīth which might be abrogated.626 Similarly, in
a chapter concerning how the imam should stand in relationship to those he leads in
prayer for different numbers of worshippers, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that the Prophet acted in a
certain way, and that practice (ʿamal) proceeded in the same way after him.627 ʿAmal thus
represents for al-Ṭaḥāwī the application of a Prophetic practice as preserved either in a
Prophetic adīth or in communal memory.
With this definition in mind, we may compare al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of ʿamal to
those of the Medinese and early Iraqi jurists. The use of ʿamal as an indicator of the law
is, of course, most famously associated with Mālik’s reliance on the practice of the ahl
al- adīna, or people of Medina.628 Early Mālikī jurists claim authority for Medinese
ʿamal on the basis that the local practice of the Medinese represents a continuous practice
going back to the time of the Prophet and his Companions in Medina, the seat of
government of the early caliphate. While some Companions settled in each garrison
town, only in Medina was there a large number of Companions able authentically to
preserve Prophetic practice. A major difference between al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of ʿamal
and that of the Medinese is thus that Medinese ʿamal is geographically limited to the
inhabitants of a certain city, and it is their tie to this city itself which gives their ʿamal its
625
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authority. In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī portrays his claims to ʿamal as universal. None of his
references to ʿamal concern a local tradition; rather, it is the very fact that the practice is
common to all scholars or to all Muslims that gives it its authority.
While Medinese ʿamal claims continuity of practice from the time of Muḥammad,
Prophetic practice is not its only component. As El Shamsy observes, ʿamal is “always
bigger and always more” than Prophetic reports, and even than the reports and practices
of the Companions and Successors.629 In addition to these sources, Medinese ʿamal
incorporates the legal opinions (raʾy) of later Medinese jurists.630 Medinese ʿamal is thus
continuous, but not static. In contrast, the ʿamal to which al-Ṭaḥāwī appeals in order to
claim support for some adīths and the abrogation of others is a simple preservation of
Prophetic practice, unaltered by the raʾy of later jurists and unconnected to the reports or
opinions of the generations after Muḥammad.
Also, where Medinese ʿamal understands practice to be embodied by the people
of Medina (ahl al-madīna) as interpreted by scholars,631 al-Ṭaḥāwī distinguishes between
the ʿamal of the scholars and the ʿamal of the Muslim Community as a whole. In some of
the passages discussed earlier, al-Ṭaḥāwī explicitly refers to the practice of the scholars.
It is they who are “trustworthy in their practice.”632 Here, the preservation of Prophetic
practice forms part of the specialized knowledge of the scholars. A few passages,
however, indicate a more generalized collective memory of Prophetic practice that is
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common to all Muslims. In one such passage, al-Ṭaḥāwī is confronted with conflicting
Prophetic adīths concerning whether Muslims should pray at the burial of a child. In
response, he argues that when adīths conflict, we should look to the practice of the
Muslims. We find that Muslims do pray at the burial of their children. The adīths
permitting prayer thus abrogate those prohibiting it.633 In this passage al-Ṭaḥāwī is
discussing a widespread practice within the Muslim Community. Similarly, in arguing
that a adīth concerning a certain prayer ritual has been abrogated, al-Ṭaḥāwī separately
appeals to what the scholars do (ʿalā) and to the practice (ʿamal) in the mosques.634
Again, the practice intended here goes beyond that of the scholars.
Finally, Medinese jurists understood the practice of the ahl al- adīna to be in
some senses separate from and in competition with Prophetic adīths. Ibn al-Qāsim (d.
191/806) wrote that when adīths are not supported by Medinese practice, they remain
“neither discredited nor adopted in practice (ghayr mukadhdhab bihi wa-lā aʿ ūl
bihi).635 In contrast, for al-Ṭaḥāwī adīths that are neither discredited nor abrogated
cannot simply be set aside as Ibn al-Qāsim envisions; the function of ʿamal is to indicate
that one adīth has abrogated another or that the Muslim community or scholars retain a
memory of a lost adīth that abrogates another. That is, ʿamal always bears upon adīth
for al-Ṭaḥāwī and always preserves a memory of a lost Prophetic text. That is, within the
instruction/inference binary underlying al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the structure of the
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law, ʿamal and istiʿ āl exclusively represent Prophetic instruction; al-Ṭaḥāwī never
appeals to an ʿamal that reflects scholars’ own inferences.
Although early Ḥanafīs including Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī criticized Medinese
ʿamal as unreliable when not verified by authentic texts,636 they, too, had a concept of
communal practice, albeit one not based on the special claim to authority of a specific
locale. Hallaq finds that the early Kūfan jurists almost never expressed the concept of
practice using the term ʿamal,637 but the language of ʿamal is well attested in extant
fragments from al-Shaybānī’s pupil, ʿĪsā ibn Abān.638 As we have seen above, al-Ṭaḥāwī,
too, uses the term ʿamal as well as the related terms istiʿ āl and tark when discussing
practice. Like the Medinese, the early Ḥanafīs weighed Prophetic adīths against local
Community or scholarly practice and rejected some adīths that were not supported by
continual practice.639 El Shamsy explains this reliance on practice as a means to defend
established Ḥanafī legal practice against the growing authority of Prophetic adīth in the
late 2nd/8th century.640 When newly circulating adīths conflicted with established Ḥanafī
doctrine, jurists could point to their absence from communal practice as evidence that
they were shādhdh, or irregular.641 The early Ḥanafī concept of communal practice, like
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Medinese ʿamal, also incorporated some Companion practice, an aspect which appears to
be absent from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of ʿamal.642
El Shamsy and Hallaq frame their discussions of the concept of communal
practice among early Ḥanafī jurists as being a characteristic of the late 2nd/8th century,643
a time when religious authority was not yet understood to be as exclusively textual in
nature as it would be by later jurists. By looking to communal practice as an indicator of
whether a adīth should be acted upon, jurists essentially implied that the texts of
revelation were not adequate in and of themselves to provide all necessary information
concerning the law. Some information had failed to be captured in textual form, and
existed only as a communal memory, preserved in communal practice. Further, the status
of some revealed texts could only be known by looking outside the text, to practice.
Dutton, too, understands the reliance on ʿamal as an early stage of jurisprudence that was
later replaced by a “ adīth-based, i.e. text-based, religion.”644 He identifies the early
stages of the process of textualization with the early Ḥanafīs, progressing to al-Shāfiʿī’s
assertion of the exclusive authority of the Qurʾān and Sunna. The process was completed,
he writes, in the works of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855) and Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī (d.
270/883).
What we learn from the works of al-Ṭaḥāwī is that the process of the
‘textualization’ of Islamic law was not as neat or as linear as the presentation above
would suggest. Almost half a century after the death of Dāwūd al-Ẓāhirī, al-Ṭaḥāwī
struggled with the question of whether authority resided in revealed texts themselves or
642
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in the community’s memory of their status and meaning. We have seen a number of
examples in which al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that ʿamal indicates that a certain adīth must have
been abrogated, even though neither the abrogating adīth nor any textual evidence of the
order in which they were revealed has been preserved.645 At the same time, we saw in a
previous chapter al-Ṭaḥāwī’s insistence on the duty of following Prophetic adīths.646
Further, in at least one passage, al-Ṭaḥāwī criticizes scholars for abandoning the practice
of a sound Prophetic adīth.647 Nor was al-Ṭaḥāwī the last Ḥanafī to look to ʿamal as an
indicator of the law; al-Jaṣṣāṣ, citing ʿĪsā ibn Abān, likewise holds that ʿamal can reveal
which of two conflicting adīths is abrogated.648
From the passages in which al-Ṭaḥāwī supplants Prophetic authority by reference
to communal practice, we may conclude that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of religious
authority is not exclusively textual. However, we must also note that the number of cases
in which he appeals to the authority of communal practice across all his extant works is
extremely small in comparison with his explicit assertions of textual authority and his
appeals to such authority in his legal arguments. Further, where the Medinese and even
the early Ḥanafīs sometimes let a contradiction between their doctrine and a Prophetic
adīth stand without attempting to justify the disparity, for al-Ṭaḥāwī any departure from
Prophetic adīths requires justification. All of his discussions of communal practice are
concerned with explaining why certain Prophetic adīths should or should not be put into
action and with rooting that practice in Prophetic authority. We might therefore say that
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al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of legal authority is not exclusively textual—though it is
largely so—but that it is exclusively Prophetic and Qurʾānic. ʿAmal for al-Ṭaḥāwī
preserves Prophetic material in an unadulterated but non-textual form.
With this observation in mind, we may return to the striking similarity mentioned
above between the passages in which al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that the abrogation of a adīth is
indicated by ʿamal and those in which he says that it is indicated by ij āʿ. The
relationship between the two processes is further complicated by the fact that, in two
passages arguing that consensus indicates that a adīth was abrogated, al-Ṭaḥāwī
explains that that consensus is known from practice.649 That is, practice indicates
consensus, which in turn indicates abrogation. In other passages we have discussed,
however, consensus is left out of this equation, and it is simply practice which indicates
abrogation.
In the context of determining the abrogation of a adīth, then, ʿamal and
consensus are not clearly distinguished in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought and appear
interchangeable. Further, both consensus and ʿamal preserve Prophetic practice in nontextual form, where Prophetic adīth preserves that practice in textual form. Lowry has
observed that, “among Shāfiʿī’s predecessors and colleagues, it would be fair to say that
the dividing lines between the normative concepts of sunna (the general concept of
tradition, sometimes stretching back to the Prophet), ij āʿ (what people think), and even
ʿamal (what people do), remained hazy.”650 It is equally fair to say that, in the context of
knowing whether adīths have been abrogated, the dividing lines between ij āʿ and
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ʿamal are still hazy for al-Ṭaḥāwī a century later. What has changed is that all three—
sunna, ij āʿ and ʿamal—are entirely Prophetic in origin.
The equation of ij āʿ and ʿamal is restricted in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought to the single
function of determining the status of adīths. Consensus, however, is a much wider
concept than ʿamal in his works, and, unlike ʿamal, is not always based on a memory of
Prophetic practice. Instead, as we have seen above, consensus can be based upon raʾy,
and therefore represent a variety of qiyās. That is, while ʿamal always takes its authority
from an assumed instance of Prophetic instruction, ij āʿ can represent either side of the
instruction/inference binary. What is always true of the consensus of the jurists, however,
is that it cannot challenge Prophetic practice, but only ‘fill in the gaps’ where that
practice is unknown or provide further information about the status of a particular adīth.
Such restrictions, however, do not appear to apply to the consensus of the Companions.

Abrogation of Prophetic Ḥadīth by Companion Consensus
On the consensus of the Companions al-Ṭaḥāwī makes a number of highly
idiosyncratic statements by the standards of the uṣūl tradition. In several passages in
Shar

aʿānī al-āthār, he ascribes to the Companions the authority to abrogate by

consensus what they know to have been the practice of the Prophet during his lifetime.
The first passage in which al-Ṭaḥāwī makes this claim concerns a debate over how many
times one should say ta bīr (‘God is great’) during a funeral prayer. Al-Ṭaḥāwī reports
that, after the Prophet’s death, Muslims spoke four, five or seven ta bīrs, and each group
claimed Prophetic authority for their practice. In response, the caliph ʿUmar consulted
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with other Companions, and they reached consensus that the funeral prayer should be
brought into alignment with the prayers for the major feasts, each of which contained
four ta bīrs. Al-Ṭaḥāwī writes:
ʿUmar thus restored the matter to four ta bīrs upon consultation ( ushāwara)
with the Companions of God’s Messenger. They were present when His
Messenger did what was reported by Ḥudhayfa [i.e., five ta bīrs] and Zayd ibn
Arqam [i.e., four ta bīrs], but they held that what they did (faʿalū) was better than
what they had previously known the law to be (ʿali ū).
[Their action] is an abrogation of what they knew, because they are trustworthy
( aʾ ūnūn) in what they do (faʿalū) just as they are trustworthy in what they
transmit. This is like their consensus after [the death of] God’s Messenger on the
scope (tawqīt) of the add punishment for drinking wine, and on ending
[permission for] the sale of slave women who bear children to their masters
(u ahāt al-awlād). Their consensus is a conclusive proof ( ujja), even if they
did something different ( hilāfuhu) during the era of the Prophet.
Their consensus on the number of ta bīrs at a funeral prayer after [the death of]
God’s Messenger likewise is a conclusive proof ( ujja), even if they knew
something different from him. What they did and reached consensus upon after
God’s Messenger abrogates (nāsi h) what God’s Messenger did.651
Al-Ṭaḥāwī also adduces versions of this argument as evidence for the legal
effectiveness of a triple statement of divorce and setting the add punishment for
drinking wine at eighty lashes.652 In each of these chapters, al-Ṭaḥāwī cites other
instances of abrogation by Companion consensus, usually those listed above. In addition,
he also mentions as examples two instances of abrogation by Companion consensus that
are never discussed at length in Shar

aʿānī al-āthār: the withdrawal of permission to

sell slave women who have borne children to their master653 and ʿUmar’s creation of the
dīwān, the register establishing how income would be distributed to Muslims who
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participated in the conquests.654 The fact that al-Ṭaḥāwī consistently cites additional
examples of abrogation by Companion consensus suggests that he considered its actual
occurrence to be self-evident as well as one of the best arguments for its permissibility.655
As we saw in the previous chapter, a similar phenomenon occurs in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
discussions of the permissibility of the Qurʾān abrogating the Sunna and vice versa,
where his argument consists largely of listing examples of its known occurrence.
The authority granted to Companion consensus in these passages is much more
powerful than the mere preservation of the knowledge of an earlier instance of
abrogation.656 Where al-Jaṣṣāṣ demurs with his statement that “we do not say that
consensus causes abrogation,”657 al-Ṭaḥāwī affirms clearly that “what [the Companions]
did and reached consensus upon after God’s Messenger abrogates (nāsi h) what God’s
Messenger did.”658 Their consensus is not a confirmation of an underlying Prophetic
action, but rather privileges what the Companions do (faʿala) over what they know
(ʿalima) from the Prophet. A comparison of the chapter on the funeral prayer cited above
with the chapter on triple divorce can help us determine what al-Ṭaḥāwī means by his
reference in the earlier chapter to what the Companions ‘do’ (faʿalū). He writes:
ʿUmar addressed all the people, among them Companions of God’s Messenger
who knew what had preceded during the time of God’s Messenger, and none of
654
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them denied or refuted him. That is the greatest proof ( ujja) of the abrogation of
what had preceded.
Just as the collective transmissions659 of the Companions of God’s Messenger
constitute legal proof, so their consensus upon an opinion (qawl) constitutes legal
proof. And just as their consensus upon transmission (naql) is exempt from errors
and lapses (barīʾ in al-wahm wa-l-zalal), likewise their consensus upon a legal
opinion (raʾy) is exempt from errors and lapses.
We have seen matters that were a certain way (ʿalā aʿānī) during the era of
God’s Messenger, which his Companions made a different way (jaʿalū ʿalā hilāf
tilk al- aʿānī) after him. This is because they saw (raʾaw) in it that which was
hidden from those who came after them, and it was an abrogating proof ( ujja
nāsi ha) over what preceded it.660
From this passage we learn that what al-Ṭaḥāwī means in the earlier passage by what the
Companions ‘do’ is not related to any concept of the continuous practice of the
Community (ʿamal). Indeed, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s choice to employ ‘faʿalū’ rather than ‘ʿa ilū’
appears deliberate, especially given how rhetorically elegant the contrast between
‘ʿa ilū’ (what the Companions practice) and ‘ʿali ū’ (what the Companions know)
would have been.
Instead, the ‘doing’ referenced in the earlier passage on funeral prayers is here
glossed as the activity of propounding legal opinions (qawl, raʾy) and reaching consensus
upon them. Upon reaching that consensus, the legal thinking of the Companions is as
exempt from error as is their transmission of Prophetic adīth. The concept of the
Companions’ legal reasoning also appears in the earlier passage, when the Companions
reach consensus that the rule for the number of ta bīrs should be brought into alignment
with the number of ta bīrs for the festival prayers. Analogy is the basis for the new rule.
659
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In his discussions of abrogation by Companion consensus, then, al-Ṭaḥāwī subverts the
instruction/inference binary that underlies his general conception of the structure of the
law. Here, Companion inference is granted a higher authority than direct Prophetic
instruction preserved in adīth form.
The chapter on triple divorce further explains why this type of abrogation is
associated with the Companions: they saw what was hidden from those who came after
them. The term used for ‘seeing’ (ra’aw) connotes both observation and the act of
propounding a legal opinion, and it appears that both of those meanings are intended
here. The Companions observed the Prophet as later Muslims would not, and as a result
their legal opinions (raʾy) are superior to those of later Muslims. In this sense, alṬaḥāwī’s understanding of the ability of Companion consensus to abrogate Prophetic
practice is still connected, if tenuously, to the idea of Prophetic instruction. Here,
preserving Prophetic practice can mean extrapolating from or even altering earlier
rulings. The concept in this passage of what it means to preserve Prophetic practice is
thus quite different from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s usual argument that the Companions preserve
Prophetic practice by transmitting it mimetically, even if not in the form of Prophetic
adīth. This form of consensus is not merely the preservation of Prophetic practice, but
has the authority to exceed and replace that practice. These passages thus preserve an
older concept of religious and Prophetic authority, one that al-Ṭaḥāwī has largely moved
away from in most of his arguments.
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Abrogation by consensus was widely rejected by jurists of all major schools,
although ʿĪsā ibn Abān and other unspecified Ḥanafīs are reported to have accepted it.661
In al-Mu arrar al-Sarakhsī rejects abrogation by consensus but describes the arguments
some Ḥanafīs make in favor of it. They consider that consensus leads to
epistemologically certain knowledge (ʿil yaqīn) like that contained in a text of
revelation (naṣṣ), and therefore consensus may abrogate. They further argue that
consensus is a stronger legal proof ( ujja) than al-khabar al- ashhūr.662 Since al-khabar
al- ashhūr may abrogate, even more so can consensus abrogate.663 In al-Sarakhsī’s
understanding, the Ḥanafī argument is based upon relative degrees of epistemological
certainty. In contrast, none of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments for abrogation by consensus
identify epistemological certainty as the basis for this doctrine. Nor have I been able to
identify other references by earlier or later jurists to the special ability of the
Companions’ consensus to abrogate Prophetic practice.
Significantly, while al-Ṭaḥāwī describes all of the passages under discussion as
examples of abrogation by the consensus of the Companions, he also intimates that they
were all undertaken at the initiative of ʿUmar ibn Abī Khaṭṭāb, the second caliph. In the
chapter on the funeral prayer, we learn in a adīth that the disagreement over the number
of ta bīrs weighed upon ʿUmar, and so he wrote to the Companions asking them to reach
consensus upon the matter. Their initial response was to ask ʿUmar to decide for them.
He responded that he is only a man (anā bashar ithlu u ) and therefore wished to
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consult together on the matter.664 The chapter on triple divorce similarly reports a speech
given by ʿUmar during his caliphate (lit. the time of ʿUmar, a ān ʿU ar) as the basis
for the Companion consensus on the permissibility of a pronouncement of triple divorce,
on the grounds that other Companions were present and did not refute him.665 In the
chapter on the punishment for drinking wine, al-Ṭaḥāwī reports that when ʿUmar came to
power (la

ā āna ʿU ar), he consulted with the people in order to establish the

punishment at eighty lashes.666 Despite the fact that al-Ṭaḥāwī only mentions in passing
the end of the selling of u

ahāt al-awlād and the establishment of the dīwān, these

events, too, are associated with ʿUmar.667
A survey of premodern and modern sources suggests that many of these events
are generally understood to have been undertaken on ʿUmar’s initiative and authority as a
caliph. In the 740s, the Khārijite Abū Ḥamza listed the establishment of the dīwān and
the punishment for drinking wine among ʿUmar’s major accomplishments.668 Modern
scholars similarly credit to ʿUmar the establishment of the dīwān, the prohibition on
selling u

ahāt al-awlād and the permission for a triple pronouncement of divorce.669

We might therefore posit that abrogation by Companion consensus functions in Shar
aʿānī al-āthār, at least de facto, to legitimize the legislative role of ʿUmar, although al-
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Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, 130.
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Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: The Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the
Eleventh Century (New York: Longman, 1986), 57; Ṣubḥī Rajab Maḥmasānī, Falsafat al-tashrīʿ fī alIslam: The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam, trans. Farhat Ziadeh (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 112;
Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, s.v. “talāḳ” by Joseph Schacht; Faruqi, “The Development of Ij āʿ,”
176.
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Ṭaḥāwī never explicitly theorizes about ʿUmar’s special authority.670 By al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
time, caliphs were no longer seen to possess sufficient legislative authority to promulgate
law independently, much less law in conflict with the Prophet’s practice. By portraying
ʿUmar’s initiatives as functioning within the framework of Companion consensus, alṬaḥāwī transforms the problem from a historical memory of the independent legislative
authority of an early caliph to the authority of the Companions in general.671
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of abrogation by Companion consensus as detailed in Shar
aʿānī al-athār effectively grants a higher authority to collective Companion legal
reasoning than to Prophetic adīths for the few questions on which he invokes this
authority, even if the Companions’ authority is rooted in their observation of the Prophet.

670

Ahmad Hasan has also recognized that “the personal opinions of the Companions, especially of ʿUmar,
in many legal problems, were accepted later as Ij āʿ of the Companions” (‘Ij āʿ in the Early Schools,”
122). The conclusion he draws from this, however, is that consensus “begins with the personal judgment of
individuals and culminates in the universal acceptance of a certain opinion by the Community in the long
run. Ij āʿ emerges by itself and is not imposed upon the Ummah” (“Ij āʿ in the Early Schools,” 122).
Thus, rather than seeing reports of ʿUmar’s legislation as threatening Prophetic authority , he portrays them
as evidence of the natural process of reaching consensus and refrains from mentioning any conflict between
it and Prophetic practice.
671
In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī accounts for the prohibition on utʿa (temporary marriage), another piece of
legislation sometimes attributed to ʿUmar, by claiming that the consensus of the Companions is an
indicator (dalīl) of its abrogation, the same argument we saw above in connection with the consensus of the
jurists and Community. While some sources identify a sermon from ʿUmar during his caliphate as the
origin of the prohibition (Shahla Haeri, “Power of Ambiguity: Cultural Improvisations on the Theme of
Temporary Marriage,” Iranian Studies 19, no. 2 (1986): 124; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Tafsīr al- abīr, aw,
Mafātī al-ghayb, ed. Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn and Aḥmad Shams al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmīya),
10.40-41), al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces Prophetic adīths both permitting and prohibiting utʿa, and then argues that
the Prophetic adīths themselves contain evidence that permission for utʿa was abrogated (Maʿānī, 3.2427). Only after establishing the abrogation does al-Ṭaḥāwī cite reports stating that ʿUmar was the source of
the prohibition. He says that the tacit assent of the Companions shows their consensus, and that their
consensus is an indication of its abrogation (Maʿānī, 3.27). Nowhere does he address the tension between
his argument that the abrogation was indicated in the Prophetic adīths and the other reports stating that it
was ʿUmar who prohibited utʿa. We may assume that al-Ṭaḥāwī portrays Companion consensus as the
indicator rather than the cause of abrogation in this case because he is relying on their consensus only as
additional source of support for his basic argument, which is about Prophetic adīths. For Schacht’s doubts
concerning the authenticity of the tradition concerning ʿUmar’s prohibition of utʿa, see Schacht, Origins
of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 267.
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In his later work of

ā al-Qurʾān,672 however, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to have reversed

his earlier position by affirming that it is “impossible that [the Muslims] would reach
consensus in contradiction with what God’s Messenger did on a matter that was not later
particularized (takhṣīṣ) or abrogated.”673 While it is possible that he intended to exclude
Companion consensus from that declaration, in his final work, Shar mushkil al-āthār,
al-Ṭaḥāwī states that the Companions “would not reach consensus in contradiction with
what God’s Messenger did unless they had confirmation that it had been abrogated and
the matter had become as they asserted, because they are trustworthy in what they do, just
as they are trustworthy in what they transmit.”674
In this passage al-Ṭaḥāwī restricts the power of Companion consensus to merely
affirming an earlier abrogation, in agreement with many other jurists. He has also
effectively redefined what it means for the Companions to be “trustworthy in what they
do” ( aʾ ūnūn ʿalā ā faʿalū). Where in Shar

aʿānī al-āthār the same phrase was

used to argue for the authority of collective Companion legal reasoning over Prophetic
practice, here al-Ṭaḥāwī employs it to assert that the Companions could never knowingly
depart from Prophetic practice. That is, he once again confirms the superior authority of
Prophetic instruction to inference. Although, given our imperfect knowledge of the
history of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works as texts, it is impossible to state with certainty that he did in
fact intend to retract his earlier arguments about abrogation by Companion consensus, it
is certainly plausible that he might find such a position uncomfortable in an atmosphere
672

The order of composition of Shar aʿānī al-āthār,
ā al-Qurʾān and Shar mushkil al-āthār is
reported in the biographical tradition (e.g., Ibn Abī al-Wafāʾ, al-Jawāhir al-muḍīya, 166) and confirmed by
internal textual evidence.
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which increasingly privileged Prophetic authority over all other forms of religious
authority.
Within the context of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought as a whole, the abrogation of Prophetic
adīths by Companion consensus is best understood as the extreme end of a spectrum for
preserving Prophetic practice that ranges from the purely textual to the more ephemeral.
At the other end of that spectrum lies Prophetic adīth, in which an obviously Prophetic
practice is preserved in a purportedly stable textual form. Next on that spectrum appear
Companion and Successor adīths, which al-Ṭaḥāwī understands in many cases to
provide a textual record of Prophetic practice, albeit not in the Prophet’s voice. With the
next group of sources, juristic consensus and the practice (ʿamal) of the jurists and the
Community, we move away from textual sources, although al-Ṭaḥāwī still understands
these sources to derive their authority from the fact that they mimetically preserve
Prophetic practice without adding anything to it.
Finally, abrogation by Companion consensus represents a non-textual source that
only obliquely preserves Prophetic practice—while the authority of Companion
consensus derives from the Companions’ observation of the Prophet, this form of
consensus grants them the power to override Prophetic practice known through Prophetic
adīth. The uncomfortable fit of abrogation by Companion consensus within a scale that
otherwise envisions a purely Prophetic, if not always textual, authority, suggests the
reason for al-Ṭaḥāwī’s rejection of this form of consensus in his later two works.
Although the passages in Shar

aʿānī al-āthār on abrogation by Companion consensus

preserve an older concept of religious authority after the Prophet’s death, on the whole,
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al-Ṭaḥāwī is firmly committed to an exclusively Prophetic authority, in what whatever
form that authority might be preserved.
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Chapter Four: Hermeneutics

Within al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works, the seven-page introduction to

ā al-

Qurʾān represents the only sustained, theory-driven discussion of how jurists may
discover the meaning of the revealed texts of Qurʾān and Sunna in their work of
determining the law. Although al-Ṭaḥāwī comments briefly on questions of hermeneutics
whenever they arise in the course of analyzing discrete texts and legal issues, the
introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān is unique in suggesting how al-Ṭaḥāwī understands his

most important hermeneutical principles to relate to each other. In the course of the
introduction, al-Ṭaḥāwī establishes three key pairs of terms: mu a : utashābih
(unequivocal:equivocal), ẓāhir:bāṭin (apparent:non-apparent) and ʿā

: hāṣṣ

(unrestricted:restricted). Without explicitly describing a hierarchy among these terms, the
structure of the introduction suggests that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of the latter two pairs of
terms serves as a set of tools for reading utashābih (equivocal) texts. By locating the
Qurʾānic dichotomy of mu kam and utashābih at the center of his theory of legal
interpretation, al-Ṭaḥāwī implies that his hermeneutics is itself Qurʾānic and, therefore,
authoritative.
In this chapter I take as my framework these three pairs of terms and analyze the
role each plays within the introduction to
body chapters of

ā al-Qurʾān. In addition, I look to the

ā al-Qurʾān as well as to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other hermeneutical works

to determine more fully both how al-Ṭaḥāwī understands these concepts and the work
they do within his legal arguments. In the remainder of the chapter, I turn to two
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additional issues raised by these terms: first, hints of a formalist approach to language
and law in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works and, second, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the role of
ijtihād (legal reasoning) in determining the law.675
Previous analyses of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutics have offered descriptions of his
hermeneutical approach to specific legal questions or his intellectual relationship with
other jurists.676 While these provide valuable insights into al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought, this
chapter represents the first study to bring together al-Ṭaḥāwī’s most important
hermeneutical principles into a coherent structure. As such, I do not attempt to catalog
every hermeneutical procedure employed in the course of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works. Nor
am I concerned here with how al-Ṭaḥāwī combines different hermeneutical techniques
within his arguments. Instead, this chapter demonstrates how al-Ṭaḥāwī draws a direct
675

The first topic, legal formalism, is raised in response to hints of a formalist understanding of ʿāmm and
hāṣṣ in some passages of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works; the second, ijtihād, is important as one of the means alṬaḥāwī suggests for approaching utashābih texts.
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Both Vishanoff and El Shamsy are concerned with the relationship between al-Ṭaḥāwī and al-Shāfiʿī. In
his Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, Vishanoff observes briefly that al-Ṭaḥāwī “inclined toward the
Shāfiʿī hermeneutic of ambiguity” and “employed al-Shāfiʿī’s distinction between general and particular
texts” (214). El Shamsy, too, emphasizes al-Ṭaḥāwī’s “strikingly close intellectual relationship with
Shāfiʿism” and al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of many of al-Shāfiʿī’s hermeneutical terms and concepts (Canonization of
Islamic Law, 205-207). I will have occasion to comment on both scholars’ analyses below. Najam Haider
analyzes al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of the qunūt prayer and the prohibition of intoxicants in al-Mukhtaṣar and
Shar aʿānī al-āthār, comparing al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical approach with that of earlier and later
Ḥanafīs (The Origins of the Shīʿa: Identity, Ritual and Sacred Space in Eighth- entury Kūfa (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 96-100, 142-145). Calder favorably compares al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion
of the cancellation of wuḍūʾ in Shar mushkil al-āthār to that of Ibn Qutayba in Taʾwīl u htalif al- adīth
and affirms that al-Ṭaḥāwī employs the hermeneutical concepts of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ in his arguments
(Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence, 228-233). He also accuses al-Ṭaḥāwī of “arbitrary and
irresponsible manipulation of Prophetic and Companion dicta,” however, an accusation which Calder
illustrates by analyzing al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of isnād criticism in his discussion of touching the penis (mass aldhakar) in Shar aʿānī al-āthār (Studies in Early Muslim Jurisprudence, 235-241). Schacht, too, portrays
al-Ṭaḥāwī as unscrupulous in his acceptance or rejection of Prophetic adīths in the course of his legal
arguments, depending on whether they support established Ḥanafī law (Origins of Muhammadan
Jurisprudence, 30-31, 47-48). Sadeghi describes al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical approach to a variety of
questions related to women’s prayer in order to demonstrate how al-Ṭaḥāwī balanced his commitment to
Prophetic adīth with his commitment to established Ḥanafī law; he emphasizes the role the concepts of
ʿāmm and hāṣṣ played in reconciling these commitments (Logic of Law-Making, 108-112, 130-137).
Wheeler is interested not in how al-Ṭaḥāwī interprets revelation, but in how his arguments construct Ḥanafī
authority (Applying the Canon, 100-109).
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connection between how God communicates with humans and the approach jurists must
take to correctly interpret His message.

Muḥkam and Mutashābih (Unequivocal and Equivocal Texts)
Al-Ṭaḥāwī begins the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān by establishing the

division of the Qurʾān into mu kam and utashābih verses.677 In Shar mushkil al-āthār,
he expands the scope of application of these terms to encompass Prophetic adīths as
well.678 Although the mu kam: utashābih dichotomy appears far less frequently in his
arguments than ʿāmm: hāṣṣ and ẓāhir:bāṭin, the other pairs of terms treated in the
introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān, its centrality to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the nature

of God’s communication through revelation is suggested by its prominent placement here
as well as further substantial discussion of the pair in two chapters of Shar mushkil alāthār.679
After a brief pious invocation, al-Ṭaḥāwī opens the introduction to

ā al-

Qurʾān by adducing Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7:
It is He who has sent down to you the Scripture, in which are the mu a āt
which are the matrix of the Scripture, whilst there are others that are
utashābihāt. As for those in whose hearts is deviation, they follow the
utashābihāt. Only God knows their interpretation, and those who are wellgrounded in knowledge.680
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in its entirety both later in the passage and in the chapters of Shar mushkil al-āthār, and so I quote it here
in full. (Translation adapted from Jones, trans., The Qurʾān (Cambridge: Gibb Memorial Trust, 2007)).
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Exegetes disputed the intent of mu a āt and utashābihāt in this verse.681 In his Jā iʿ
al-bayān al-Ṭabarī identified five meanings exegetes assigned to the pair, including that
the terms indicate the abrogating and abrogated verses; the legal verses and the verses
which merely resemble one another; verses permitting only one interpretation and those
permitting multiple interpretations; stories about earlier prophets and communities given
in clear detail and those repeated across chapters without detail; and verses which can be
understood by scholars and those which cannot.682
In the mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition, the terms mu kam and utashābih were
severed from their Qurʾānic roots and made technical terms designating the clarity or
obscurity of individual words within revealed texts. In particular, the Ḥanafīs employed
them as the extreme ends of an eight-part scale in which mu kam represents absolutely
clear discourse permitting neither interpretation nor abrogation, and utashābih
represents unintelligible discourse from which God’s intention cannot be determined.683
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On the range of exegetical discussions of Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7, see Sahiron Syamsuddin, “Mu kam and
Mutashābih: An Analytical Study of al-Ṭabarī’s and al-Zamakhsharī’s Interpretations of Q3:7,” Qurʾānic
Studies 1, no. 1 (1999): 63-79; Leah Kinberg, “Mu a āt and Mutashābihāt (Koran 3/7): Implication of a
Koranic Pair of Terms in Medieval Exegesis,” Arabica 35, no. 2 (1988): 143-172; Vishanoff, Formation of
Islamic Hermeneutics, 17; Michel Lagarde, “De L’Ambiguïté ( uta ābih) dans le Coran,” Quaderni di
Studi Arabi 3 (1985): 45-62.
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Al-Ṭabarī, Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī: Jā iʿ al-bayān ʿan taʾwīl al-Qurʾān, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad Shākir
(Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1969), 6.169-182. Al-Ṭabarī holds the last of these positions, that mu kam verses
can be understood by scholars, while utashābih verses may not. In addition to the positions catalogued by
al-Ṭabarī, al-Māturīdī (d. 333/934) preserves the following views: 1) that the mu a āt are Q 6/alAnʿām:151-153 and Q 17/al-Isrāʾ:23 onwards, while the rest of the Qurʾān is utashābih; 2) that the
mu a āt are understood by everyone, while the utashābihāt require study and inquiry; 3) that the
mu a āt are verses whose intention may be understood while the utashābihāt are a test of faith; 4) that
the mu a āt are verses [whose meaning] is apparent to all Muslims, such that they do not disagree
concerning them, while the utashābihāt cause doubt and disagreement because of differences in language
or because of a conflict between the apparent and inner meaning; and 5) that the mu a āt are verses that
may be understood by the intellect while the utashābihāt require revelation to be understood (al-Māturīdī,
Tafsīr al-Qurʾān al-ʿaẓī , al- usa ā Taʾwīlāt ahl al-Sunna, ed. Fāṭima Yūsuf al-Khaymī (Beirut:
Muʾassasat al-Risāla, 2004), 1.246-248).
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The eight-part scale designates language as mu kam (unequivocal), mufassar (explained), naṣṣ
(explicit), ẓāhir (apparent), hafī (hidden), mushkil (problematic), mujmal (concise) and utashābih
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This recontextualization of mu kam: utashābih appears already in al-Sarakhsī’s
Mu arrar, in which the full eight-part scale is described in a chapter on “Terms for the
Forms of Divine Address” (as āʾ ṣīghat al-khiṭāb). Although al-Sarakhsī refers briefly to
phrases from Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7 within his discussion, his arguments are primarily
etymological and hermeneutical rather than exegetical.684
Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not know mu kam and utashābih as part of a formal scale for
describing the clarity of terms, but neither does he conform to any of the exegetical
explanations of Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7 offered by al-Ṭabarī or al-Māturīdī. In both the
introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān and the two chapters of Shar mushkil al-āthār, al-

Ṭaḥāwī’s approach is initially exegetical, adducing Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7 or a related Prophetic
adīth before glossing the obscure terms mu kam and utashābih.685 However, in all
three cases he then makes his exegesis the foundation for a theory of hermeneutics that
draws a direct connection between the role of jurists, their methodology, and God’s use
of language in revelation.686
After citing Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7 in the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān, al-Ṭaḥāwī

continues:
God informed us by means of [this verse] that in His Scripture there are
unequivocal (mu kam) verses, which He has made secure in terms of their
(unintelligible). The Shāfiʿīs employed a similar scale consisting of only four divisions: ẓāhir, naṣṣ, mujmal
and utashābih. See Sukrija Husejn Ramić, Language and the Interpretation of Islamic Law (Cambridge:
Islamic Texts Society, 2003), 65-138; Zysow, Economy of Certainty, 53-56; Nyazee, Islamic
Jurisprudence, 299-300; Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 122-140.
684
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685
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ā , 1.59; Mushkil, 2.219-221, 6.334-337. Although most chapters of Shar mushkil alāthār resolve apparent conflicts between Prophetic adīths or between the Qurʾān and adīths, some
chapters, including the two under discussion here, offer an exegesis of obscure or potentially problematic
(mushkil) revealed texts.
686
I have not identified any jurists preceding al-Ṭaḥāwī who incorporated mu kam and utashābih into a
theory of hermeneutics, rather than treating it as an exegetical matter.
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interpretation (taʾwīl) and the reason ( ikma) for their revelation. These are the
foundation of the Scripture. [He also informed us] that there are equivocal
( utashābih) verses, and he criticized those who seek them out, saying “As for
those in whose hearts is deviation, they follow the equivocal verses.”
[The reason for His criticism] is that the valuation ( ukm) of the equivocal verses
must be sought from the unequivocal verses which God made the foundation of
His Scripture, and then from the rules which he promulgated through the speech
of His Messenger in order to illustrate what He revealed in an equivocal manner
in His Scripture.687
The crucial features of the mu kam: utashābih dichotomy as presented in

ā al-

Qurʾān are thus that the interpretation of mu kam verses is certain and the reason for
their revelation—that is, God’s intent in revealing them—is known. In contrast, the
valuation of utashābih verses must be sought first in mu kam verses of the Qurʾān and
then from Prophetic adīth. Interpretations of utashābih verses that do not rest on these
two foundations are baseless and therefore blameworthy. The role of jurists is thus to
determine the valuation of utashābih verses using the methodology outlined in this
passage.688
Two chapters of Shar mushkil al-āthār add further details concerning alṬaḥāwī’s concept of mu kam and utashābih. As noted above, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues in one
that the dichotomy can be applied not only to Qurʾānic verses, but also to Prophetic
adīths. After listing examples of both unequivocal and equivocal verses of the Qurʾān,
al-Ṭaḥāwī writes:
Among [the prescriptions of religious law that God has imposed] are those that
were promulgated through the speech of the Prophet for this purpose. He made
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some of what was conveyed through his speech mu kam and laid bare in meaning
( a shūf al- aʿnā).689
He lists examples of rules established through unequivocal Prophetic adīths, including
the five prayers of the day and night and the manner in which travelers shorten them. In
contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces quotations from adīths, rather than the rules derived from
those adīths, when giving examples of equivocal Prophetic speech, presumably because
the rules are disputed. He concludes the discussion by noting that scholars must seek the
true meaning ( aqāʾiq) of equivocal Prophetic adīths, and that all equivocal texts,
whether found in Qurʾān or Sunna, belong to a single category (jins), while all
unequivocal texts belong to a separate category.690
Apart from the discussion in this chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī never classifies a Prophetic
adīth as equivocal or unequivocal in any of his extant works. Nonetheless, this passage
is significant for two reasons. First, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s application of the mu kam: utashābih
dichotomy to Prophetic adīths appears to be highly unusual among exegetical
discussions of Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7. While later theorists would employ the pair as abstract
technical terms designating the clarity of revealed language in both the Qurʾān and
Sunna, I have not been able to identify other exegetical discussions of Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7
that explicitly expand the scope of mu kam and utashābih to encompass non-Qurʾānic
revelation. We might tentatively suggest that al-Ṭaḥāwī represents a transitional stage
between exegetical discussions focused on identifying the meaning of obscure words
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within the Qurʾān and a later effort to apply consistent analytical categories to language
in all revealed texts.691
The second reason for the significance of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s application of mu kam and
utashābih to Prophetic adīths is related to his overall hermeneutical project. While alṬaḥāwī does not have a system of technical terms for assessing the clarity of revealed
texts, his discussion of mu kam and utashābih, and in particular his extension of the
terms mu kam and utashābih to Prophetic adīth, reveals that his goals in the
introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān and the chapters of Shar mushkil al-āthār extend

beyond the exegetical. Instead, he argues in these passages that revelation is
fundamentally divided into two categories—the unequivocal and the equivocal—and that
the mission and methodology of jurists rests upon this division. That is, Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7
serves as the point of departure for al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of the structure of revelation.
Shar mushkil al-āthār clarifies how al-Ṭaḥāwī understands the relationship
between the role of jurists and the division of revelation into the equivocal and the
unequivocal. In one chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī begins by citing Prophetic adīths concerning the
occasion of revelation for Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7. He then writes:
God informed us that in His Scripture there are verses that are unequivocal in
their interpretation (taʾwīl). They are the verses whose interpretation is agreed
upon and whose intention is intelligible ( aʿqūl). [He also informed us that] there
are equivocal ( utashābih) verses whose interpretation is sought from the
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Further evidence suggesting this transitional stage is found in the Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā al-bidʿa of alṬaḥāwī’s contemporary Abū Muṭīʿ al-Nasafī (d. 318/930). In the course of criticizing a group of extreme
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unequivocal verses, which are the matrix of the Scripture. [The equivocal verses]
are those whose interpretation is disputed.692
This passage is significant because it draws a direct line between the occurrence of
scholarly agreement or disagreement and the degree to which God has made His intent
manifest in a particular revealed text: unequivocal verses are those “whose interpretation
is agreed upon and whose intention is intelligible,” while equivocal verses are those
“whose intention is disputed.” In other words, scholarly disagreement is the result of
God’s rhetorical choices. This point is confirmed in another chapter of Shar mushkil alāthār, in which al-Ṭaḥāwī writes that “the unequivocal verses are those in which God
revealed His meaning ( aʿnā) to them… and the equivocal verses are those in which he
did not reveal His intent ( urād) to them.”693
For al-Ṭaḥāwī, then, mu kam and utashābih designate the degree to which God
as a speaker fully expresses His intent in a discrete text such that that intent can be
understood without reference to other revealed texts. This claim bears some similarity to
one of the exegetical explanations of mu kam and utashābih cited from al-Ṭabarī
above: namely, that mu kam verses permit only one interpretation while utashābih
verses permit multiple interpretations.694 Proponents of this explanation include Abū
Jaʿfar al-Iskāfī (d. 240/854), al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935), al-Karkhī (d. 340/952) and al-Jaṣṣāṣ
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 6.337.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.221.
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of mu kam and utashābih also bears some similarity to al-Ṭabarī’s own
position: that mu kam verses can be understood by scholars while utashābih verses cannot. However, alṬabarī classifies as mu kam both verses whose intent is immediately understood and those which can be
understood through recourse to other texts. The category of utashābih is limited to texts which cannot be
understood at all.
693
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(d. 370/982).695 Both al-Ṭaḥāwī and the proponents of this explanation understand
mu kam and utashābih to be related to clarity and ambiguity; however, while alṬaḥāwī views ambiguity as a result of the speaker’s rhetorical choices in expressing his
intent, the scholars cited above view ambiguity as a purely lexical matter. In

ā al-

Qurʾān, al-Jaṣṣāṣ defines mu kam as “an expression containing no homonymy,” while a
utashābih verse may be interpreted in multiple ways.696 In al-Fuṣūl, al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s
examples of utashābih verses are limited to cases in which ambiguity concerning the
voweling of a verse leads to uncertainty over its meaning.697
In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s examples of utashābih texts do not concern homonymy.
Instead, they address cases in which God did not provide sufficient detail in a statement
for scholars to adequately understand His intent without reference to other sources. His
examples of equivocal verses include Q 5/al-Māʾida:38 (“The thief, male and female: cut
off their hands”), Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:23 (“[It is also forbidden] that you should have two sisters
together, except for cases that have happened in the past”) and Q 4/al-Nisāʾ:24 (“[Also
forbidden] are married women, except what your right hand possesses”).698 Although he
does not explicitly state here or in other examples what makes these verses equivocal,
these verses he cites all lack specific, detailed information that would permit the hearer to
understand or act upon the verse without further instruction.699
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Vishanoff, Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 17; al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 1.205-208; al-Jaṣṣāṣ,
ā alQurʾān, 2.280.
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Al-Jaṣṣāṣ,
ā al-Qurʾān, 2.280.
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Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Fuṣūl, 1.205-207.
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.221.
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Notably, the equivocality of Q 5/al-Māʾida:38 (“The thief, male and female: cut off their hands”) is
apparent only in hindsight, with knowledge of later adīths that constrained the meaning of ‘thief’ and
‘hand’ in this verse. That al-Ṭaḥāwī gives this verse as an example of a mutashābih text affirms that, for
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While al-Ṭaḥāwī departs from other exegetes in his emphasis on God’s intent in
his definition of mu kam and utashābih, his assertion that the meaning of equivocal
verses must be sought from unequivocal verses was shared by a number of later jurists,
including al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Zamakhsharī, al-Ṭūsī, Ibn Kathīr and others.700 Kinberg portrays
al-Jaṣṣāṣ as a very early advocate of this procedure and notes that its other known
proponents lived considerably later.701 Although there is no evidence to suggest either
that al-Jaṣṣāṣ took this concept from al-Ṭaḥāwī or that al-Ṭaḥāwī was the first to make
this claim, we may at least conclude that the argument was known a half century before
al-Jaṣṣāṣ.
The conflict between some scholars’ definition of utashābih as “unintelligible”
and others’ claim that the meaning of utashābih verses may be understood from
mu kam verses rests on a disagreement about the best reading of an ambiguous section of
Q 3/Āl ʿImrān:7. Depending on whether one reads a particular “wa” (and) as introducing
a second subject to the previous sentence or beginning a new sentence, the verse can be
understood either to mean that only God knows the interpretation of the utashābih
verses, or that only God and the scholars know their interpretation.702 The second reading
makes a powerful claim for the authority of scholars to interpret the texts of revelation,

him, equivocality is a question of whether the speaker fully conveyed his intent and not whether a hearer
could construe the statement as meaningful.
700
Syamsuddin, “Mu kam and Mutashābih,” 69-70; Lagarde, “De l'Ambiguïté (muta ābih) dans le Coran,”
52.
701
Kinberg, “Mu a āt and Mutashābihāt,” 161-162.
702
The Arabic reads, “ ā yaʿla u taʾwīlahu illā llāh wa-l-rāsi hūn fī al-ʿil yaqūluna a annā bihi.” It
may be translated in two ways: 1) “No one knows its interpretation but God. Those who are firm in
knowledge say, “We believe in it”; or 2) “No one knows its interpretation but God and those firm in
knowledge. They say, “We believe in it.”
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although neither al-Ṭaḥāwī nor al-Jaṣṣāṣ claimed that scholars would be able to interpret
every equivocal verse.
Where al-Ṭaḥāwī departs from al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s discussion is in his explicit linking of
the discovery of the meaning of equivocal texts from unequivocal texts to the process of
ijtihād (legal interpretation). In one of the chapters of Shar mushkil al-āthār discussed
above, al-Ṭaḥāwī is asked by an interlocutor if the existence of equivocal texts means that
we cannot make judgments concerning those matters. Al-Ṭaḥāwī replies that we can, and
that the proper way to do so is through ijtihād al-raʾy (legal reasoning), a process which
may or may not lead to an objectively correct answer, but which is always praiseworthy
when undertaken in the right way.703 The division of revelation into mu kam and
utashābih thus divides God’s speech into the interpretable and that which is not in need
of interpretation, and links this division to the juristic process of ijtihād.

Mu a and Mutashābih in al-Ṭa āwī’s Her eneutical rgu ents
Given the importance of the mu kam: utashābih dichotomy in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
understanding of the nature of God’s revelation and the role of jurists in interpreting it, it
is notable how rarely he appeals to these concepts in his hermeneutical arguments. Their
application is most noteworthy in the opening paragraph of a number of chapters of
ā al-Qurʾān. In one, he adduces a section of Q 5/al-Māʾida:6 (“wipe your faces and
your hands with it (minhu)”). He then states that “wipe your faces” is unequivocal and
self-explanatory (qāʾi bi-nafsihi); however, the phrase “and your hands with it” is
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 2.223-225.
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equivocal and its intent is debated.704 Here and in similar passages,705 al-Ṭaḥāwī
identifies different sections in a given verse as equivocal or unequivocal. More
importantly, he explicitly connects the phenomenon of juristic disagreement to equivocal
verses, confirming the relationship between mu kam and utashābih and the role of
jurists outlined above.
Perhaps the paucity of appeals to the mu kam: utashābih dichotomy in alṬaḥāwī’s hermeneutical arguments is best explained by the observation that, in general,
mu kam and utashābih do not constitute an interpretive technique for al-Ṭaḥāwī, but
instead provide the conceptual framework for the fundamental division that underlies
multiple layers of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal thought, that is, the division between that which
jurists may interpret and that for which God has already adequately conveyed His intent.
In previous chapters, we have seen this dichotomy in the form of tawqīf and raʾy, ideas
very closely aligned to mu kam and utashābih. I will return to the relationship between
mu a : utashābih and tawqīf:raʾy in the final section of this chapter.

Ẓāhir and Bāṭin (Apparent and Non-Apparent Meaning)
Al-Ṭaḥāwī concludes his discussion of mu kam and utashābih in the
introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān with a lengthy, four-page justification for his argument

that the Sunna has the authority to explain the utashābih verses of the Qurʾān. He points
to the observed occurrence of abrogation between the Qurʾān and Sunna as evidence that
the Qurʾān and Sunna are of the same type (shakl)—that is, they are ontologically
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī,
ā , 1.103.
E.g., al-Ṭaḥāwī,
ā , 1.102, 1.118.

221
equivalent.706 This argument, in turn, provides the justification for his claim that jurists
may seek the meaning of equivocal Qurʾānic verses in the Sunna.707 Although the
authority of the Sunna and the occurrence of abrogation between the Qurʾān and Sunna
are crucial concepts within al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutics, he does not introduce them as
independent topics here, but only as evidence for his other claims. In analyzing the
structure of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān, we should therefore consider

this lengthy passage on abrogation and the authority of the Sunna to form part of his
discussion of mu kam and utashābih.708
After concluding his comments on abrogation, al-Ṭaḥāwī returns to the major
work of the introduction of

ā al-Qurʾān, which is to introduce a set of

hermeneutical principles for jurists based on his theory of divine-human communication.
The next pair of technical terms he addresses is ẓāhir:bāṭin, in most cases best translated
in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works as apparent and non-apparent meaning.709 Although he does not say
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I analyze this passage as well as other evidence for al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of the Qurʾān and Sunna
as ontologically equivalent in Chapter One, “Qurʾān and Sunna,” pp. 73-85.
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī,
ā , 1.59-64.
708
It is evident that al-Ṭaḥāwī did not intend to introduce abrogation as an independent hermeneutical
technique equivalent to his discussions of mu kam: utashābih, ẓāhir:bāṭin or ʿāmm: hāṣṣ from the fact
that he provides no prescription for jurists concerning its use. While al-Ṭaḥāwī frames the other
hermeneutical topics in the introduction to
ā al-Qurʾān as guidelines for jurists, the passage on
abrogation is focused exclusively on demonstrating that Islamic law as it stands cannot be explained
without accepting that abrogation between Qurʾān and Sunna has actually occurred on many occasions,
something which can only happen if the Qurʾān and Sunna are ontologically equivalent. That al-Ṭaḥāwī
does not treat abrogation on par with mu kam: utashābih, ẓāhir:bāṭin and ʿāmm: hāṣṣ within the
introduction to
ā al-Qurʾān can be explained by the fact that his goal in discussing these three pairs of
terms is to introduce the model of divine-human communication that is the subject of this chapter, and the
technique of abrogation does not form part of that model.
709
For an overview of how scholars studying Islamic law have translated ẓāhir, see Robert Gleave, Islam
and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation in Islamic Legal Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2012), 55-60. I have selected ‘apparent’ and ‘non-apparent’ to capture al-Ṭaḥāwī’s usage
of ẓāhir and bāṭin for two reasons. First, the terms capture al-Ṭaḥāwī’s orientation toward the perspective
of the addressee in his discussions of ẓāhir and bāṭin; meanings are ẓāhir from the perspective of an
individual, as we shall see below. Second, although there are cases in which al-Ṭaḥāwī considers the bāṭin
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so explicitly, al-Ṭaḥāwī must understand the diversion from ẓāhir to bāṭin meaning as a
feature of utashābih texts, because mu kam texts reveal their intent immediately and
unequivocally. The final section of the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān likewise treats a

topic that must fall under the category of utashābih texts: unrestricted and restricted
meanings of texts (al-ʿāmm wa-l- hāṣṣ). We can therefore describe the overall structure
of the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān as establishing first the dichotomy between

revelation in which God has clearly revealed His intent and that in which He has not and,
second, stating two principles for jurists to observe when determining the meaning of
texts in which God has not revealed His intent. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s overall purpose in the
introduction, therefore, is not primarily to describe the structure of revelation, but instead
to provide a set of instructions for jurists based on what we know about the nature of
God’s communication with us.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī opens his discussion of ẓāhir and bāṭin by affirming that the true
meaning of texts may not be in alignment with their apparent meaning, while establishing
jurists’ duty nonetheless to act upon the apparent meaning of revelation:
Within the Qurʾān is that which may be expressed such that its apparent meaning
differs from its true meaning ( ā qad ya hruj ʿalā al- aʿnā allādhī ya ūn
ẓāhiran li- aʿnā, wa-ya ūn bāṭinuhu aʿnā ā har). Our duty is to employ its
apparent meaning, even if the true meaning could be something else, because we
were addressed in order to receive clarification ( hūṭibnā li-yubayyan lanā), and
we were not addressed for any other purpose.710
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s first argument for the primacy of the apparent meaning rests on his
understanding of the nature of God’s revelation: God addresses us in order to provide
meaning the true or objectively correct meaning, more often he is critical of those who seek a bāṭin
meaning for texts.
710
Al-Ṭaḥāwī,
ā , 1.64. In this particular passage ‘true meaning’ seems more apposite than ‘nonapparent meaning.’
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clarity (bayān).711 While acknowledging that the true meaning of a text is not always the
apparent meaning, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that it is in God’s nature to clarify His intent through
revelation, and therefore jurists should act upon the assumption that apparent meaning is
the true meaning. The hermeneutical principle of the primacy of the apparent meaning
thus amounts to an optimism about God’s likeliness to express His intent
straightforwardly.712
In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s second and lengthier argument concerns not the nature of
revelation, but the evidence of the precedent of the Companions. He writes:
[The apparent meaning takes precedence] even if some scholars have opposed us
in this and held that the apparent meaning does not take precedence over the non-
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El Shamsy views this passage as evidence that “the way in which al-Ṭaḥāwī conceptualizes revelation as
a whole closely parallels al-Shāfiʿī’s understanding of revelation as a communicative act taking place
through the medium of human language” (Canonization of Islamic Law, 206). My reading of the
introduction to
ā al-Qurʾān broadly confirms this analysis: a jurist’s job is to understand how God has
expressed His intent in language and to apply the correct procedures in cases where He has not made His
intent immediately clear. El Shamsy has a second purpose in discussing the introduction to
ā alQurʾān, however, which is to emphasize al-Ṭaḥāwī’s “indebtedness to al-Shāfiʿī” (205). By indebtedness,
El Shamsy seems to mean not only a general similarity of views, but also relatively specific (though
unattributed) borrowings from al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla. In Chapter One, “Qurʾān and Sunna,” I questioned El
Shamsy’s characterization of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of mu kam and utashābih as mirroring al-Shāfiʿī’s
theory of the bayān. El Shamsy likewise suggests a close parallel between al-Ṭaḥāwī’s statement that “we
were addressed in order to receive clarification” ( hūtibnā li-yubayyan lanā) and the phrase “bayān li-man
hūṭiba bihi” in al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla (206). Observing the striking similarities of language between these two
passages, El Shamsy translates the phrase as “clarification for those addressed by it”; however, the phrase
has quite a different meaning in context, where it refers to the definition of a bayān, or legislative
statement. Al-Shāfiʿī writes that “the lowest common denominator among those convergent and yet
divergent meanings is that such a statement is directed to whoever is addressed by it among those in whose
language the Qurʾān was revealed” (I have taken this translation from Lowry, trans., The Epistle on Legal
Theory, 15). Al-Shāfiʿī is not describing God’s purpose in revelation, but rather establishing the addressees
of God’s legislative statements. Although El Shamsy is undoubtedly correct in emphasizing the close
relationship between the thought of al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ṭaḥāwī, his eagerness to demonstrate direct borrowing
has led him to disregard important differences in how and why the two jurists employ language and
concepts that may initially seem quite similar. Because of the differences in how the two jurists employ
similar concepts, as well as the absence of evidence for any direct textual borrowing, I am by no means
convinced, as El Shamsy appears to be, that al-Ṭaḥāwī knew the text of the Risāla, although he clearly had
great familiarity with al-Shāfiʿī’s thought.
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Despite al-Ṭaḥāwī’s insistence that the nature of revelation is to clarify, al-Ṭaḥāwī never explains why
all Qurʾānic verses should not be mu kam; that is, why God did not choose to reveal His intent
immediately, relieving the need for jurists’ interpretations.
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apparent meaning. We have reached our opinion on this matter because of
evidence we observed indicating that and obligating its use.713
Al-Ṭaḥāwī cites the example of the revelation of Q 2/al-Baqara:187 (“Eat and drink until
the white thread is distinct to you from the black thread at dawn”). Upon receiving this
revelation, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes, a number of Companions began to examine white and black
threads to determine when to resume the Ramadan fast each morning. When the Prophet
heard of their actions, he clarified that the white and black threads refer to the darkness of
night and the lightness of day. However, al-Ṭaḥāwī emphasizes, Muḥammad did not
scold them for acting upon the apparent meaning.
[The Companions’] acting upon [the apparent meaning] before receiving
instruction (tawqīf) from God’s Messenger about [the verse’s] intent is an
indication that [Muslims] are to act upon the Qurʾān according to its apparent
meaning. [This is so] even if they have not been apprised of its true interpretation
in the way that they have been apprised of the mere text. The affirmation [of their
actions] entails the affirmation of acting upon the apparent meaning, and that it
takes precedence over interpreting verses for their non-apparent meaning.714
Here al-Ṭaḥāwī portrays the Companions as the models upon whose actions jurists should
base their hermeneutical principles. He further establishes that jurists may act upon the
apparent meaning of a revealed text in the absence of instruction from the Prophet
(tawqīf).715 Although he does not say so in the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān, it is also

tawqīf that is required in most cases in order to divert from the apparent meaning to the
true meaning of a text. It is notable that in this example al-Ṭaḥāwī holds up the
Companions as a model for emulation in a case in which their privileging of the ẓāhir
meaning led them to an objectively incorrect understanding, albeit one promptly
713
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corrected by the Prophet. What al-Ṭaḥāwī offers in the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān

is not a complete set of instructions to jurists on how to derive a correct understanding of
the law from its sources, but rather an argument for how jurists should approach revealed
texts given certain facts about God’s habits in communicating with humans.
That al-Ṭaḥāwī is more interested in the assumptions jurists should make about
God’s speech than in guaranteeing correct answers is confirmed by his final argument for
the primacy of the apparent meaning. Here again, al-Ṭaḥāwī looks to the example of the
Companions, this time examining their responses to the revelation of the prohibition on
wine (khamr). In contrast to the earlier example in which the ẓāhir meaning of the text
was self-evident, here the Companions disagree on what the apparent meaning of the
prohibition on wine might be. Al-Ṭaḥāwī identifies five different understandings of the
prohibition among the Companions and reports that each faction acted upon their
understanding by destroying the kinds of wine that they held to be included within the
scope of the prohibition. Al-Ṭaḥāwī observes that:
This indicates that they acted upon the verse according to their immediate
understanding of its intent (ʿalā ā waqaʿa fī qulūbihi annahu urāduhu),
based on what was apparent to them concerning its ruling (ʿalā ā ẓahara lahum
min u ihā). [It indicates] that they were not obligated to do anything more.
Later, the Prophet did not scold them or say to them, “you should not have rushed
to destroy your property until you knew what God had prohibited with no
possibility of incorrect knowledge.”716
In this passage al-Ṭaḥāwī claims support for the primacy of the ẓāhir both from the fact
of the Companions’ having acted upon what they held to be the apparent meaning and
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from the Prophet’s tacit acceptance of their actions.717 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī’s optimism
concerning God’s likeliness to express His intent would seem to conflict with the panoply
of apparent meanings that Companions identified for the prohibition on wine, this tension
remains unacknowledged.

Ẓāhir and Bāṭin in al-Ṭa āwī’s Her eneutical rgu ents
We saw above that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of ẓāhir and bāṭin in the introduction
to

ā al-Qurʾān focuses exclusively on jurists’ duty to privilege the apparent

meaning of revealed texts while avoiding any consideration of the circumstances
warranting a departure to a non-apparent meaning. Within the body of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
hermeneutical works, the claim that jurists may not depart from the ẓāhir to the bāṭin
without evidence ( ujja, dalīl, tawqīf) allows al-Ṭaḥāwī to portray his interlocutors’
interpretation of revealed texts as straying from a foundational hermeneutical principle. 718
For example, in a chapter on whether neighbors receive the right of preemption (shufʿa)
when a house is being sold, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s interlocutors suggest that the word “neighbor”
(jār) actually means “partner” in Prophetic adīths apparently permitting shufʿa for
neighbors. Al-Ṭaḥāwī retorts:
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In contrast, al-Shāfiʿī employs the same anecdote in the Risāla as evidence for the authority of the
uncorroborated report (khabar al-wā id) (al-Risāla, 187-188). That is, al-Shāfiʿī frames this anecdote as
bearing on questions of epistemological certainty in transmission, while al-Ṭaḥāwī understands it as a
matter pertaining to the interpretation of meaning.
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meaning, but he does not use the term tawqīf (e.g., al-Shāfiʿī, Risāla, 146, 156, 268). For discussions of alShāfiʿī’s understanding of the evidence required to permit diverging from the apparent meaning, see
Vishanoff, Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 44; Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 117, 247-248;
Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 99-112.

227
You claim that reports should be interpreted according to their apparent meaning,
so how have you abandoned the apparent meaning, which is supported by
evidence, and clung to something else with no evidence to support it?719
In other cases, the mere claim that a certain rule is supported by the apparent meaning of
a Qurʾānic verse or Prophetic adīth serves as sufficient evidence for al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
position.720
Frequently al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that evidence does exist to depart from the apparent
meaning in cases where the ẓāhir of a revealed text is in conflict with another revealed
text or a position to which al-Ṭaḥāwī is committed. For example, although some versions
of a Prophetic adīth apparently indicate that it is permissible to free a slave on
someone’s behalf as expiation ( affāra), al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that Qurʾānic verses clarify
that individuals must undertake their own affāra.721 Although other revealed texts often
serve as al-Ṭaḥāwī’s evidence for a non-apparent reading, he also claims support for nonẓāhir readings on the basis of consensus, the opinion of a Companion or the flexibility of
the Arabic language.722
In his argument that jurists should rely on the apparent meaning of texts in the
absence of evidence indicating otherwise, al-Ṭaḥāwī is in agreement both with earlier
jurists of the formative period and with the mature uṣūl tradition, including the Ḥanafī
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school.723 Although several passages in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, including the introduction to
ā al-Qurʾān, suggest the existence of jurists who did not privilege the ẓāhir, theirs
was never a widely-held position.724 Within the mature Ḥanafī tradition, the term ẓāhir
would also take on an additional meaning as part of the eight-part scale designating the
clarity and ambiguity of terms, already discussed above.725 Of the four terms indicating
degrees of clarity, ẓāhir represents the weakest claim: a ẓāhir term has a meaning that is
immediately grasped by the hearer, but is nonetheless subject to diversion from that
meaning if other evidence so indicates.726
While this definition bears an obvious similarity to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s claim that jurists
must not depart from the ẓāhir without evidence, later legal theorists understand ẓāhir as
a quality of clarity present in some, but not all, words. In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī frames ẓāhir
as part of an interpretive practice—jurists should choose to privilege the ẓāhir meaning of
a text because of what we know about the nature of God’s communication with humans
and because of the example of the Companions. For al-Ṭaḥāwī, all revealed texts can be
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read according to their ẓāhir, although not every text has a bāṭin. In his understanding of
ẓāhir and bāṭin, al-Ṭaḥāwī shows no hints of moving toward later uṣūl theories, unlike
some other areas of his hermeneutics addressed in this chapter.

ʿĀmm and Khāṣṣ (Unrestricted and Restricted Meaning)
In the final and shortest section of the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān, al-

Ṭaḥāwī argues for the obligation to interpret Qurʾānic verses according to their broadest
meaning ( a luhā ʿalā ʿu ū ihā) and establishes the opposition between unrestricted
(ʿāmm) and restricted ( hāṣṣ) readings of texts. In mature legal theory, ʿāmm and hāṣṣ
would be understood as properties inhering in words by virtue of their linguistic form.
For instance, nouns prefaced by the definite article were held to be ʿāmm, that is, to
designate all members of their class in the absence of other evidence restricting their
application.727 This linguistic understanding of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ is found already in alJaṣṣāṣ’s Fuṣūl, which dedicates nearly one hundred pages to detailing the linguistic forms
of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ, establishing the types of contextual evidence that may cause an
apparently ʿāmm term to have a hāṣṣ meaning, and exploring various epistemological
and theological questions related to reliance on ʿāmm and hāṣṣ in formulating the law.728
Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not share later theorists’ understanding of the terms ʿāmm and
hāṣṣ as linguistic features of words, however. Nor does his usage of the terms ʿāmm and
727
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hāṣṣ resemble that of Abū Ḥanīfa and other early Ḥanafīs, who employed the term to
designate the closeness of the match between a word and its intended referent.729 Instead,
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s theory of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ most closely resembles that of al-Shāfiʿī and his
student al-Muzanī. For them, all legal texts are originally unrestricted, and some are then
shown to be restricted by virtue of another text indicating that the original, unrestricted
meaning is not the intended one.730 Vishanoff has noted the similarity between alShāfiʿī’s and al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ, arguing that al-Ṭaḥāwī “employed alShāfiʿī’s distinction between general and particular texts.”731
While al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ṭaḥāwī both understand ʿāmm and hāṣṣ as terms
designating how legal sources act upon each other, however, the concepts do subtly
different work in al-Shāfiʿī’s Risāla and in the introduction to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s

ā al-

Qurʾān. In the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī writes that it is “in the nature of God’s language that it
can be used to address people in a way that seems unrestricted with a readily apparent
meaning that is in fact intended as unrestricted and in its apparent sense.”732 He goes on
to list three more varieties of divine speech: language that seems unrestricted but
combines restricted and unrestricted elements; language that seems unrestricted but is
actually intended as restricted; and language whose actual meaning is shown by context
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to be completely different from its apparent meaning. Al-Shāfiʿī’s argument that all legal
texts initially appear unrestricted is thus a linguistic claim based on the observable
features of “the nature of God’s language.” That al-Shāfiʿī considers unrestrictedness a
natural and obvious feature of divine language is confirmed in the following chapters,
where he illustrates each type of divine speech listed above by citing relevant Qurʾānic
verses. Although he explains the way in which restrictedness enters into some categories,
he accepts as obvious that the apparent meaning of each verse is unrestricted.
In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī dedicates the two paragraphs on ʿāmm and hāṣṣ in the
introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān to arguing for the priority of unrestricted readings, not

as a natural feature of the language, but instead as a hermeneutical claim about the role of
the jurist in interpreting divine communication. He writes:
The obligation to construe these verses according to their apparent meaning
(ẓāhir) entails the obligation to construe them according to their broadest meaning
(ʿalā ʿu ū ihā). This is so even if some scholars have held that the unrestricted
(al-ʿāmm) does not hold priority over the restricted (al- hāṣṣ) except by means of
an indication from the Book, the Sunna or consensus. We do not say that, but
instead hold that the unrestricted does have priority over the restricted.
That is because some verses are intended as unrestricted and some as restricted,
but they [i.e., the Companions] used to act upon the intention that was apparent to
them concerning the unrestricted and the restricted before they had received
instruction (tawqīf). Restricted meaning (khuṣūṣ) is not known (yūqaf ʿalayhi) by
the apparent meaning of revelation (ẓāhir al-tan īl), but is rather known by a
secondary act of instruction (tawqīf thānī) from the Prophet or from another
revealed verse indicating that.
What we have said proves that the duty in this is to employ verses according to
their unrestricted meaning. That is better than employing them according to their
restricted meaning, until it is known that God intended something else.733
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For al-Ṭaḥāwī, it is not immediately obvious that all legal texts are unrestricted in the
absence of other evidence. He recognizes that texts may be read in a restricted or
unrestricted manner independent of other texts, and he alludes to other jurists who give
priority to a restricted reading. To support his argument that jurists should favor the
unrestricted meaning, he makes three interconnected claims. First, the priority of the
ʿāmm is entailed by the priority of the ẓāhir. Second, the Companions used to act upon
the ʿāmm meaning before receiving instruction from the Prophet (tawqīf), implying that
acting upon the ʿāmm does not require tawqīf. Third, restricted meaning can only be
known through an act of tawqīf.
In claiming that hāṣṣ readings require tawqīf while ʿāmm readings do not, alṬaḥāwī is not arguing that divine language naturally appears unrestricted. Instead, he is
looking to the example of the Companions to determine the best hermeneutical approach
to language that might be read as either ʿāmm or hāṣṣ. By using the example of the
Companions’ actions previous to receiving tawqīf, al-Ṭaḥāwī again emphasizes his
concept of divine-human communication as an unfolding process in which God does not
always choose to reveal His intent immediately. As we saw in the earlier discussions of
mu kam: utashābih and ẓāhir:bāṭin, al-Ṭaḥāwī is primarily concerned in the
introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān with portraying jurists as the successors to the

Companions, tasked with knowing how to act upon texts that do not always reveal their
own intent.
Read in context, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s claim that the priority of the ẓāhir entails the priority
of the ʿāmm is also an argument about following the example of the Companions rather
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than a claim about the nature of divine speech.734 Immediately prior to his discussion of
ʿāmm and hāṣṣ, al-Ṭaḥāwī gives the example of how a number of Companions reacted
to the prohibition on grape wine (khamr) by destroying all varieties of wine before they
had received instruction from the Prophet (tawqīf) concerning what was meant by khamr.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that the Prophet’s failure to chastise them for acting upon what they
perceived as the apparent meaning of the verse indicates that it is correct to act upon an
apparent meaning, even though the true meaning (bāṭin) might be different.735 He then
immediately observes that the priority of the ẓāhir indicates the priority of the ʿāmm,
apparently referring to the fact that many Companions perceived the prohibition on
khamr as a broad prohibition on all wine; that is, they understood the ẓāhir meaning of
khamr to be ʿāmm.736 In both his discussion of ẓāhir:bāṭin and his discussion of
ʿāmm: hāṣṣ, then, al-Ṭaḥāwī is concerned not with describing the natural features of
language, but with establishing hermeneutical approaches based on following the
example of the Companions.

ʿĀ

and Khāṣṣ in al-Ṭa āwī’s Her eneutical rgu ents
We have seen above that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussion of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ in the

introduction to
734

ā al-Qurʾān is first and foremost an argument for the duty to
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construe revealed texts broadly in cases in which they do not unambiguously convey
God’s intent. The concept of restricted and unrestricted meaning likewise plays a major
role within the body of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works, where terms from the roots ʿm-m and kh-ṣ-ṣ—including ʿamma, ʿāmm, ʿu ū , khaṣṣa, hāṣṣ and khuṣūṣ—appear
hundreds of times. Although al-Ṭaḥāwī clearly uses ʿāmm and hāṣṣ as technical terms in
the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān, his usage of them elsewhere is somewhat

inconsistent. When discussing whether a rule applies to an entire class, al-Ṭaḥāwī
sometimes replaces the terms ʿāmm and hāṣṣ with the pair kull (all) and baʿḍ (some). In
other cases, he pairs the terms ʿā

:baʿḍ and ull: hāṣṣ or shifts between terms within a

single passage.737 Despite this linguistic variability, al-Ṭaḥāwī consistently employs
derivatives of the roots ʿ-m-m and kh-ṣ-ṣ within the body of his hermeneutical works
when making abstract theoretical statements about restricted and unrestricted meanings,
confirming that ʿāmm and hāṣṣ do represent technical terms for him.738
Appeals to ʿāmm and hāṣṣ take two major forms within the body of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
hermeneutical works. In the first, al-Ṭaḥāwī reasserts the rule established in the
introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān: jurists should construe texts broadly in the absence of

evidence indicating that their true meaning is restricted ( hāṣṣ). This assertion appears in
polemical contexts where al-Ṭaḥāwī disagrees with another jurist’s restricted reading of a
text, such as Mālik and al-Shaybānī’s claim that a rule about leading congregational
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prayer while sitting applies only to Muḥammad, or the claim that the hides of predatory
animals represent an exception to the rule that all tanned hides are ritually pure.739
In these and other passages, al-Ṭaḥāwī goes beyond merely asserting that a text is
ʿāmm where others have interpreted it as hāṣṣ; instead, he portrays his opponents as
dangerously violating a foundational hermeneutical principle, and thus mistaking God’s
law. Concerning Mālik and al-Shaybānī’s stance on seated prayer leaders, al-Ṭaḥāwī
writes, “no one may restrict (yakhuṣṣ) anything from the Prophet except when it is
required by an act of instruction (tawqīf) from the Prophet to the people.”740 Similarly, he
writes concerning the hide of predatory animals that “no one may exclude anything from
what God’s Messenger has generalized (ʿamma) except in response to that which requires
its exclusion: a Qurʾānic verse, a transmitted Sunna or the consensus of the scholars.”741
Al-Ṭaḥāwī thus portrays his opponents as departing from the hermeneutical model
established in the introduction to

ā al-Qurʾān and as setting themselves up as

lawmakers in opposition to the intentions of God and His Prophet.
In the second and far more prevalent type of appeal to ʿāmm and hāṣṣ, al-Ṭaḥāwī
claims that evidence does exist to support a restricted ( hāṣṣ) reading of an apparently
unrestricted (ʿāmm) text. Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ṭaḥāwī regularly argues that an apparently
unrestricted legal rule established in the Qurʾān is in fact shown to be restricted by a
Prophetic Sunna.742 For example, al-Ṭaḥāwī notes that Q 62/Al-Jumʿa:9 (“O you who
believe, when proclamation is made for prayer on the day of assembly, hasten to
739
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remembrance of God and leave [your] trading”) is apparently unrestricted in its wording
(ẓāhir [al-khiṭāb] ʿalā al-ʿu ū ), such that all believers are included within the scope of
the verse. However, a Prophetic Sunna clarified that women, slaves, travelers and certain
other groups are not required to attend congregational prayer. Therefore, they are not
among those addressed in the verse.743
For both al-Ṭaḥāwī and al-Shāfiʿī, the ʿā

: hāṣṣ rubric serves as a crucial tool

for harmonizing apparently contradictory revealed texts. In claiming that the true scope
of reference of one text is revealed by means of another text, they affirm that both texts
remain fully legally effective—God has merely chosen to make His intent clear through
the interaction of two texts, rather than through a single act of revelation. It is in this
sense that Vishanoff is correct in arguing that al-Ṭaḥāwī “employed al-Shāfiʿī’s
distinction between general and particular texts.”744 Vishanoff rightly places al-Ṭaḥāwī in
a scholarly genealogy with al-Shāfiʿī in his treatment of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ, a genealogy to
which we must add al-Ṭaḥāwī’s teacher al-Muzanī.
In contrast, the classical Ḥanafī understanding of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ developed as
part of a competing scholarly genealogy originating in the opposition of the proto-Ḥanafī
ʿĪsā ibn Abān (d. 221/836) to al-Shāfiʿī’s approach to ʿāmm and hāṣṣ. Where al-Shāfiʿī
used the ʿā

: hāṣṣ rubric to preserve the legal effectiveness of both texts in cases of

apparent contradiction, Ibn Abān set stringent limits on particularization and instead often
resorted to discarding Prophetic adīths in apparent conflict with other revealed texts. He
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was later followed by al-Karkhī (d. 340/952) and al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/981), although alJaṣṣāṣ modified the earlier Ḥanafīs’ restrictions on particularization to such an extent that
it functioned almost as flexibly as al-Shāfiʿī’s model.745 That al-Ṭaḥāwī followed alShāfiʿī in his liberal use of particularization as a harmonization tool, rather than the more
restrictive approach of his Ḥanafī predecessor ʿĪsā Ibn Abān, is fully consistent with his
role as the first major Ḥanafī adīth harmonizer.
While Vishanoff is thus correct in identifying the crucial link between
harmonization and the ʿā

: hāṣṣ rubric for both al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ṭaḥāwī, the two

jurists differ substantially in other aspects of their approach to ʿāmm and hāṣṣ. As
discussed above, al-Shāfiʿī understands the presumptive unrestricted nature of revealed
texts as a natural feature of Arabic, while al-Ṭaḥāwī portrays it as a hermeneutical
principle known from the actions of the Companions. Further, al-Shāfiʿī’s law-related
examples of the ʿā

: hāṣṣ rubric all concern the interaction of multiple texts, almost

always a Prophetic Sunna that indicates a restricted meaning for an apparently
unrestricted Qurʾānic verse.746 For al-Shāfiʿī, particularization is one manifestation of the
Sunna’s role in explaining the Qurʾān.
In contrast, while al-Ṭaḥāwī often invokes the ʿāmm: hāṣṣ rubric to address
Qurʾān-Sunna interactions, he equally envisions particularization between two Qurʾānic
texts or two Prophetic adīths.747 Here, as in all other areas of his hermeneutics, alṬaḥāwī’s theory of how revealed texts act upon each other is source-neutral: none of alṬaḥāwī’s harmonization techniques distinguish between the functions of Qurʾān and
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Sunna, in keeping with his understanding of the Qurʾān and Sunna as nearly equal and
not always entirely ontologically distinct sources.748 Further, the range of hermeneutical
procedures that al-Ṭaḥāwī invokes using the language of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ is much
broader than that envisioned by al-Shāfiʿī, for whom law-related examples of ʿāmm and
hāṣṣ exclusively relate to the interaction between two revealed texts. At different times,
al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that an apparently unrestricted text may be known to be restricted
through consensus, analogy or the practice of a Companion.749

Hints of a Formalist Understanding of ʿĀ

and Khāṣṣ

Among the most crucial developments marking the transition from the formative
period of Islamic legal theory to the mature uṣūl tradition was a movement toward legal
formalism, the claim that language fully encodes meaning.750 Although the uṣūl tradition
never committed itself to an exclusively formalist hermeneutic, even the earliest
preserved uṣūl works from the second half of the 4th/10th century display a concern with
establishing the meaning and legal force of certain particles and grammatical forms.751
The identification of linguistic forms associated with general and particular meaning
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(ṣiyagh al-ʿu ū wa-l-khuṣūṣ) represents one of the major areas in which legal theorists
sought to correlate meaning to grammatical form.
We have seen above that al-Ṭaḥāwī overwhelmingly portrays the presumption of
unrestricted meaning as a hermeneutical principle based on Companion precedent, rather
than as a linguistic feature of particular words. Three passages of Shar mushkil al-āthār,
however, discuss the scope of terms in ways that prefigure the mature uṣūl tradition’s
understanding of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ. In the first example, al-Ṭaḥāwī analyzes a Qurʾānic
verse implying that apes and pigs are the descendants of Jews whom God transfigured
into animals as a punishment for their disobedience. The verse is in apparent
contradiction with a Prophetic adīth stating that transfigured animals do not reproduce.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s unnamed interlocutor argues that the use of the definite ( aʿrifa) in
connection Q 5/al-Māʾida:60 (“He made of them apes (al-qirada) and pigs (alhanā īr)”) indicates that the verse is talking about the apes and pigs known in his day—
that is, the entire class of apes and pigs. If the verse were discussing a limited set of apes
and pigs, it would have used the indefinite (nakira).752
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s response does not directly engage with his interlocutor’s linguistic
argument. Instead, he argues that the apparently conflicting texts can be harmonized by
positing that God first created apes and pigs (al-qirada wa-l- hanā īr) when He created
other creatures, then later transfigured a disobedient Jewish community into apes and
pigs (al-qirada wa-l- hanā īr). As indicated by the Prophetic adīth, the transfigured
animals did not reproduce; the apes and pigs known in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s day are the
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descendants of non-transfigured animals.753 Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not comment on
his opponent’s assertion that the presence of the definite article indicates all apes and
pigs, his own use of the definite article in referring both to the apes and pigs present in
his own day and to the subset of transfigured animals suggests that he does not accept his
interlocutor’s identification of definite plural nouns with general reference.
The second example explains the obscure Prophetic adīth, “The infidel eats into
seven guts, while the believer eats into a single gut.” Al-Ṭaḥāwī understands this adīth
as an observation about the behavior of a single individual, rather than a commentary on
believers and infidels in general. He offers three arguments in support of his position.
First, we know that some believers eat a great deal, while some infidels eat very little,
and so this adīth is not an accurate description of reality if construed to refer to all
infidels and all believers.754 Second, more extended versions of the adīth clarify that the
Prophet was speaking about a certain gluttonous infidel who began to eat more
moderately after converting to Islam.755
As his final argument, al-Ṭaḥāwī observes that the expression used to refer to the
believer and infidel is grammatically definite (al-makhraj makhraj al- aʿrifa), indicating
that only a single individual was intended. In support he adduces Q 94/Al-Sharḥ:5 (“With
the hardship there is ease”) as an example of another verse in which a singular definite
noun refers to a single instance of the noun.756 He continues
What we said above holds true for everything whose expression is definite, unless
it contains some indication (dalāla) that the intended meaning is more than one
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individual. In that case it is diverted to that [intent], and its value ( ukm) is that of
the indefinite (nakira). An example of this is Q 103/al-ʿAṣr:1-3 (“By the
afternoon, man (al-insān) is indeed in a state of loss – Though that will not be the
case with those who believe and do good works”). It is known by this that the
class (al-jins), not the individual (al-insān al-wā id), was intended.757
Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues here that, as a general rule, a singular definite noun should be
understood as referring to a single individual. However, the presence of the relative
pronoun “those” (alladhīna) within the same verse referring back to al-insān makes it
clear that the intent here is the entire class of humans. At the same time, he intimates in
his passing reference to the “value of the indefinite” ( ukm al-nakira) that plural
indefinite nouns refer generally to all members of their class.
This chapter thus contains two prescriptive interpretive rules based on the
grammatical properties of nouns, while the previous example implied al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
rejection of another grammar-based interpretive rule suggested by his interlocutor.
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does not employ any terms derived from the roots ʿ-m-m or kh-ṣ-ṣ
when stating these interpretive rules, his discussions of the relationship between the use
of the definite article and the scope of reference of a noun clearly map onto mature uṣūl
debates identifying the linguistic forms that indicate general and restricted meanings
(ṣiyagh al-ʿu ū wa-l-khuṣūṣ).
In contrast, in the third and final example al-Ṭaḥāwī does employ a derivative of
the root ʿ-m-m when discussing the relationship between the definite article and the scope
of reference of a noun. In this passage al-Ṭaḥāwī rejects Saʿīd ibn al-Musayyab’s claim
that hiba, a form of marriage in which a woman offers herself to a man, was permissible
only for the Prophet. As evidence, he examines the language of a Companion adīth in
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which ʿĀʾisha exclaims, “doesn’t a woman feel ashamed to present herself to a man
without a dowry?” Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that
[ʿĀʾisha] did not intend that man to be the Prophet, but rather included (ʿammat
bihi) all men (al-rijāl). That is because her expression was grammatically
indefinite (kharaja min-hā a hraj al-nakira), and the indefinite includes
everyone in its scope (al-na ira taʿa u al-nās ja īʿan).758
Here al-Ṭaḥāwī reaffirms the prescriptive interpretive rule established in the previous
example: indefinite nouns include all members of their class. He states this rule using the
verb ʿamma (to include, comprise). This usage appears non-technical, in contrast to alṬaḥāwī’s fairly consistent use of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ as technical terms referring to the
meaning, rather than the grammatical form, of a revealed text, as discussed in the
previous section of this chapter.
Nonetheless, the appearance of these linguistic discussions in Shar mushkil alāthār represents a significant departure from al-Shāfiʿī and al-Ṭaḥāwī’s teacher alMuzanī, who did not employ technical terminology from the field of Arabic grammar in
their discussions of hermeneutics. Further, these chapters may reveal an important stage
in the transition between the formative understanding of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ as a
hermeneutical procedure in which texts act upon each other, and the mature uṣūl
conception of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ as linguistic properties of words. Given that al-Ṭaḥāwī
introduces these grammar-based interpretive principles without using the technical terms
ʿāmm and hāṣṣ, and further that his own conception of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ is not based on
linguistic form, it seems plausible that the linguistic forms theorists label ʿāmm and hāṣṣ
were in fact originally debated independently of the ʿāmm: hāṣṣ umbrella, and only later
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subsumed under it. That is, al-Ṭaḥāwī may represent a period in which jurists were
debating implications of linguistic form for determining meaning, but the rules they
proposed were not yet firmly associated with the grammatical language of ʿāmm and
hāṣṣ.
Further, in affirming the unrestrictedness of indefinite nouns, al-Ṭaḥāwī is in
agreement with the later uṣūl tradition. However, he opposes later jurists both in his
rejection of the claim that definite plural nouns refer to all members of their class and in
his own assertion that definite singular nouns refer to a single individual.759 The
explanation for these discrepancies may lie in the diverging goals of al-Ṭaḥāwī and later
theorists. For legal theorists, the assertion that many linguistic forms indicate generality
in the absence of other evidence functions to maximize the legal effects of revealed texts.
Further, uṣūl texts are more interested in showing that language has a systematic structure
than in individual problems of legal interpretation. In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s task in Shar
mushkil al-āthār is the harmonization of specific texts, which he often achieves by
restricting the meaning of a problematic term to a single individual. For his purposes, it is
not useful a priori to assign unrestricted meaning to the maximum number of classes of
nouns, because his harmonization efforts require considerable interpretive flexibility.

Other Evidence for Legal Formalism: Amr and Nahy (Command and Prohibition)
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument for the priority of unrestricted meaning concludes his
presentation of a hermeneutical framework for jurists in the introduction to

ā al-

Qurʾān. In what remains of this chapter, I will further address two issues raised by my
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discussion above: 1) evidence for legal formalism in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought beyond the
examples considered already concerning the scope of nouns; and 2) the relationship
between equivocal ( utashābih) texts, Prophetic tawqīf (instruction) and ijtihād (legal
interpretation).
I observed above that a movement toward legal formalism was one of the most
crucial developments marking the transition between formative and post-formative legal
theory. Authors of mature uṣūl works dedicate considerable space to determining the
relationship between different types of linguistic forms (ṣiyagh, sing. ṣīgha) and meaning.
Above, we considered evidence for al-Ṭaḥāwī’s early movement toward a linguistic
understanding of ʿāmm and hāṣṣ, a major topic of formalist debate in later theory works.
In addition, legal theorists devoted particular attention to the imperative as the sole or
most characteristic grammatical form encoding the divine commands and prohibitions
that constitute Islamic law. Because of the importance of command and prohibition in
later uṣūl works, I examine al-Ṭaḥāwī’s approach to this topic to determine the extent to
which he is moving toward the formalist conception characteristic of later theorists.
Already in al-Jaṣṣāṣ’s Fuṣūl we find an extended theoretical consideration of the
imperative. There is a useful ambiguity for jurists in the Arabic terms related to command
and prohibition; amr can mean both command and imperative, while nahy means both
prohibition and negative imperative. Like later theorists, al-Jaṣṣāṣ addresses a variety of
issues arising from the identification of God’s commands with the imperative form,
including the range of observed meanings of the imperative; its literal meaning; whether
the term amr can properly be applied to an inferior speaking to a superior; whether a
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command must be performed immediately or may be delayed; whether the commanded
action must be performed repeatedly; what is required when a command suggests a
choice of actions; whether a repeated command must be performed repeatedly; whether
non-believers are legally responsible for performing commanded actions; and whether
prohibited actions may still be legally effective.760
In contrast, while jurists of the formative period understood scriptural commands
and prohibitions to be the foundation of the law, they were concerned with the meaning
rather than the grammatical form of God’s commands. In the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī sets out a
two-part theory of nahy that distinguishes between broad prohibitions which may have
narrow exceptions indicated elsewhere in revelation, and more limited prohibitions
establishing restrictions on otherwise permitted activities.761 The discussion of nahy is
framed as a problem specific to interpreting adīth; Lowry argues that al-Shāfiʿī’s major
concern is harmonizing apparently conflicting divine commands.762 His student alMuzanī offers a considerably more complex categorization of both amr and nahy in his
Kitāb al-Amr wa-l-nahy. In addition to arguing that commands and prohibitions may be
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restricted or unrestricted in both Qurʾān and Sunna, he also notes that commands may
indicate mere permission, while prohibitions may signify discouragement.763
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī was the student of al-Muzanī before he affiliated himself
with the Ḥanafīs, he neither addresses amr and nahy in the theoretical introductions to his
extant works nor offers anything approaching the complex interaction of sources and
hermeneutical rubrics envisioned by al-Muzanī. Where al-Ṭaḥāwī does offer brief
theoretical statements about amr and nahy in the course of discussing discrete legal
questions, his ideas anticipate the treatment of amr and nahy in mature legal theory much
more than they resemble those of his predecessors al-Muzanī or al-Shāfiʿī. While I will
argue that al-Ṭaḥāwī is not committed to a formalist understanding of amr and nahy in
which meaning is determined by grammar, his discussion suggests that formalist ideas
were in circulation in his time.
Perhaps the most important difference between al-Muzanī and al-Ṭaḥāwī is that
al-Ṭaḥāwī explicitly identifies commands and prohibitions with the grammatical
imperative. In two chapters of Shar mushkil al-āthār and one chapter of

ā al-

Qurʾān, he argues that a dispute over the meaning of a Qurʾānic verse or a adīth hinges
on whether a certain verb is understood as a divine command or a simple declaration, a
distinction which is known through the use of the jussive (maj ū ) to indicate an
imperative or the indicative ( arfūʿ) to show predication.764 The apparent meaning
(ẓāhir) of a jussive verb, we learn, is a command, an argument al-Ṭaḥāwī supports by
citing two Qurʾānic verses employing the imperative: Q 96/al-ʿAlaq:19 (“Do not obey
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him (lā tuṭiʿhu), but prostrate yourself and draw near”) and Q 76/al-Insāna:24 (“Do not
obey (lā tuṭiʿ) any ungrateful one or any sinner among them”). 765
Interestingly, both verses in fact concern negative imperatives, or prohibitions,
and yet al-Ṭaḥāwī labels them amr, a term generally translated as command. Likewise,
the disputed adīths and Qurʾānic verse in the chapters under discussion also concern
negative imperatives, which al-Ṭaḥāwī again labels amr. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s consistent use of
the term amr to indicate imperatives and negative imperatives as well as commands and
prohibitions in these passages suggests that he is using the term to designate the
grammatical category of jussive verbs, rather than simply referring to the functions of
commanding and prohibiting. That is, for al-Ṭaḥāwī, meaning has become linked to
grammatical form.
However, while al-Ṭaḥāwī may conceive of divine commands and prohibitions in
terms of their grammatical form, grammar does not provide sufficient information to
determine meaning. Like al-Muzanī, al-Ṭaḥāwī recognizes that amr does not always
indicate absolute obligation. In

ā al-Qurʾān, al-Ṭaḥāwī presents a tripartite typology

of amr, observing that God’s commands may indicate obligation (ījāb), the
recommendation and urging of pious acts (al-nadb wa-l- aḍḍ ʿalā al-khayr) or the
permissibility of something that had previously been prohibited (ibā at ā qad āna
aẓarahu qabla dhāli a). Each of the three possibilities is followed by two Qurʾānic
proof texts illustrating the relevant use of the imperative.766 In other chapters, al-Ṭaḥāwī
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discusses an additional possible meaning of the imperative: the threat whose apparent
meaning (ẓāhir) is a command (amr) and whose true meaning (bāṭin) is a prohibition
(nahy).767 Similarly, he analyzes Q 17/al-Isrāʾ:64 (“And startle with your voice any of
them you can”) by stating that “its linguistic form (lafẓ) is the form of a command, and its
true meaning is a prohibition and a threat.”768 Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of the term lafẓ (linguistic
form) in this passage anticipates later theorists’ emphasis on the lafẓ or ṣīgha (wording)
of particular grammatical forms and provides further evidence that al-Ṭaḥāwī understands
amr to be a grammatical, and not a purely semantic, phenomenon.769
Like al-Ṭaḥāwī, theorists of the mature uṣūl tradition would discuss a range of
possible meanings of the imperative. In addition to the four possibilities envisioned by alṬaḥāwī in his hermeneutical works, al-Jaṣṣāṣ argues that the imperative can express
guidance (irshād) or a rebuke and assertion of powerlessness (al-taqrīʿ wa-l-taʿjī ).770
Unlike al-Ṭaḥāwī, however, jurists of the mature uṣūl tradition were concerned with
establishing a baseline meaning of amr in a way that would allow them confidently to
(“Such of those whom your right hands possess who seek the document, write it for them ( ātibūhu ) if
you know some good in them”) and Q 24/al-Nūr:32 (“Marry off (anki ū) the unmarried among you and the
righteous among your male and female slaves”); for the imperative indicating permission for previously
prohibited acts, he adduces Q 62/al-Jumʿa:10 (“And when the prayer is ended, disperse (intashirū) in the
land and seek (abtaghū) some of God’s bounty”) and Q 5/al-Māʾida:2 (“When you leave the pilgrim state,
then hunt (aṣṭādū)”) (
ā , 1.184-185).
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derive law from scripture. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, citing al-Karkhī, argues that the literal meaning of
amr is obligation, and other meanings are figurative ( ajā ). His argument is based on
linguistic and rational considerations: every language must have a linguistic form (ṣīgha)
originally coined for designating obligation, just as it must have forms to designate
predication (khabar), interrogatives (isti hbār), and generality (ʿu ū ).771 His claim that
the only literal meaning of amr is obligation would become the majority position of the
Ḥanafī school. Other jurists argued that recommendation or permission was the primary
meaning of amr, that amr had multiple primary meanings, or that it was not possible to
know the primary meaning of amr, a position labeled waqf (hesitation).772
Like later theorists who held that it is not possible to know the primary meaning
of amr, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not indicate a literal meaning for the imperative in his extant
works. However, where jurists of the mature uṣūl tradition arrived at waqf as the result of
theological, pragmatic or linguistic considerations that prevented them from assigning a
primary meaning,773 al-Ṭaḥāwī does not attempt to establish one. The question does not
appear to be pressing for him in the way it would be for later jurists, suggesting that for
al-Ṭaḥāwī, the association of the imperative with a command had not yet resulted in the
formalist conviction that grammar should be fully determinative of meaning.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī does appear to be familiar with the concept of exclusively associating
amr with obligation, however; in several passages he feels it necessary to state that amr
can have meanings other than obligation. In these passages, as in those discussed above,
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al-Ṭaḥāwī’s evidence consists solely of Qurʾānic verses which he holds self-evidently use
amr to express a meaning other than obligation.774 However, it is not clear whether he is
countering other jurists who were already arguing in his time that the primary meaning of
amr is obligation, or whether he is merely addressing general perceptions about the use of
amr that do not yet rise to the level of a clearly articulated legal formalism. In either case,
it is clear that al-Ṭaḥāwī was not constrained by the formalist assumption that grammar
should or could be fully determinative of meaning, an assumption that underlies
discussions of the meaning of amr in mature uṣūl works, whether jurists were able to
arrive at a primary meaning for the term or not.
Beyond considering the range of possible meanings of the grammatical amr, alṬaḥāwī does not address any of the other issues concerning amr that were so pressing for
later theorists.775 The only related theoretical questions he treats concern the relationship
between commands, legal responsibility and the consequences of actions: he argues that
it is permitted to disobey God’s command if obeying will lead to doing something
prohibited, and that, while God’s prohibitions are absolute, His commands are dependent
on the capacity of legal actors to obey.776 These questions concern theology rather than
the derivation of law from language.777
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To some extent, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s disinterest in establishing formalist rules for the legal
effects of the imperative must be understood as a consequence of his orientation toward
practical hermeneutics. Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ṭaḥāwī is primarily concerned with
demonstrating that texts of revelation, including those containing commands and
prohibitions, are not in conflict with each other. While formalist discussions of
grammatical forms and particles in legal theory texts make a strong theological claim that
God’s will is knowable through the medium of language, such rules are likely to be less
useful for a jurist engaged in removing apparent contradictions from texts, an enterprise
where considerable interpretive flexibility is called for. The theory construction of the
legal theorists has different requirements than practical exercises in interpretation, even if
exercises such as those of al-Ṭaḥāwī reveal an underlying theory. It is thus important to
note that in every case cited above in which al-Ṭaḥāwī discusses the possible meanings of
the imperative, he does so not in order to establish a primary meaning, as would later
jurists, but in order to claim interpretive flexibility. Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that the imperative
has more meanings than simply obligation, and so his interpretation of the text is not in
fact constrained by grammar.

nahy (narrow prohibitions on generally permissible activities) in that they tend to concern matters of
etiquette. Al-Shāfiʿī views the contravention of such prohibitions as a lesser transgression than violating the
first category of prohibition, but still a sin (see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 136). In contrast, alṬaḥāwī appears to categorize such prohibitions as forming part of the body of Prophetic statements that do
not constitute revelation, a topic discussed in Chapter One, “Qurʾān and Sunna.” Concerning the selling of
dogs, he suggests that the Prophet’s prohibition may not mean that this action is prohibited in the way that
things are prohibited in the Sharīʿa ( arā a-l-ashyāʾ al-mu rama bi-l-sharīʿa), suggesting that not all of
the Prophet’s prohibitions fall within the scope of religious law (Mushkil, 12.77). In another chapter, he
argues that the Prophet’s nahy on giving unequal gifts to one’s children was merely by way of advice
(mashwara). Thus, al-Ṭaḥāwī appears to classify this form of nahy as falling outside the scope of
revelation, where al-Shāfiʿī views it as fully within religious law.
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Ijtihād (Legal Reasoning)
In the preceding sections we have been concerned with unrestricted and restricted
meaning (ʿāmm: hāṣṣ) as well as apparent and non-apparent meaning (ẓāhir:bāṭin), two
rubrics which the introduction to A ā al-Qurʾān portrays as crucial for understanding
equivocal ( utashābih) texts. As mentioned previously, however, a chapter of Shar
mushkil al-āthār also explicitly connects the interpretation of equivocal texts to a third
hermeneutical procedure: ijtihād al-raʾy (legal reasoning). In this chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī is
asked by an unnamed interlocutor whether the existence of utashābih texts prevents
judges from ruling on the matters contained in them. Al-Ṭaḥāwī replies:
Our answer is that it is incumbent upon judges to engage in legal reasoning
(ijtihād raʾyihi ) and then to rule based on the results of that reasoning, as God’s
Messenger commanded them.
In illustration of this command, al-Ṭaḥāwī adduces a Prophetic adīth stating that judges
receive two rewards if they reach the objectively correct answer (ṣawāb) through their
ijtihād, but still receive one reward if they engage in legal reasoning but fail to reach the
objectively correct answer. Al-Ṭaḥāwī continues:

This indicates that judges have a duty to use legal reasoning in their rulings, and
that legal reasoning might reach either an objectively correct answer (ṣawāb) or
an objectively incorrect answer (khaṭaʾ). They are not charged (yu allafū) with
reaching an objectively correct answer, but are rather charged with engaging in
legal reasoning.778
The effect of this discussion is to draw a direct connection between the role of jurists and
God’s division of revelation into the equivocal and unequivocal. In addition, it limits the
scope of a jurist’s legal reasoning to a subset of revealed texts—those that are equivocal.
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī also addresses ijtihād in a number of other passages of Shar mushkil
al-āthār and Shar

aʿānī al-āthār, albeit without using the language of mu kam and

utashābih. Instead, he frequently sets up a dichotomy between ijtihād and tawqīf
(instruction). This term, which we have already encountered in Chapter Two,
“Companion and Successor Ḥadīths,” is closely related to the mu kam: utashābih
dichotomy. When God expresses His intention fully in a revealed text, it is mu kam; all
other revealed texts are utashābih. Mutashābih texts may then be further subdivided
into two categories: those in which God’s intentions can only be known through a
subsequent tawqīf, and those concerning which jurists may exercise their ijtihād. As we
saw above, al-Ṭaḥāwī holds that an occurrence of tawqīf may be known or inferred from
a variety of sources, including a Qurʾānic verse, a Prophetic adīth, scholarly consensus,
scholarly practice, or the opinion of a Companion or Successor on matters where ijtihād
would be inappropriate.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that ijtihād is permissible not only in cases where no tawqīf
exists,779 but also when an individual jurist is simply unaware of its existence, usually
because he does not know of a certain Prophetic adīth.780 He emphasizes, however, that
tawqīf is superior to ijtihād, and that the results of ijtihād must be abandoned if its
practitioner subsequently learns of a relevant instance of tawqīf.781 While mu kam and
tawqīf are closely related ideas, they are also distinct in an important way. As we saw in
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the first section of this chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī understands mu kam as a description of God’s
use of language, and whether or not that language conveys God’s intent. In contrast,
tawqīf refers merely to the act of instruction—that is, to the existence of revelation
concerning a certain matter—without making any claims about language, signification, or
intent. In addition, there is an important structural difference between mu kam and
tawqīf: mu kam implies a single text, while tawqīf requires one text (or other form of
revelational authority) to act upon another.
Despite these differences, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s division of Qurʾānic verses and Prophetic
adīths into mu kam texts whose meaning God has made clear and utashābih texts
which must be interpreted through legal reasoning, is echoed by his two-tiered system of
authority for Prophetic adīths, post-Prophetic adīths, and consensus based upon
whether he holds them to represent revelatory instruction or juristic legal reasoning.
Together, these two dichotomies form a binary structure of the law that cuts across
traditional categories of legal sources. At its heart, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s binary vision of the law is
concerned with defining the role of jurists and delimiting the permissible scope of legal
reasoning by claiming that some areas of the law and texts of revelation simply are not
subject to juristic reasoning.
In all of his discussions of ijtihād, al-Ṭaḥāwī consistently emphasizes the same
ideas that we have already encountered in the passage from al-Mukhtaṣar analyzed above
concerning judges’ use of ijtihād. There, he asserted both that there is an objectively
correct answer to every legal question, and that jurists’ ijtihād is praiseworthy regardless
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of whether they reach that objectively correct answer.782 Versions of this argument
appear in every passage in which al-Ṭaḥāwī addresses ijtihād, suggesting that it
represents an important polemical concern for him.783 Indeed, this dispute gives rise to
one of the very few occasions on which al-Ṭaḥāwī directly names an opponent on a
question of legal theory. After stating his own theory of ijtihād, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes:
Others have exceeded the proper bounds and claimed that anyone who possesses
the tools of ijtihād and rules according to them will reach the truth that would
have been stated by the Qurʾān, were there a revelation on this matter. The
proponents of this argument are refuted by undeniable evidence. One of those
who went too far in this was Ibrāhīm ibn Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUlayya.
Ibn ʿUlayya (d. 218/834) supports a strong version of juristic infallibilism—the idea that
every mujtahid is correct (kull mujtahid muṣīb).784 In Ibn ʿUlayya’s view, this principle
means that every jurist will reach the objectively correct answer. Conversely, advocates
of the strongest versions of juristic fallibilism held that jurists are not rewarded for or
justified in undertaking ijtihād when that ijtihād does not reach the objectively correct
answer. In his more moderate claim that an objectively correct answer exists, but the
782
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jurist is not tasked with finding it, al-Ṭaḥāwī upholds a doctrine associated with both alShāfiʿī and early and later Ḥanafīs.785
Surveying the discussions of ijtihād that appear in many chapters across alṬaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works, we may observe that they fall into two categories. In one
group of chapters, a Prophetic adīth bearing some connection to the concept of legal
reasoning leads al-Ṭaḥāwī to justify the practice of ijtihād. His discussion of ijtihād in
response to the Prophetic adīth about mu kam and utashābih, already discussed
above, is one example of this type of chapter.786 A similar discussion appears in response
to a Prophetic adīth stating that judges who judge based on ignorance will go to hell. An
unnamed interlocutor suggests that this adīth refutes the validity of ijtihād, but alṬaḥāwī responds that humans are not charged with more than they can achieve (lam
yu allifnā ā lā nuṭīq), and it is not possible for humans to be certain of achieving an
objectively correct answer through ijtihād. Therefore, this adīth does not threaten
hellfire for judges who employ ijtihād appropriately but fail to reach the objectively
correct answer.787 In the course of refuting his interlocutor, al-Ṭaḥāwī once again
reiterates the major points of his theory of ijtihād already encountered in the previous
example.
In contrast, in the second type of chapter on ijtihād al-Ṭaḥāwī asserts its
praiseworthiness in order to account for the actions of one or more Companions. Two
such chapters concern occasions on which Companion committed violence in apparent
direct violation of a Prophetic adīth. Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not argue that no rule existed on
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the matter, but rather that the Companions understood themselves to be employing an
appropriate form of ijtihād. Their actions should therefore be considered praiseworthy,
even though they were in fact in error.788 In the first such chapter, the Companion Usāma
ibn Zayd kills an infidel combatant despite the man’s profession of the shahāda, on the
grounds that his last-minute conversion to Islam does not lift the punishment already due
to him. The Prophet clarifies that Usāma was incorrect in his legal reasoning; however,
al-Ṭaḥāwī notes, Usāma was permitted to use his raʾy on this matter, and therefore the
Prophet did not blame him for the unjust killing.789 In the second chapter, al-Ṭaḥāwī
appeals to ijtihād in order to reconcile the intra-Muslim violence of the Battle of the
Camel with a Prophetic adīth stating that whenever one believer takes up arms against
another, both will be condemned to Hell.790 In a related example, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that
the actions of Abū Bakr and ʿUmar in a certain Companion adīth should not be taken as
binding upon later scholars, because they were merely employing ijtihād. In the absence
of a confirmatory tawqīf, their ijtihād is no more binding than that of anyone else, and so
al-Ṭaḥāwī feels himself justified in reaching a different conclusion.791
This second category of chapter on ijtihād represents a variation on al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
treatment of the Prophet’s ijtihād, analyzed at length in Chapter One, “Qurʾān and
Sunna.”792 His discussions of the ijtihād of both the Prophet and his Companions serve
two functions within his works: first, to account for otherwise inexplicable behavior
(readers will recall the Prophet’s prohibition on pollinating date palms, a predictably ill788
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advised order which he later excused by observing that he is no farmer—al-Ṭaḥāwī
explains this episode as an example of the Prophet’s permissible but ultimately
unsuccessful use of ijtihād);793 and second, to deny that a certain action constitutes a
legally binding example.794 In the latter case, appeals to ijtihād effectively serve as a
mechanism for harmonizing a Prophetic or Companion adīth with another revealed
source or with al-Ṭaḥāwī’s own understanding of the law. Although al-Ṭaḥāwī does state
more than once that ijtihād is employed in cases where nothing is found in the Qurʾān,
Sunna or consensus,795 it is notable that none of his examples of ijtihād are particularly
concerned with filling legal gaps.796 Instead, his appeals to ijtihād serve a primarily
harmonizing function.

Raʾy, Isti hrāj and Istinbāṭ (Legal Reasoning; Derivation)
The remarks above all pertain to passages in which al-Ṭaḥāwī explicitly discusses
ijtihād or ijtihād al-raʾy. I now turn to some of the more important terms and techniques
which fall under the umbrella of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s concept of ijtihād. Raʾy, isti hrāj and
istinbāṭ are three of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s most common terms for legal reasoning. In the
discussion of post-Prophetic reports in Chapter Two, “Companion and Successor
Ḥadīths,” we encountered many examples of an argument that al-Ṭaḥāwī relies upon to
expand the corpus of texts for which he may claim Prophetic authority: a certain
793
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apparently non-Prophetic statement—almost always from a Companion—must in fact
have been made on the basis of the Prophet’s tawqīf (instruction), because the statement
is not of a type that may be supported by raʾy, isti hrāj or istinbāṭ. This argument
contrasts instruction from the Prophet—a form of revelation—with human legal
interpretation. Despite his use of multiple terms for legal reasoning, however, what
concerns al-Ṭaḥāwī in this argument is not a precise technique represented by each term,
but rather the general concept of legal reasoning. This point is confirmed by the fact that
al-Ṭaḥāwī uses the three terms singly and in combination when making this argument, in
ways that are unrelated to the legal issue at hand.797
To determine the kind of legal reasoning indicated by each of these terms, then,
we must look to passages that show each functioning in context. Raʾy (legal reasoning, a
legal opinion) is by far the most common of the three terms, appearing over 150 times in
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works.798 Al-Ṭaḥāwī uses the term to denote both the act and
the end result of engaging in ijtihād.799 Its distinguishing characteristic is that its results
may be opposed by any jurist whose ijtihād leads him to a different conclusion.800 Indeed,
individual references to raʾy within al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works most often serve
the purpose of denying any binding authority to a report containing a legal rule by
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labeling it as merely one person’s conclusion. For example, al-Ṭaḥāwī regularly follows
Companion adīths with the observation that the rule stated therein is the Companion’s
raʾy.801 This claim permits al-Ṭaḥāwī to harmonize reports containing contradictory rules
by stating that one or both represent raʾy.
Although al-Ṭaḥāwī denies binding authority to earlier jurists’ raʾy, these denials
are not meant to suggest criticism of raʾy or its practitioners. During the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th
centuries, the term raʾy had acquired increasingly negatively connotations among the ahl
al- adīth, traditionists who accused the proponents of raʾy (ahl al-raʾy) of abandoning
Prophetic traditions in favor of their own reasoning.802 Although reliance on raʾy was
primarily associated with the proto-Ḥanafī school, al-Ṭaḥāwī shared with the ahl aladīth a commitment to legal argument based on adīth; he is widely acknowledged as
having provided Ḥanafī positive law a basis in adīth.803 Despite his commitment to
adīth, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not share in the ahl al- adīth’s attacks on raʾy as
unregulated human reason. Instead, he fully identifies raʾy with ijtihād, an authorized
and, indeed, commendable process in which legal reasoning is employed not in
competition with revelation, but rather in service to it. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s rare criticisms of raʾy
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therefore attack jurists who rely on raʾy in situations where it is not authorized, rather
than rejecting raʾy itself.804
In contrast to raʾy, the terms isti hrāj (extraction) and istinbāṭ (derivation) appear
most frequently when al-Ṭaḥāwī is expressing a binary opposition between tawqīf and
legal reasoning, as discussed above. Like raʾy, isti hrāj and istinbāṭ are closely related to
ijtihād; they describe the process of a jurist deriving positive legal rules from revealed
sources or from other known rules. In the introduction to Shar mushkil al-āthār, for
example, al-Ṭaḥāwī states that one of his objectives is to derive (istakhraja) rules of law
from Prophetic adīth.805 When he approves of the results of someone’s legal reasoning,
al-Ṭaḥāwī sometimes praises it as a good ( asan, laṭīf) isti hrāj from a particular
source.806 Al-Ṭaḥāwī uses isti hrāj and istinbāṭ synonymously, sometimes switching
between them when describing a single act of derivation.807 Broadly speaking, al-Ṭaḥāwī
employs the terms isti hrāj or istinbāṭ in cases where he explicitly discusses the text or
rule upon which a process of legal reasoning is based; if he is merely conveying the result
of legal reasoning, he prefers the term raʾy. Isti hrāj and istinbāṭ are thus not technical
terms indicating a specific variety of legal reasoning, but are rather general labels for the
process by which jurists derive the law from its sources in the absence of Prophetic
tawqīf.
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Naẓar and Qiyās
While al-Ṭaḥāwī uses the terms raʾy, isti hrāj and istinbāṭ primarily in reference
to others’ acts of legal reasoning, he largely reserves naẓar and qiyās to label his own
interpretive endeavors. Naẓar, which had served among early jurists as a general term for
systematic reasoning, had already by the time of Ibn Qutayba come to be associated
specifically with the systematic reasoning of the speculative theologians ( uta alli ūn)
and of the Muʿtazilīs in particular.808 Naẓar in the sense of systematic reasoning was later
adopted into the mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition; al-Jaṣṣāṣ argues in al-Fuṣūl for the
obligation to use naẓar to establish matters such as the unity of God and the existence of
a wise creator (ṣāniʿ a ī ).809 For al-Ṭaḥāwī, in contrast, naẓar is always directed
toward deriving a legal rule or interpreting a revealed text on the basis of other texts and
previously established rules.810 Indeed, naẓar is distinguishable from ijtihād in alṬaḥāwī’s thought only by the context in which he employs each term: he appeals to
ijtihād in all of his theoretical discussions establishing the permissibility of legal
reasoning, but he labels his own acts of reasoning naẓar.811
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Naẓar plays a major role in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works; in Shar

aʿānī al-

āthār, almost every chapter contains a section in which al-Ṭaḥāwī supports his
conclusions by appealing to naẓar. Within the chapters of Shar

aʿānī al-āthār and

elsewhere in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works, naẓar has two major functions. First, it provides a
resolution when al-Ṭaḥāwī is otherwise unable to resolve a conflict between revealed
texts or between competing opinions on how a text should be interpreted.812 Second, even
when al-Ṭaḥāwī is able to resolve a conflict satisfactorily by other means, he routinely
demonstrates that naẓar would have led him to reach the same conclusion.813 That is not
to say that al-Ṭaḥāwī claims that the results of legal reasoning are identical to revelation
in every case; in a small number of chapters, he notes the conflict between the rule stated
in a Prophetic adīth and the results of legal reasoning, while affirming his own
commitment to adīth.814 Nonetheless, the preponderance of chapters in which al-Ṭaḥāwī
confirms a rule found in revelation by appealing to legal reasoning suggests that, overall,
al-Ṭaḥāwī understands the law as a coherent, internally consistent system.
In most passages mentioning naẓar, al-Ṭaḥāwī simply makes an argument based
on legal reasoning without labeling his techniques further.815 In other passages, however,
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he calls his reasoning qiyās.816 Al-Ṭaḥāwī does not define qiyās in his extant works, and
he makes only a few comments on its proper use: qiyās must be used when no evidence
for a question is found in the Qurʾān, Sunna or consensus;817 qiyās is obligatory for
matters on which we do not have tawqīf (instruction);818 punishments cannot be
determined through qiyās, only through tawqīf;819 linguistic knowledge is not subject to
analogy.820 These few theoretical statements place some limits on the use of qiyās and
affirm that it is to be used in the situations in which al-Ṭaḥāwī also affirms the use of raʾy
and ijtihād.
In the absence of any definition or classification of qiyās, however, we must look
to its use in context in order to compare al-Ṭaḥāwī’s understanding of qiyās to that of
other jurists. For this purpose, al-Shāfiʿī’s typology of qiyās serves as a useful starting
point. In the Risāla, al-Shāfiʿī identifies three kinds of qiyās: causal analogy, the analogy
of resemblance and the a fortiori argument.821 My analysis of the arguments that alṬaḥāwī labels qiyās shows that he concurs with al-Shāfiʿī in labeling all of the above
arguments qiyās, and also adds a fourth type: the disjunctive syllogism. My analysis
further shows that naẓar is functionally equivalent to qiyās for al-Ṭaḥāwī; every kind of
argument that he labels naẓar is also sometimes called qiyās, and vice versa.
816

The term qiyās is often translated as ‘analogy’ (e.g., Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, 2).
However, for many jurists, including al-Ṭaḥāwī, qiyās encompassed a number of non-analogical
arguments, and only certain types of analogy constituted permissible qiyās. For that reason, I leave the term
un-translated here. On the meaning of qiyās, see Wael Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni
Juridical Qiyās,” Arabica 36, no. 3 (1989): 286-289.
817
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 10.142; Mushkil, 15.230 mentions Qurʾān and Sunna only.
818
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Mushkil, 8.427.
819
Al-Ṭaḥāwī, Maʿānī, 3.152. It is generally held among jurists that punishments, enumerations of
quantities and basic ritual matters cannot be the basis of analogy.
820
Al-Ṭaḥāwī,
ā , 1.240.
821
Al-Shāfiʿī, Risāla, 16, 238. On al-Shāfiʿī’s discussion of qiyās, see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory,
149-163; Schacht, Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence, 122-126; Hallaq, History of Islamic Legal
Theories, 29.

265
In some passages, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s appeals to qiyās and naẓar take the form of causal
analogy (qiyās al- aʿnā, qiyās al-ʿilla), a type of argument in which jurists identify the
reason ( aʿnā, ʿilla) behind a legal injunction and then apply that injunction in a new
case. For instance, jurists debate the case of a man who has entered into a state of i rā
(ritual purification) while wearing a qa īṣ, a garment prohibited during i rā . Some
jurists hold that he must cut off the qa īṣ, because removing the garment in the normal
way means briefly covering the head, another action prohibited during i rā . By
examining the known rules for a variety of situations involving covering the head during
i rā , al-Ṭaḥāwī determines that the prohibition falls only on garments specifically worn
on the head, such as a turban. Since the head is not ‘wearing’ (lābis) the qa īṣ during its
removal, there is no prohibition.822 In this example, al-Ṭaḥāwī explicitly identifies the
cause of the prohibition—donning an item of clothing meant to be worn on the head—
and determines that it does not apply to the new case. Therefore, the prohibition of one
does not entail the prohibition of the other.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī makes the above argument without employing any of the technical
terms—aṣl (the original case), farʿ (the new case), ʿilla/ aʿnā (the cause of the ruling) or
ukm (the ruling)—that mature legal theorists would rely upon to describe formally the
structure of causal analogies. Most of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s other appeals to causal analogy are
similarly non-technical, although he uses the term ukm regularly, both in the context of
qiyās and more generally. In a limited number of passages, al-Ṭaḥāwī does employ the
terms aṣl and ʿilla in the context of qiyās although their usage seems still to be informal
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and so they may not yet represent technical terms specific to qiyās in his usage.823 More
frequently, al-Ṭaḥāwī introduces qiyās using non-technical terms to suggest equivalence
between two cases. These terms include mithl (the like of something), a/ a ā (like, as)
and istawā (to be equivalent to).824
Further, in many, if not most examples of causal analogies, al-Ṭaḥāwī does not
explicitly state the shared rationale that allows him to transfer a rule to the new case. For
instance, al-Ṭaḥāwī analogizes concerning whether a Muslim must make the same
recompense for causing bodily harm to a non-Muslim who has concluded a treaty with
the Muslims, as he would to a Muslim. He observes that Muslims are forbidden to harm
either the body or the property of such a person, but that harm to both was permitted to
Muslims before the non-Muslim concluded his treaty. We know that a Muslim who steals
the property of someone with such a treaty is subject to the add punishment for theft.
Therefore, someone who causes bodily harm to such a person should also be subject to
the same punishments as if they had harmed a Muslim.825 From this passage, we may
infer that the concluding of a treaty is the cause of being protected by the law in the same
way that Muslims are protected, although al-Ṭaḥāwī never states that cause directly.
Instead, here and in most of his analogical arguments, al-Ṭaḥāwī emphasizes the multiple
legal effects common to two cases as a reason for bringing all of the rulings related to
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them into alignment. That is, his analogical arguments rely on the identification of
consistency of legal effects more than they emphasize the rationale of a specific ruling. 826
In addition to causal analogy, al-Ṭaḥāwī also labels other types of argument qiyās.
In this, al-Ṭaḥāwī is at odds with the mature legal theory tradition, in which causal
analogy was the predominant form of qiyās.827 More importantly, the mature Ḥanafī
tradition would insist that causal analogy was the only valid form of qiyās; although
Ḥanafī theorists accepted some of the other forms of argument that al-Ṭaḥāwī labeled
qiyās, they classified them as linguistic or rational inferences (istidlāl).828 In addition to
causal analogy, al-Ṭaḥāwī relies on the analogy of resemblance (qiyās al-shabah), a type
of argument identified and defended by al-Shāfiʿī and later disputed within the Shāfiʿī
school.829 As al-Shāfiʿī describes it, the analogy of resemblance consists of determining
which of two known cases a new case more closely resembles in order to apply the ruling
from the most relevant case to the new case.830 Whereas causal analogy relates two cases
in terms of the reason behind the ruling in each, the analogy of similarity is concerned
with the likeness of the things to which the rule is applied.
In a clear example of the analogy of similarity, al-Ṭaḥāwī describes how the
dispute between scholars concerning the amount and timing of a āt (alms) due on waraq
826
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(coined silver, sheets of metal) hinges upon whether waraq is more similar (ashbah) to
herds of animals or to agricultural produce. Proponents of analogizing waraq to
agricultural produce point out that both produce and waraq are weighed in determining
a āt, while animals are counted. Their opponents retort that a minor or a mentally
incompetent person is required to pay a āt on agricultural produce from land they own,
just as if they were a legally competent adult. However, such individuals are exempted
from the normal alms requirement for both waraq and livestock. Therefore, waraq is
more similar to livestock for the purposes of determining a āt.831
Less frequently, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s appeals to qiyās take the form a fortiori
arguments.832 Jurists as early as Abū Ḥanīfa argued that the prohibition of a small degree
of something entails the prohibition of a larger degree of it, just as permission for a large
degree of something entails permission for a smaller degree of it. In considering the a
fortiori argument a form of qiyās,833 however, al-Ṭaḥāwī stands apart from later Ḥanafīs,
most of whom classified it as a language-based inference.834 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ treats a fortiori
arguments in his chapter on textual implications (dalīl al-khiṭāb), while al-Sarakhsī
emphasizes that no rational inference is needed to understand this kind of meaning from a
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text.835 In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī is in agreement with both early Ḥanafīs and al-Shāfiʿī in
treating a fortiori claims as a form of rational argument.836
In the course of his hermeneutical works, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs the a fortiori
argument in both its a minore ad maius and a maiore ad minus forms. In one example of
the former, al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that if clasping the hands in front of oneself is praiseworthy
in supererogatory prayers as a posture of humility ( hushūʿ), it is likewise praiseworthy
during obligatory prayers, because humility is even more appropriate (awlā) there.837 An
example of the latter is found in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s response to al-Shāfiʿī’s claim that fasting
during seclusion in a mosque (iʿti āf) is optional. Al-Shāfiʿī argues that scholars’
agreement that the uʿta if (a person in a state of iʿti āf) does not fast at night, and yet
remains in iʿti āf, indicates that fasting is not necessary to enter into iʿti āf. Al-Ṭaḥāwī
retorts that the uʿta if may leave the mosque to relieve himself without canceling his
iʿti āf, although he may not enter into iʿti āf while outside a mosque. If exiting the
mosque does not cancel iʿti āf, then even more so (a rā) should the arrival of night (and
the concomitant end to fasting) not affect his iʿti āf, because the first is an action taken
by him while the second is not of his own volition. Therefore, the permissibility of
certain events or actions during iʿti āf cannot serve as evidence for what is required to
enter into the state initially.838
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Although the passages above do not fully conform to the a fortiori argument as
described by legal theorists in that they do not involve different degrees of a single
permitted or prohibited action, they are nonetheless closely related to classical
descriptions of the a fortiori argument in that they concern the permissibility of actions.
In other passages, however, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs the same language (awlā, a rā) to
determine not the permissibility of actions but the applicability of a rule to a group. 839 For
example, al-Ṭaḥāwī observes that a man who acknowledges having had sexual
intercourse with his wife may still deny paternity of her child. Therefore, it is even more
so the case (a rā) that a man who acknowledges having had sexual intercourse with his
slave may deny paternity of his slave’s child.840 That is, the rule for husbands also applies
to men owning concubines. In this passage, as in most a fortiori arguments of this type,
al-Ṭaḥāwī does not state explicitly what it is about the new group that makes the rule
even more appropriate than in its original application, although the connection between
the two cases is generally simple to work out. In this case, for instance, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
argument hinges on the relative statuses of wives and concubines. In contrast, al-Ṭaḥāwī
states his reasoning explicitly when arguing that men may not cover their faces with their
garments while in a state of i rā (ritual consecration). He observes that women are not
permitted to cover their faces during i rā , even though women are permitted to cover
more than men while in that state. Therefore, it is even more so that case that men may
not cover their faces.841 Here, al-Ṭaḥāwī reasons that, given what we know about
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women’s wider latitude to cover themselves in i rā , a rule that prohibits a particular
garment to women is even more appropriately applied to men.
To this point, the arguments that al-Ṭaḥāwī has labeled qiyās have followed the
division proposed by al-Shāfiʿī in the Risāla. However, al-Ṭaḥāwī also employs a fourth
form of argument under the heading of qiyās: the disjunctive syllogism. In one example,
al-Ṭaḥāwī argues that, although Muḥammad, Abū Bakr and ʿUmar all shortened their
prayers during the Hajj while halting at Minā, residents and imams of Mecca do not
shorten their prayers, because their travel does not meet the length requirement for
shortening prayer. Qiyās requires this conclusion, al-Ṭaḥāwī writes, because Muḥammad,
Abū Bakr and ʿUmar can only have shortened their prayer for one of three reasons (lā
ya hlū in aʿnā in thalāthat aʿānin): the length of their travel, their participation in
the Hajj or the place they were in (i.e., Minā). There is no other possibility. He continues:
We considered whether the shortening might be because of the place itself, but
found that scholars agree that non-pilgrims do not shorten their prayers [at Minā],
and so we knew that God’s Messenger and his Companions cannot have
shortened their prayer for that reason. Then we considered whether the shortening
was due to the pilgrimage. However, we found that pilgrims from Minā do not
shorten their prayers at Minā during the pilgrimage, and so we knew that they
cannot have shortened their prayers because of the pilgrimage. Because those two
reasons have been eliminated as the cause for their shortening their prayers and
only one other reason—travel—remains, we know that they shortened their
prayers because of the length of their travel.842
This argument follows the form of a disjunctive syllogism. First, al-Ṭaḥāwī establishes a
list of possible causes for the Prophet’s actions and claims exhaustiveness for it. Next, he
excludes all but one possibility. Finally, he affirms that the remaining possibility must be
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true, without needing to provide any other evidence to support his claim. Arguments of
this form appear regularly in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutic works.843
To date, little has been written on disjunctive syllogisms within Islamic legal
thought before al-Ghazālī. Among later theorists, the disjunctive syllogism would come
to be known as al-sabr wa-l-taqsī (“probing and division”), and its validity as a method
for determining the ʿilla (effective cause) of an analogy would be accepted by many
jurists, although it was rejected except in a very limited form by almost all Ḥanafīs.844
Hallaq suggests that this form of argument was assimilated into legal thought in the
4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries from Greek logic, although most jurists did not label it a
form of qiyās.845 Larry Miller, in contrast, associates the disjunctive syllogism and other
techniques from the Greek logical tradition with 6th/12th-century jurists beginning with alGhazālī.846
It is unlikely, however, that the regular appearance of arguments in the form of
the disjunctive syllogism in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works is evidence of an earlier
incorporation of Greek logic into jurisprudence than has until now been assumed. Indeed,
there are important differences between al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of the disjunctive syllogism and
the way it in which it is discussed by later jurists. For example, Miller has analyzed a
manuscript of the Muqaddima of Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 684/1286) in which the
disjunctive syllogism is described in terms of the logical incompatibility of P and Q.847 In
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contrast, in the example concerning shortening prayers during the Hajj discussed above
and in other passages employing disjunctive syllogisms, al-Ṭaḥāwī is not arguing based
on the logical incompatibility of the premises, but rather on the fact that they are premises
that the community has agreed upon. That is, there are three reasons that jurists have
identified as possible explanations for why Muḥammad, Abū Bakr and ʿUmar shortened
their prayers, and al-Ṭaḥāwī’s argument rests on the assumption that one of those
explanations must be correct. That assumption in turn appears closely connected to
notions of a kind of consensus (ij āʿ) that encompasses known juristic disagreements,
and to the insistence of many jurists that, once established, such disagreements cannot be
expanded to permit new opinions.848 While the formal features of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments
may thus closely resemble those of later scholars who embraced Greek logic, the
assumptions underlying his arguments are quite different. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s use of the
disjunctive argument is therefore probably best understood within the context of the preAristotelian logic juristic dialectical movement identified by Walter Young and
embracing jurists including al-Shāfiʿī.849
In total, then, al-Ṭaḥāwī employs four clearly identifiable types of argument
under the heading of qiyās, only one of which would be recognized as qiyās by later
members of his legal school. Rather than concluding that al-Ṭaḥāwī conceives of qiyās as
consisting of four types of argument, however, it would be more accurate to say that he
uses the term qiyās as a general label for the kind of rational argument that he believed
God had licensed jurists to employ in determining the law. It is not apparent from al848
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Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works that he clearly differentiates between different types of arguments;
indeed, it is frequently difficult to assign particular examples of his qiyās to one of the
four categories mentioned above. Where both al-Shāfiʿī and later jurists are concerned
with classifying and defining qiyās, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s primary concern is the harmony between
qiyās and legal rulings found in revealed texts.

Isti sān (Departure fro Qiyās)
In al-I ā fī uṣūl al-a ā , Ibn Ḥazm names al-Ṭaḥāwī as his only example of a
Ḥanafī jurist who rejected isti sān, a hermeneutical procedure closely associated with the
Ḥanafīs in which jurists depart from the results of their qiyās because they consider
another position better (ista sana, lit., to deem good).850 Ibn Ḥazm denounces isti sān as
a practice devoid of any proof from revelation (burhān) and one that allows jurists to
follow their own whims in rejecting any inconvenient or undesirable results of qiyās.851
The critique of isti sān was first articulated by al-Shāfiʿī in al-Risāla and Ibṭāl alisti sān.852 Al-Shāfiʿī emphasizes that qiyās is a procedure based upon evidence from
revelation; isti sān, in contrast, is simply an invention by the jurist without any basis in
revelation. If jurists may depart from divinely-sanctioned qiyās, then they may as well
devise their own legal rulings in cases where no text has been revealed.853 For al-Shāfiʿī,
then, isti sān represents a rejection of the authority of revelation. This understanding of
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isti sān is in turn the consequence of al-Shāfiʿī’s larger project of anchoring all law in
revelation.854 For the early Iraqi jurists among whom isti sān first become a technical
term denoting departure from qiyās on the basis of some other important consideration,855
however, it was not yet apparent that qiyās was binding to the exclusion of other kinds of
authority.856
Like al-Shāfiʿī, al-Ṭaḥāwī is committed to the idea that all law must be derived
from revelation and, further, that no true conflict can exist between sources of legal
authority. It is therefore instructive to examine how he treats isti sān, a procedure
condemned by al-Shāfiʿī but closely associated with al-Ṭaḥāwī’s fellow Ḥanafī jurists.857
In fact, none of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant works contain any statement of principle in support or
rejection of isti sān; if Ibn Ḥazm based his report on al-Ṭaḥāwī’s own statement, then the
work in which that statement appeared is presumably lost to us. It is also possible that Ibn
Ḥazm (or his source) based his conclusions on the almost total absence of any mention of
isti sān in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s hermeneutical works. I have identified only a single passage in
which al-Ṭaḥāwī uses the term isti sān in a technical sense. In a chapter of Shar mushkil
al-āthār on whether the qārin (a pilgrim combining the Hajj and ʿUmra) must perform
854
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the required circumambulations of the Kaaba for each type of pilgrimage individually, alṬaḥāwī writes that Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī held that qiyās led to a
certain conclusion, but they professed a different position on the basis of isti sān. AlṬaḥāwī’s response is telling:
We do not agree with them; rather, we hold that qiyās obligates what they held to
be isti sān.858
Al-Ṭaḥāwī here avoids either accepting or condemning isti sān by arguing instead that
the position of his Ḥanafī predecessors is, in fact, supported by qiyās.
Mentions of isti sān appear considerably more frequently in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
Mukhtaṣar, an epitome of Ḥanafī positive law.859 The Mukhtaṣar, like al-Ṭaḥāwī’s
hermeneutical works, contains no statement of principle accepting or rejecting isti sān. A
similar reticence is apparent here, however. When al-Ṭaḥāwī’s Ḥanafī predecessors
disagree on whether to follow the results of qiyās or to base their position on isti sān, alṬaḥāwī habitually states his agreement with the position based on qiyās.860 In cases
where his Ḥanafī predecessors unanimously agree that the ruling should be based on
isti sān rather than qiyās, he refrains from adding the affirmation “[I] adopt this position”
(wa-bihi naʾ hudh), so common within the pages of the Mukhtaṣar.861
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s treatment (or absence of treatment) of isti sān both in Shar
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al-āthār and in his Mukhtaṣar suggests considerable discomfort with the procedure, but
also an unwillingness to publicly oppose a technique so closely associated with the
Ḥanafīs. Later Ḥanafīs, too, would become subject to pressure from the criticism of
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isti sān when the principle that law must be based in revelation came to be widely
accepted, including by the Ḥanafīs themselves.862 In contrast to al-Ṭaḥāwī, Ḥanafī legal
theorists of the mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition would respond to criticism of isti sān not by
silence but rather by reimagining isti sān to conform to mature uṣūl expectations about
revelation as the basis for all law. Ḥanafīs including al-Jaṣṣāṣ and al-Sarakhsī would
vehemently deny that isti sān is based on the jurist’s whim; instead, they argued, it is a
divinely-sanctioned method for determining the correct solution when the initial results
of qiyās do not produce the objectively correct answer, or else for determining the correct
way to proceed when a question can be approached through competing analogies.863
Despite the differences between their approaches, both al-Ṭaḥāwī and later Ḥanafī jurists
share the objective of accommodating their hermeneutics to changing conceptions of
legal authority without directly criticizing the Ḥanafī tradition.
In this chapter I have examined a number of key hermeneutical topics discussed
theoretically or put into practice in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works. The list of topics covered is far
from exhaustive, however; much work remains to be done on subjects including alṬaḥāwī’s isnād and matn criticism, his analysis of figurative language, and his overall
approach to adīth harmonization, among others. In selecting the topics that I have, I
have tried to suggest how al-Ṭaḥāwī draws connections between the different aspects of
his hermeneutics such that every idea is bound to one fundamental, underlying binary:
that between mu a / utashābih and tawqīf/ray. In analyzing each topic, I have also
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noted where al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought most closely resembles that of earlier jurists during the
formative period, and where it anticipates the mature uṣūl tradition that would be firmly
established within fifty years of his death. Writing at the very end of the formative
period, al-Ṭaḥāwī is a transitional figure, and a close examination of how he defines
hermeneutical concepts and employs them in context provides important information
about how legal thought changed during this critical period. Notably, although al-Ṭaḥāwī
anticipates the mature uṣūl tradition in important ways, we have seen in this chapter that
al-Ṭaḥāwī’s thought is more often closest to that of al-Shāfiʿī, even if not to the extent or
in the same way that previous analyses have suggested.
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Conclusion

When I embarked upon this study, I hoped to piece together the uṣūl al-fiqh work
that the Egyptian Ḥanafī jurist, traditionist and theologian Abū Jaʿfar Aḥmad al-Ṭaḥāwī
(d. 321/933) would have written, had he composed a work in that genre. During the year
that I spent reading al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant oeuvre, I had been struck by the wide range of
discussions on the interpretation and relative authority of legal sources in three of alṬaḥāwī’s major works,

ā al-Qurʾān, Shar

aʿānī al-āthār and Shar mushkil al-

āthār. Although the discussions in question were scattered and brief, ranging from a
sentence to a few paragraphs in most cases, they encompassed almost all of the major
topics of a mature uṣūl al-fiqh work. By analyzing these passages and bringing them into
dialogue with each other, it seemed, I could shed light on the development of uṣūl al-fiqh
in the late 3rd/9th and early 4th/10th centuries, a crucial period of transformation from
formative to post-formative Islamic law, but one that remains largely opaque to
researchers due to the paucity of surviving sources.
It quickly became apparent, however, that what I was piecing together was not an
uṣūl work. Instead, these passages in

ā al-Qurʾān, Shar

aʿānī al-āthār and Shar

mushkil al-āthār represented a different kind of intellectual activity. Where works of the
uṣūl al-fiqh genre are primarily interested in elaborating an elegant system by bringing
principles of legal theory into relationship with each other, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s three works are
concerned with the relationship between individual revealed texts and specific theoretical
principles. In all of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s extant oeuvre, only the seven-page introduction to

ā
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al-Qurʾān makes any attempt to bring a coherent structure to a set of theoretical
principles, and even there al-Ṭaḥāwī does not aim at a complete account of legal theory.
That is not to say that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory lacks coherence; he invokes the same
concepts and principles repeatedly across his works, often using the same language, and
these concepts and principles are not in conflict with each other. However, the drive to
identify or elaborate an overarching, complete system characteristic of mature uṣūl alfiqh works as well as the earlier Risāla of al-Shāfiʿī, is simply not a major feature of alṬaḥāwī’s interest in legal theory. Neither are al-Ṭaḥāwī’s three works comparable to
earlier or later works of fiqh, which cite principles of legal theory in the course of setting
out the rules of positive law, but without explaining or justifying those principles.
Instead, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s discussions of legal theory appear in the context of an
intellectual project and form of writing that I have termed ‘practical hermeneutics,’
whose major theological concern is to affirm the essential coherence and
comprehensibility of the Divine Message by demonstrating how God’s intent may be
derived from revealed sources. In the field of law, which is the exclusive topic of Shar
aʿānī al-āthār and

ā al-Qurʾān and a major topic in Shar mushkil al-āthār,

practical hermeneutics additionally affirms that God’s intent in fact has been derived
from revelation by showing how established rules of positive law are grounded in
revealed sources. In terms of their literary form, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s texts of practical
hermeneutics consist of a series of chapters in which he first adduces one or more
revealed texts and then resolves the necessary interpretive issues in order to produce a
statement of God’s intent, usually in the form of a rule of positive law. Discussions of
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legal theory appear where al-Ṭaḥāwī needs to justify particular, perhaps controversial,
interpretive moves.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī was not unique in composing texts of practical hermeneutics.
Surviving works by al-Shāfiʿī, Ibn Qutayba and al-Ṭabarī serve a similar function and
take a similar literary form, and it is likely that other 3rd/9th-century a ā al-Qurʾān
works, all of which are now lost, also belong to practical hermeneutics, as may other, yetto-be-identified works. Indeed, the emergence of practical hermeneutics is best
understood as a response to the particular challenges jurists faced in the late formative
period of Islamic law. By the turn of the 3rd/9th century, the rules of fiqh had been
articulated in the first major compendia, even if they were not yet stated as systematically
as they would be in later centuries. Those compendia, along with the major late 2nd/8thand early 3rd/9th-century jurists to whom they were attributed, would become associated
with the emerging madhhabs a century later, around the lifetime of al-Ṭaḥāwī.
Also in the 3rd/9th century, the rising authority of Prophetic adīth and the
growing conviction, most famously associated with al-Shāfiʿī, that all law must be based
in revealed texts, created an imperative to demonstrate that Islamic law had in fact been
derived exclusively from revelation, even if those connections had not previously been
explicitly articulated. When al-Ṭaḥāwī wrote his works of practical hermeneutics
asserting the connection between Ḥanafī fiqh and revelation at the turn of the 4th/10th
century, the Ḥanafīs were widely perceived as ahl al-raʾy, jurists whose positive law was
based on mere opinion rather than revelation. Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical
hermeneutics thus in some sense represent the culmination of a project first clearly
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articulated by al-Shāfiʿī. By tethering the fiqh of the first major Ḥanafī compendia to
revelation, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works also pave the way for the consolidation of the madhhabs in
the mid-4th/10th century.
The legal theory that emerges from al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics
is closely related to, and yet distinct from, the legal theory of the uṣūlīs. While he
addresses most of the major topics of uṣūl al-fiqh works—legal sources such as the
Qurʾān, adīth and consensus, and concepts including ijtihād, abrogation, ʿāmm: hāṣṣ,
ẓāhir:bāṭin and others—his approach to most topics is less detailed and more flexible
than that of the uṣūlīs. Where the uṣūlīs’ theological pre-commitments and desire for
comprehensiveness and elegance drive them to explore a range of subsidiary questions
for most topics, al-Ṭaḥāwī only addresses concrete interpretive problems where led to by
his sources, and then only explores topics in sufficient detail to produce a resolution of
the interpretive difficulty at hand. Indeed, the flexibility of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory
appears to be required by the project of practical hermeneutics; the corpus of revealed
sources that al-Ṭaḥāwī treats is messy and sometimes apparently conflicting. His theory,
therefore, must in some sense be responsive to the sources in front of him.
On its surface, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory assigns varying levels of authority to a
series of clearly distinguished sources of the law in the same manner as the mature uṣūl
al-fiqh tradition. Both his hermeneutical discussions and his repeated appeals to the list
‘Qurʾān, Sunna, consensus’ imply a hierarchy among three major sources of interpretive
authority. In cases where no guidance is found in these three sources, al-Ṭaḥāwī tells us,
we must look to ijtihād or qiyās. Although they do not generally appear in his lists of
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legal sources, post-Prophetic adīths and ʿamal also constitute sources of law. For alṬaḥāwī then, the relative authority of sources ostensibly depends on their formal
characteristics. Degrees of legal authority are assigned to entire categories of sources. In
this way, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s rhetoric concerning the sources of the law anticipates that of the
mature uṣūl al-fiqh tradition.
A closer examination of his hermeneutical arguments, however, reveals that alṬaḥāwī attributes authority to individual textual and non-textual sources in ways that
cannot be predicted based upon this hierarchy. Companion adīths and instances of
consensus are frequently claimed to represent revelational authority sufficient to compete
with that of an established Prophetic adīth, while at other times a Prophetic adīth is
deemed merely to convey Muḥammad’s personal opinion and is thereby stripped entirely
of its authority as a binding legal source. Each of these interpretive moves rests upon an
underlying binary concept of legal authority which draws a crucial distinction between
knowledge that might permissibly be reached by inference, and knowledge that can only
have come from revelation. Where a Companion states an opinion or jurists reach
consensus on a rule that al-Ṭaḥāwī claims may not permissibly be based upon inference,
he accepts implicitly that the rule must originally have been based upon revelational
instruction, even if that instruction is not indicated in the source. This binary is often
made explicit in al-Ṭaḥāwī’s arguments about the status of post-Prophetic adīth, where
he appeals to the terms tawqīf (Prophetic instruction) and raʾy (inference). In other areas,
such as the status of consensus and some Prophetic adīths, the same binary is latent in
his arguments.
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The authority that al-Ṭaḥāwī grants any given source, then, is not a function of its
formal characteristics, but rather the result of a judgment about content and origins. In the
body of this study I have noted places where al-Ṭaḥāwī offers rules concerning the types
of legal rulings that require revelational instruction. However, the rules he enumerates are
far from adequate to account for all the cases in which al-Ṭaḥāwī claims Prophetic
authority for non-Prophetic legal sources. I have further argued that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s elevation
of non-Prophetic sources to Prophetic status appears to stem from a sincere deference to
the special knowledge of the Companions and the Successors, as evidenced by his
willingness to depart from Ḥanafī law in order to comply with Companion legislative
statements. Nonetheless, in the absence of a comprehensive set of principles defining
exactly which types of Companion legislative statements or juristic consensus require
tawqīf, the declaration that any particular statement must be based on an original tawqīf
is, at its core, arbitrary.
Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s legal theory does not aspire to the same type of formalism as that
aspired to by later uṣūlīs; as I have demonstrated, only hints of a linguistic formalism
appear in his arguments. Nonetheless, the literary form of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of
hermeneutics, moving inexorably from text to law, is designed to imply that a known
hierarchy of sources and a predictable set of hermeneutical principles allow jurists to
derive the law from revelation. Yet, within his arguments, al-Ṭaḥāwī sometimes invokes
the instruction/inference binary in ways that reveal that those hermeneutical principles
are in fact malleable and dependent on his determination of whether a particular
legislative statement represents instruction or inference.
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Al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics thus represent crucial sources for
conceptualizing the relationship between legal theory and positive law in the Islamic
legal tradition. While works of uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh largely separate legal theory and
positive law into distinct genres, al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works of practical hermeneutics represent a
separate, hybrid genre that portrays legal theory in action, if not precisely the legal theory
of the later uṣūl tradition. Taken at face value, his works show that the Ḥanafīs are not, in
fact, ahl al-raʾy, and that their fiqh is grounded in revelation. The idea of ‘portrayal’ is,
however, fundamental to al-Ṭaḥāwī’s project. Although his works purport to show how
law was derived from revelation, they are in fact ex post facto recreations of a process
whose historicity cannot be proven by his works alone. There is thus an unresolved
tension between the literary form of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works and their function in providing a
retrospective justification of Ḥanafī fiqh.
The evidence that al-Ṭaḥāwī’s works offer concerning the relationship between
legal theory and positive law is, therefore, ambiguous. At multiple points in his works, alṬaḥāwī adheres to his stated hermeneutical principles at the cost of failing to support an
established rule of Ḥanafī fiqh. However, the flexibility of his legal theory in most cases
allows him to claim support from his hermeneutics for Ḥanafī law. It is neither the case
that his legal theory fully determines his positions on positive law, nor that his positive
law is always advanced at the cost of his hermeneutical principles. In the end, perhaps
texts of practical hermeneutics are best understood as a meeting point in which revealed
text and law are brought together by means of a hermeneutic of sufficient flexibility to
accommodate them both.
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